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ABSTRACT 
Moral events and the actions, decisions and people they involve, are judged as 
right or wrong, and the moral responsibility associated with them generates further 
judgments, often legal in nature, of blame and punishment or praise.  Not only do moral 
events and the normative judgments they presuppose define essential aspects of human 
nature, they are also ubiquitous at the level of society as well as the individual.  Despite 
their importance, characterizing the sociological, psychological, and neurological features 
of moral events is in its infancy.  Much of the recent research has focused on a priori 
philosophical frameworks and has used artificial events as probes, in part because 
collecting, characterizing and analyzing real-life moral events is a major undertaking.  
This dissertation attempts such an undertaking. 
758 autobiographical memories of personal moral events were collected from a 
well-characterized and representative sample of 100 healthy Californian adults.  
Transcriptions of the events were further characterized and all data were entered into a 
large, searchable database.  An initial set of results provides a detailed description of the 
participants and the memories of moral events they generated.  This description showed 
that participants were highly representative of the general population of California; that 
the overall amount and patterns of moral events recollected was relatively universal and 
not influenced by gender, ethnicity, IQ, or personality; and that the moral events 
produced could generally be judged quite reliably both by the participants themselves as 
well as by independent raters. 
The database was further analyzed with respect to three specific aims:  (1) to 
study the semantic structure of real-life moral events; (2) to study the effects of focal 
  vi 
lesions to emotion-related brain regions on recollection of moral events; (3) to study the 
temporal distribution of autobiographical moral events.  We found that real-life moral 
events have a hierarchical structure, with two broad categories of “good” and “bad”, and 
subordinate categories of “good”, “lying”, “stealing”, and “hurting another person”.  
These categories define the most common scripts encountered in real life that have strong 
moral value.  In studying neurological patients with focal lesions to the ventromedial 
prefrontal cortex or the amygdala, we found no evidence for a notable skew in the moral 
events that were recollected, further evidence for the universality and robustness of such 
events in our autobiography.  Finally, we found that positively valenced moral events 
were systematically recalled as being more recent in time than negatively valenced moral 
events, a temporal bias that was independent of absolute participant age.  The methods 
used here, the database that was constructed, and the scientific questions that were 
analyzed constitute the first comprehensive investigation of a large number of real-life 
moral events and provide a rich resource for future studies. 
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Chapter 1: Review of the Literature 
 
 
The events that constitute our autobiography largely define who we are 
individually and what we have experienced, making them of prime importance in 
developmental and social psychology.  Closely intertwined with the events that actually 
transpired – and of necessity linked in the studies described in this dissertation – are our 
memories of them.  The events we are able to recollect form the explicit part of our 
autobiographical memory and the part most amenable to experimental investigation, 
although they are a filtered version of the entirety of events we actually experienced.   
This dissertation thus concerns two large topics: morality and memory, and 
investigates their intersection.  This introductory chapter reviews some of the literature 
pertinent to each of these topics.  I begin with a brief overview of philosophical views 
about morality, because this provides an important backdrop both for the way we as 
scientists may think about the data I will show, but also because the data themselves may 
well be influenced by philosophical, moral views that participants hold.  This first section 
will also bring out a key point that motivated my study and that makes the data produced 
especially valuable for future experiments: there are several philosophical theories of 
morality (not to speak of psychological theories, of which there are also several).  There 
is little agreement on how to structure moral events or how best to probe moral reasoning 
or judgment.  One response to this situation is the data of this dissertation, which sought 
to characterize the moral events that people actually experience in everyday life and 
which now provides an organized database from which well-characterized, rated and 
veridical moral vignettes could be drawn as future experimental stimuli. 
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After reviewing some of the philosophical views on morality, I very briefly 
summarize some of the psychological views before going on to review in more detail 
current work in cognitive neuroscience that attempts to look at the neural substrates of 
moral processing.  This most recent work in cognitive neuroscience also relates back to 
the philosophical and psychological theories that are presumably informed by the 
neuroscience data. I conclude with a quick review of autobiographical memory, a huge 
topic in its own right and not the primary focus of this dissertation.   
 
Section 1: Moral Philosophy 
 
We do not act rightly because we have virtue or excellence, but we rather have those 
because we have acted rightly.     – Aristotle  
 
Moral Philosophy: 
 Moral philosophy can be divided into three branches: metaethics, normative 
ethics and applied ethics1. Metaethics addresses broad philosophical questions about the 
role and meaning of ethical principles; normative ethics describes the framework of 
human moral standards; and applied ethics uses the concepts of metaethics and the 
framework of normative ethics to solve current social ethical dilemmas. While metaethics 
and applied ethics are interesting topics in moral philosophy, it is normative ethics that 
provides the intersection between moral philosophy and neuroscience that drives this 
work. (It also provides an intersection between moral philosophy and moral psychology, 
                                                 
1 Fieser, J. (2006). "Ethics." from http://www.iep.utm.edu/e/ethics.htm . 
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as described by Anscombe2.) Thought experiments in moral philosophy, particularly ‘The 
Trolley Problem’ (see Appendix A), have inspired researchers across disciplines to 
design experiments to test moral judgment and the theories of normative ethics3. 
 
Normative Ethics: 
 Normative ethics seeks to describe which actions people should believe are right 
and wrong; that is, the norms for moral behavior. It is a prescriptive discipline – rather 
than describing those actions that people do believe are right or wrong, normative ethics 
is intended to develop a system that encompasses what people should embrace as moral 
standards. It is important to understand this distinction when approaching moral 
philosophy from an experimental perspective. The three major branches of normative 
ethics are not theories seeking to be proven (moral psychology, instead, has such 
theories); they are descriptions of what philosophers believe should be. This 
understanding helps to inform the logic behind the development of the Trolley Problem 
as a thought experiment, but also undermines its use as an experimental tool.  
 In seeking to describe what moral beliefs people ought to have, three branches (or 
theories) of normative ethics have emerged: virtue ethics, consequentialism and 
deontology. Each of these describes a system of moral conduct that highlights a different 
part of a moral action. Virtue ethics focuses on the moral character of the agent who 
performs the action. The morality of an action depends on whether an agent brings 
virtues like courage or compassion to the action. Consequentialism focuses on the results 
of an action. Under this theory, the most moral action is that which brings the best 
                                                 
2 Anscombe, G. E. M. (1958). "Modern Moral Philosophy." Philosophy 33(124): 1. 
3 It is worth noting (as described in the next paragraph) that normative theories were not developed to be 
tested, but rather to prescribe what should be morally acceptable. 
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consequences. (What is ‘best’ is a question developed in detail by several 
consequentialist theories.) In consequentialism, the ends may justify the means of many 
actions. Deontology, however, focuses on the action itself4. Deontologists believe that 
actions carry with them a moral value, regardless of the agent who performs them or the 
results of the action. Under deontology, to be morally correct, some actions must always 
be performed and others must never be done. While the focus of each theory is quite 
different, the underlying desire of all normative ethics is to describe a system that uses a 
single set of principles to determine what morally ought to be done. 
 
Virtue Ethics: 
 Virtue ethics focuses around the central question, “How should I live?” or “What 
kind of person should I be?” Thus, rather than emphasizing total welfare as 
consequentialism does or the normative value of actions, virtue ethics focuses on the 
person.  Although predated by similar writings of Chinese philosophers and Plato, 
Aristotle’s ‘Nicomachean Ethics’ is thought of as the founding work in virtue ethics. 
Aristotle believed that achieving a virtuous character should be the goal for any human’s 
life5 and used this premise to develop the principles of virtue ethics: arête (virtue), 
phronesis (practical wisdom) and eudaimonia (usually translated as happiness or 
                                                 
4 Deontology is from the greek word ‘deon’ which means duty. 
5 From Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics. H. Rackham. Book 1, Ch. 7: “If then the function of man is the 
active exercise of the soul's faculties in conformity with rational principle”… “and if we declare that the 
function of man is a certain form of life, and define that form of life as the exercise of the soul's faculties 
and activities in association with rational principle, and say that the function of a good man is to perform 
these activities well and rightly, and if a function is well performed when it is performed in accordance 
with its own proper excellence – from these premises it follows that the Good of man is the active exercise 
of his soul's faculties in conformity with excellence or virtue, or if there be several human excellences or 
virtues, in conformity with the best and most perfect among them.  Moreover, to be happy takes a complete 
lifetime; for one swallow does not make spring, nor does one fine day; and similarly one day or a brief 
period of happiness does not make a man supremely blessed and happy.” 
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flourishing). The interplay of the first two – a virtuous character which is ruled by 
practical choices – leads to a eudaimon life; one that is fulfilling and good.  
 Personal character or disposition is paramount in virtue ethics. It is both the 
problem and the solution to the question, “How should I live?” To live a good life, one 
must have a virtuous character and to achieve this, one must practice virtues. Aristotle 
believed that virtuous behavior could be learned and, indeed, virtues must be repeated 
many times to become part of one’s disposition6. While some of the specifics of modern 
virtues have changed, the principle of striving for a virtuous character has remained. To 
have a virtuous character a person’s life must embody the virtue in question. For 
example, a courageous person not only is brave when faced with a dangerous 
circumstance, but is also one who teaches courage to others, who is disappointed when 
hearing about someone who is not courageous and who does not have difficulty with the 
idea of being brave in future situations. Thus, a courageous person cannot be judged by 
one action, but instead by the sum of all of her choices, beliefs and actions. In this way, a 
person’s virtuous character is a fixed part of who she is and one would expect to find this 
virtue displayed in all situations. However, humans are not perfect and this definition of a 
virtuous person necessarily suggests that this is an ideal to strive for and that most people 
will not live their lives with perfect virtue. However, since Aristotle believed that striving 
for virtue is the path to a flourishing life, it is enough, in virtue ethics, to try. 
There are thus at least two differences between virtue ethics and the 
consequentialist and deontological views that are described in more detail below.  First, 
in focusing on the person, it acknowledges real-life constraints and limitations.  It is 
                                                 
6 It is worth noting that habit alone, however, does not make one virtuous. A virtuous character must be 
developed through choice, not just habituation. Aristotle felt that becoming virtuous could take a lifetime of 
moral development. 
  6 
focused on practice as opposed to a more abstract normative stance.  Second, in focusing 
on effort and acquisition, it emphasizes learning and change, which are also not concepts 
that consequentialism or deontology have.  Arguably, these features of virtue ethics make 
it the most relevant with respect to this dissertation, since the data here speak to moral 
actions and outcomes experienced by real people in the real world – often under 
constraints and extenuating circumstances and often with subsequent regret and change in 
the person. 
 While Aristotle encouraged the development of a virtuous character, the principle 
of practical (or moral) wisdom is necessary to ensure the balance needed to be virtuous in 
all situations. Aristotle advocated that virtue lies in the mean between two extremes7. 
Courage, for example, can become foolhardiness when faced with an unbeatable danger 
or fear when faced with an intimidating challenge. Phronesis encapsulates the idea that 
knowledge and choice are integral parts of virtue. A virtuous disposition must arise out of 
choice and the application of knowledge gained through experience. In order to be 
virtuous, one must understand a situation, be able to weigh the relative merits of 
competing interests and decide upon the path that is most virtuous. The recognition of 
those factors that are morally salient can be thought of as the key to practical wisdom. 
Understanding those things that ‘matter’ allows a virtuous person to do the ‘right’ thing 
in every situation, even when the nuances of the situation may change what the correct 
action is.  Aristotle differentiates between natural virtue (as in kindness expressed by a 
child) and a virtuous character. A child, when doing the right thing, does not do so out of 
an understanding of possible choices, rather merely out of feeling. Aristotle felt 
                                                 
7 From Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics. H. Rackham. Book 2, Chapter 6: And it is a mean state between two 
vices, one of excess and one of defect. Furthermore, it is a mean state in that whereas the vices either fall 
short of or exceed what is right in feelings and in actions, virtue ascertains and adopts the mean.  
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compelled to distinguish this specifically because doing the virtuous thing without 
knowing why cannot lead to eudaimonia.  It is the combination of wisdom with a 
character that is attuned to being virtuous that leads to a life of eudaimonia.  
Eudaimonia8 is the root of most of the variance in modern virtue theories. 
Aristotle explains that eudaimonia is not merely the outcome of a virtuous life, but also 
the purpose for any human’s life. This claim comes from his idea that each item in the 
world has one primary function. Using Aristotle’s examples, a knife’s function is to cut 
and a human’s function is to reason. To this end, the purpose of a human life must be to 
reason well, thereby living a eudaimon life. This naturalistic teleological argument is part 
of the reason that virtue ethics fell out of favor during the 19th century. While modern 
virtue ethics has been split into several types9, nearly all agree that there is a link between 
virtue and eudaimonia10. However, the description and understanding of what sort of link 
it might be is the topic of a great deal of modern discussion. It is worth noting that 
modern virtue ethics encompasses more than just Aristotelian virtue ethics. Ethics of care 
and agent-based approaches to virtue ethics are interesting and emerging fields in virtue 
ethics.  
 
Consequentialism: 
 Consequentialism is based on the general principle that an action is morally 
correct when it leads to the best consequences. The details of what consequences are, 
                                                 
8 Eudaimonia is most commonly translated as ‘happiness’ or ‘flourishing’. Both translations have elements 
that capture the spirit of the word and elements that don’t. For an explanation of these, see Hursthouse, R. 
(2007). "Virtue Ethics." from http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ethics-virtue/.The literal translation is 
“having a good guardian spirit”. 
9 As many as 75 varieties! Swanton, C. (2003). 75 Virtue Ethics. International Encyclopedia of the Social 
and Behavioral Sciences, Elsevier Science. 
10 A major exception to this is Michael Slote. Slote, M. (1992). From Morality to Virtue. New York, 
Oxford University Press. 
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how one determines what the ‘best’ is, and for whom the consequences should be 
considered have lead to a great number of different types of consequentialism. Rather 
than discuss these at length, this discussion will focus on the relevant historical elements 
of consequentialism. 
The classic form of consequentialism, utilitarianism, was championed by John 
Stuart Mill11 during the 19th century (as well as by Jeremy Bentham12 and Henry 
Sidgwick during the 18th and 20th centuries, respectively). Utilitarianism is the strictest 
application of consequentialist thinking; defining all moral actions as a function of their 
utility13. Utilitarian philosophers before Mill had generally agreed that the utility of any 
action was defined by the amount of happiness that it produced. This conclusion was 
drawn from the idea that achievement of pleasure and avoidance of pain are the only true 
driving factors for human behavior and thus what is right and wrong must grow out of 
that drive. (Bentham espoused this belief so fully that he believed that the value of an 
action could be calculated by measuring the amount of pleasure that resulted, the length 
of time this pleasure lasted and so forth14.) This pleasure-driven line of thinking was 
often misrepresented by the public of Mill’s day as a purely hedonistic theory15 despite 
Bentham’s ‘greatest happiness’ principle specifically taking into consideration the 
community at large. Mill set forth to reframe utilitarian thinking in his book, 
                                                 
11 Mill, J. S. (1998). Utilitarianism New York, Oxford University Press. 
12 Bentham, J. (1961). An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation. Garden City, 
Doubleday. 
13 Utility in this sense can be thought of as the amount of satisfaction brought about by an action. 
14 Kemerling, G. (2002). "Utilitarianism." from http://www.philosophypages.com/hy/5q.htm#util. 
15 At least according to Mill, J. S. (1998). Utilitarianism New York, Oxford University Press. Ch. 2: “Yet 
the common herd, including the herd of writers, not only in newspapers and periodicals, but in books of 
weight and pretension, are perpetually falling into this shallow mistake. Having caught up the word 
utilitarian, while knowing nothing whatever about it but its sound, they habitually express by it the 
rejection, or the neglect, of pleasure in some of its forms; of beauty, of ornament, or of amusement. Nor is 
the term thus ignorantly misapplied solely in disparagement, but occasionally in compliment; as though it 
implied superiority to frivolity and the mere pleasures of the moment.” 
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Utilitarianism, as well as provide a counter-theory to moral intuition – the reigning 
theory of the day16.  
 Mill’s definition of utilitarianism can be used as the framework to discuss all 
other consequentialist theories, based on their divergence from this basic statement. 
 
“The creed which accepts as the foundation of morals, Utility, or the Greatest 
Happiness Principle, holds that actions are right in proportion as they tend to 
promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness. By 
happiness is intended pleasure, and the absence of pain; by unhappiness, pain, and 
the privation of pleasure.”17 
 
Mill specifically defines the measurement of consequences in terms of happiness – firmly 
placing utilitarianism on a track away from pure hedonism. He manages to do this 
without rejecting the idea that happiness may encompass pleasure by suggesting that 
happiness also involves the avoidance of pain. While Mill settled upon utility as the key 
to his doctrine, other philosophers began to argue that the satisfaction derived from an 
action might not be the only necessary measurement of consequences.  
Many consequentialists agree that the best outcome can mean the most happiness, 
but perhaps it is not the only value that should be considered. One of the driving 
questions of modern consequentialism is: “What is the ‘best’ consequence?” 
 
Deontology: 
                                                 
16 Again, according to Mill, J. S. (1998). Utilitarianism New York, Oxford University Press. Ch. 1: 
“…recourse to the popular theory of a natural faculty, a sense or instinct, informing us of right and wrong.” 
17 Mill, J. S. (1998). Utilitarianism New York, Oxford University Press. Ch. 2.  
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 The term ‘deontology’ is used to describe duty-based moral theories. First coined 
by C.D. Broad in 1930, the Greek words deon, meaning ‘obligation’ or ‘duty’, and telo, 
meaning ‘goal’, ‘end’ or ‘purpose’, were used to differentiate the two major ethical 
theories of his era18. (At the time virtue ethics had fallen out of favor, mainly due to 
difficulties with the naturalistic fallacy.) Deontology focuses on the obligation of an 
individual to adhere to universal moral rules, while teleology focuses on the outcome of 
an action to determine its moral value. Frequently, deontology and consequentialism are 
discussed in tandem as they are, in many ways, opposing theories. However, it is 
important to note that Broad’s distinction was slightly different from the typical contrast. 
Not all consequentialists are teleolgists19. Teleologists, in Broad’s definition are 
fundamentally concerned only about the “rightness of actions in terms of the goodness of 
the state of affairs that occurs because of that action”. This means that regardless of the 
intentions of the person who carried out the action, something that accomplishes greater 
good in the world is right. 
 Several types of deontological theories have been posited but the one most 
commonly discussed is that of Immanuel Kant20. In 1785, Kant published his theory of 
duty-based ethics, developed from the position of calculated rationality. From this 
perspective, Kant found that only one concept, ‘a good will’, could be thought of as good 
without qualification. All other good things could be dependent on circumstances, but 
                                                 
18 Broad, C. D. (1930). Five Types of Ethical Theory. New York, Harcourt, Brace and Co.: 277-278. 
19 Broad himself notes this, saying: 'Utilitarianism, in some of its forms, would be an example of 
[teleological ethics]. But [Henry] Sidgwick, though a Utilitarian, definitely rejects the view that "right" 
means "conducive to good". Broad, C. D. (1930). Five Types of Ethical Theory. New York, Harcourt, 
Brace and Co. p.278. 
20 Notable others include Samuel Pufendorf’s 17th century theories about duties to God, oneself and others; 
Divine Command Theory, put forth by 18th century Calvinists and Rene Descartes; Rights Theory 
championed by John Locke (17th century)  and Thomas Jefferson (18th century); and W.D. Ross’s (1930) 
prima facie duty theory, also known as pluralistic deontology.  
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since a good will is purely intentional, it cannot be impacted by external influences. 
Importantly, since a good will is encapsulated, even the outcome of an action guided by 
good will cannot affect it. This is a critical element of Kant’s philosophy and it is the 
main distinction between deontology and consequentialism; deontology finds that the 
consequences cannot matter in a theory of morality while consequentialism holds that 
maximizing good consequences is the defining feature of a moral system.  
 Kant believes that a duty to principle (especially in the face of choices that might 
be personally preferable) defines the behavior of a rational, moral person. Additionally, 
any principle that defines a moral system must be abstract enough to be applied in all 
circumstances to all people equally; that is, it must have the property of 
universalizability21. Kant developed his ‘categorical imperative’ as distinct from 
‘hypothetical imperatives’, which impel one to do something for a particular purpose. 
Morally, deontologists find this troubling as it requires the person to be duty bound to 
take an action only if they believe both in the goal and that the action taken will achieve 
the desired results. By comparison a categorical imperative requires (morally) only that 
the person perform the action. They are duty bound to this principle without reference to 
its possible outcomes. In designing his categorical imperative, Kant created three forms 
of a moral rule. Its first (and most commonly used) formulation is: “I ought never to act 
except in such a way that I could also will that my maxim should become a universal 
law.”22,23 For Kant, from this principle all moral behavior ought to follow.  
                                                 
21 Other philosophers, like Richard Hare, also believe that universalizability is a defining feature of moral 
judgments. They must apply equally to all people. Hare, R. M. (1991). The Language of Morals, 
Clarendon. 
22 Kant, I. (1785). Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals, Hackett. p.30. 
23 This formulation is usually called the Formula of the Universal Law of Nature. The other two 
formulations of the categorical imperative are the Humanity Formula: “Act in such a way that you treat 
humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, always at the same time as an end and 
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Deontology’s strength and weakness lies in its moral absolutes. If all actions have 
inherent rightness or wrongness and universal moral rules exist, what happens when these 
rules conflict? Benjamin Constant, a Swiss philosopher, challenged Kant about the 
universality of these absolutes by asking if it is acceptable to lie to a murderer who is 
asking for a victim’s location. Kant replied, “Truthfulness in statements that cannot be 
avoided is the formal duty of man to everyone, however great the disadvantage that may 
arise therefrom for him or for any other.”24 While this may seem to merely refute 
Constant’s question without further explanation, Kant’s ‘formal duty’ asserts that if one 
person lies then all people must assume that all people lie all the time. Were that to be the 
case, no lies would be believed and lying to the murderer would not result in any help to 
the victim. More importantly, however, is that in an absolutist deontological system the 
outcome that may result from telling the truth does not affect the moral value of that 
choice25. It is upon this point that deontology and consequentialism have stood, 
diametrically opposed, for more than 200 years.  
 The parallel development of these two conflicting theories and the resurgence of 
virtue ethics has led to the development of three mature, moral philosophies. While these 
philosophies are designed to describe how we ought to behave most morally, analytic 
philosophers have found there is much to be learned about how these philosophies are 
applied in the real-world using thought experiments. The trolley problem (described in 
Appendix A), introduced by Philippa Foot and Judith Jarvis Thompson in the 1970s, was 
                                                                                                                                                 
never merely as a means to an end.”; and the Kingdom of Ends Formula: “Therefore, every rational being 
must so act as if he were through his maxim always a legislating member in the universal kingdom of 
ends.” Kant, I. (1993). Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals, Hackett. 
24 “On a Supposed Right to Lie Because of Philanthropic Concerns”  from Kant, I. (1993). Grounding for 
the metaphysics of morals; with, On a supposed right to lie because of philanthropic concerns (Third 
Edition). Indianapolis, Hackett . 
25 Not all deontologists are as absolutist as Kant. W.D. Ross is an example of one such philosopher. 
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devised to help tease apart exactly that26. Depending upon the dilemma and its 
permutation, people in the real world can be found to make either deontological or 
utilitarian judgments. There are individual differences, of course, but there is good 
general agreement among the testing population about most of these moral dilemmas27. 
The addition of these dilemmas to cognitive neuroscience has provided insight about the 
effects of brain damage on utilitarian judgments and the brain areas that are involved in 
these decisions. Perhaps most of all, however, they have illuminated how much more 
there is to learn about moral judgment. The data in this dissertation seek to provide new 
tools for philosophers to ask the questions that will best elucidate not just how we do 
behave, but how we ought to behave. 
 
Section 2: Moral Psychology 
 
 Thinking in moral psychology has been dominated by the work of Lawrence 
Kohlberg, a developmental psychologist whose work was defined by his description of 
the six stages of moral development28. Kohlberg believed that moral behavior was a 
function of moral reasoning and that the development of moral reasoning from childhood 
to adulthood could be described in stages. The idea of a stage theory of moral 
development was influenced by work from Jean Piaget, a Swiss philosopher who 
                                                 
26 Foot, P. (1978). The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of the Double Effect in Virtues and Vices and 
Other Essays in Moral Philosophy. Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press.; Thomson, J. 
J. (1986). Rights, Restitution, and Risk: Essays, in Moral Theory. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University 
Press. 
27Hauser, M. D., F. Cushman, et al. (2007). "A dissociation between moral judgments and justifications." 
Mind & Language 22(1): 1-21. 
28 Kohlberg, L. (1958). The Development of Modes of Thinking and Choices in Years 10 to 16, University 
of Chicago. Ph.D. dissertation. 
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developed a theory of cognitive development29, explaining how children progress in 
cognitive development from stage to stage. Piaget’s stages were defined as constructive; 
once a child has progressed into a new stage, they rarely lose the ability to use those 
cognitive abilities. Stages were also necessary – it was not possible to skip a stage 
because each was dependent on the cognitive growth during the previous stage. Kohlberg 
adopted the same rules for his stages, for reasons nearly identical to Piaget’s. Kohlberg 
did acknowledge, however, that particularly in moral behavior, people do not necessarily 
function at the highest level of their development all the time.  
 Kohlberg’s six stages of moral development are divided into three categories: pre-
conventional (typically from birth to age 9), conventional (typically from age 9 to 20) and 
post conventional (typically after age 20; with most people never reaching the final 
stage). (See Figure 2 for a graphical depiction of these stages.)  In the pre-conventional 
stages (1 and 2), morality is judged by the consequences of an action. Stage one is 
thought of as the obedience and punishment orientation and is typified by judging 
morality based on how much one will be punished for doing a particular action. This 
often leads to a belief that things that incur more punishment are more wrong. Stage two 
is primarily focused on self-interest. Reasoning in this stage is primarily involved with 
what the person wants and can be thought of as morally relativistic. Punishment is 
considered as a risk instead of a definition of morality. The conventional stages of 
morality (3 and 4) are driven by an individual’s understanding of themselves as a part of 
a larger society. Stage 3 reasoning is focused on interpersonal relationships. The morality 
of an action is determined by its impact on those around us. Motivations for an action 
begin to play a role in determining how right or wrong an action is. People using this 
                                                 
29Piaget, J. (1977). The Essential Piaget. New York, Basic Books. 
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reasoning also typically believe that others will all feel the same way (hence, the title 
‘conventional’)30.  Stage 4 reasoning focuses on the role that moral behavior plays in 
maintaining a social order. It acknowledges an individual’s right to make bad choices, but 
concludes that if everyone did bad things, society would fall apart; thus one must make 
morally good choices to prevent this from happening. Some adults do not progress 
beyond this stage. In addition Kohlberg later proposed an intermediate stage here 
between stages 4 and 5. The post-conventional stages (5 and 6) of morality balance the 
rights of the individual with the rights of the society/world. Stage 5 reasoning focuses on 
the balance between society’s laws and individual happiness. Utilitarian thinking – the 
most happiness for the most people – is often associated with stage 5 and democratic 
government is proposed to arise out of this stage of moral development as well. People 
using stage 5 reasoning consider that rights and laws do not always coincide. Stage 6 
reasoning is rarely achieved. Kohlberg had difficulty finding subjects who routinely 
employed this form of reasoning in real life and eventually came to consider it as largely 
theoretical. Reasoning in stage 6 is driven by a principle of universal ethical values. Stage 
6 reasoning finds that all people require equal consideration and no law or rule should be 
implemented that disadvantages one person in favor of another. Kohlberg’s belief is that 
moral reasoning is justice driven and stage 6 is the pinnacle of justice-oriented reasoning.  
  To measure these stages, Kohlberg developed a series of moral dilemmas that 
were administered in a guided interview-style testing session31. The justification (not the 
                                                 
30 It is also important to note that this is the stage that best meshes with Carol Gilligan’s care orientations. 
31 The classic example is that of “Heinz Steals the Drug”: “In Europe, a woman was near death from a 
special kind of cancer. There was one drug that the doctors thought might save her. It was a form of radium 
that a druggist in the same town had recently discovered. The drug was expensive to make, but the druggist 
was charging ten times what the drug cost him to make. He paid $200 for the radium and charged $2,000 
for a small dose of the drug. The sick woman's husband, Heinz, went to everyone he knew to borrow the 
money, but he could only get together about $ 1,000 which is half of what it cost. He told the druggist that 
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answers themselves) that subjects provided for their answers were used to determine an 
individual’s moral stage. We considered administering an updated version32 of the 
Kohlberg dilemmas to our participants but found that even the ‘updated’ version was too 
dated to seem relevant to our participants.  
 Kohlberg’s work received criticism for being too focused on Western values and 
not adequately accounting for theories of morality espoused by other cultures33, but 
perhaps most famously for being sexist. Carol Gilligan, a colleague of Kohlberg’s, took 
umbrage with Kohlberg’s findings that women were generally less morally developed 
than men and began to his question his fundamental assumption of justice as the 
determining orientation of morality. She felt that “... men tend to embrace an ethic of 
rights using quasi-legal terminology and impartial principles … women tend to affirm an 
ethic of care that centers on responsiveness in an interconnected network of needs, care, 
and prevention of harm. Taking care of others is the core notion34.” Gilligan developed an 
alternative stage theory based on an orientation of care, rather than one of justice35. The 
care stage theory of moral development has a pre-conventional stage with a focus on 
individual needs, a conventional stage that transitions from selfishness to responsibility to 
others, where goodness is defined by self-sacrifice and a post-conventional stage that 
                                                                                                                                                 
his wife was dying and asked him to sell it cheaper or let him pay later. But the druggist said: "No, I 
discovered the drug and I'm going to make money from it." So Heinz got desperate and broke into the 
man's store to steal the drug-for his wife. Should the husband have done that?” Kohlberg, L. (1963). "The 
development of children's orientations toward a moral order. l: Sequence in the development of human 
thought." Vita Humana 6: 11-33(a). p. 19. 
32 Hogan, R. and E. Dickstein (1972). "A measure of moral values." Journal of Consulting and Clinical 
Psychology 39(2): 210-214. 
33 Simpson, E. (1974). "Moral development research: A case study of scientific cultural bias." Human 
Development 17: 81-106. 
34 Beauchamp, T. L. and J. F. Childress (2001). Principles of Biomedical Ethics, 5th edition. New York, 
Oxford University Press. p. 371. 
35 Gilligan, C. (1977). "In a Different Voice: Women's Conceptions of Self and Morality." Harvard 
Educational Review 47(4): 1-37. 
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focuses on a principle of doing no harm (to self or others), which involves recognizing 
that one’s own needs are as important as others.  
 The re-emergence of social intuitionism has moved current moral psychology away 
from the rationalism embraced by Kohlberg. Moral motivation36, moral hypocrisy and 
integrity37, moral intuition38, moral perspective taking (simulation)39 and imitation40, and 
altruism are all topics being currently studied. 
 
Section 3: Neuroscience of Moral Cognition 
 
The advent of recent technologies has allowed us to take the study of morality 
beyond the realm of philosophical thought experiments and into the analytical realm of 
the scientific method. Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) gives us a way to 
look specifically at which brain structures are involved in moral decision making. 
Approaching the questions of moral cognition from a biological point of view, however, 
presents an interesting dilemma: Can the traditional philosophical methods be usefully 
applied to a biological inquiry of moral decision-making? Several neuroscientists have 
attempted to bridge this gap using variations of philosophical thought experiments41. 
While this continuity of academic thought is admirable and has elicited some interesting 
                                                 
36 Hardy, S. A. (2006). "Identity, Reasoning, and Emotion: An Empirical Comparison of Three Sources of 
Moral Motivation." Motivation and Emotion 30: 207-215. 
37 Batson, C. D. and E. R. Thompson (2001). "Why don't moral people act morally? Motivational 
considerations." Current directions in psychological science 10(2): 54-57. 
38 Knobe, J. (2005). "Theory of mind and moral cognition: exploring the connections." Trends in Cognitive 
Sciences 9(8): 357. 
39 Batson, C. D., D. A. Lishner, et al. (2003). "... As you Would have Them Do Unto You: Does Imagining 
Yourself in the Other's Place Stimulate Moral Action?" Personality & Social Psychology Bulletin 29(9): 
1190. 
40Meltzoff, A. N. and J. Decety (2003). "What imitation tells us about social cognition: a rapprochement 
between developmental psychology and cognitive neuroscience." Philosophical Transactions of the Royal 
Society of London 358(1431): 491. 
41 See Appendix A for a discussion of the trolley problem. 
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results, it falls far short of the biological ideal of ecological validity. These philosophical 
problems do not mimic real life situations and in that way can never give us accurate 
information about what real people are doing when making real moral choices in their 
daily lives. They may give us insight into the more abstract functions of moral judgment; 
indeed, there is much of value that can be gained from these dilemmas. However, by their 
design, they cannot accurately assess the moral decision making that we encounter every 
day. In this section, the current neuroscience research about moral cognition will be 
discussed, as well as a brief overview of the research on moral intuition and moral 
reasoning and moral emotions.  
To review the intersection of neuroscience, philosophical thought and moral 
cognition, it will be useful to progress from those researchers and ideas that 
fundamentally come from a philosophical school of thought to those that approach the 
problem from a biological perspective. In this way, we will cover the breadth of the field 
and examine the underlying biases that come from each way of examining moral 
problems. 
Recent work by William Casebeer42, a moral philosopher, approaches 
neuroscience as a tool to help illuminate the debate in moral philosophy among the three 
leading theories in normative ethics: virtue ethics, deontology and utilitarianism43. 
Casebeer’s argument can be distilled as follows: Each of the three leading philosophical 
theories can be used to design a model for how the brain computes moral problems. 
Utilitarianism, generally, seeks to maximize happiness. (For Casebeer, it is irrelevant to 
                                                 
42 Casebeer, W. D. (2003). "Moral cognition and its neural constituents." Nature Reviews Neuroscience 4: 
841-846., Casebeer, W. D. (2003). "The Neural Mechanisms of Moral Cognition: A Multiple-Aspect 
Approach to Moral Judgment and Decision-Making." Biology and Philosophy 18: 169-194. 
43 Casebeer chooses to discuss utilitarianism rather than the broader idea of consequentialism Casebeer, W. 
D. (2003). "Moral cognition and its neural constituents." Nature Reviews Neuroscience 4: 841-846.  
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the model whether this is personal happiness or happiness of the masses.) In order to 
achieve this goal, a brain must be capable of calculating which actions will eventually 
produce happiness. Deontology seeks to create categorical imperatives44. A brain that 
makes deontological judgments must facilitate the creation of universal rules and the 
application of those rules to the current moral situation. Virtue ethics seeks eudaimonia 
and a virtuous character. A brain that fulfills the needs of virtue ethics must be able to 
recognize virtuous behavior and happiness. Casebeer argues that, given the current 
neuroscience data, virtue ethics is the best theory for describing moral cognition. He does 
recognize that the goals of virtue theory are much more broadly described, but feels that 
the “give and take required by co-evolution of theories…would, hopefully, correct any 
such bias eventually.”45 
While Casebeer’s idea that neuroscience may inform philosophy has strengths, he 
is strongly criticized by some46 for failing to address a critical distinction between the two 
disciplines: their goals. Moral neuroscience seeks to understand the biological substrates 
of moral cognition and behavior while normative ethics seeks to describe a system of 
moral standards that people should uphold. The philosophical assertion that what is and 
what ought to be are distinct from one another was originally made by Hume47; the 
mistake in deriving one from the other is referred to as the ‘is/ought’ problem48. The 
is/ought problem does not necessarily prevent philosophers from using neuroscience to 
                                                 
44 Kant, I. (1993). Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals, Hackett. p. 30. 
45 Casebeer, W. D. (2003). "Moral cognition and its neural constituents." Nature Reviews Neuroscience 4: 
841-846. p 842. 
46 Greene, J. D. Ibid."From neural ‘is’ to moral ‘ought’: what are the moral implications of neuroscientific 
moral psychology?": 847-850. 
47 Hume, D. (2003). A Treatise of Human Nature, Project Gutenberg. Book III, Part I, Section I. 
48 The is/ought problem is often closely tied to the ‘naturalistic fallacy’; another problem that Casebeer’s 
critics have with his work. The ‘naturalistic fallacy’ is used to describe the claim that those things that are 
natural are good. It was first described by G.E. Moore. Moore, G. E. (1903). Principia Ethica, Cambridge 
University Press. 
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inform their theories, but it does require care when constructing those uses. In his critique 
of Casebeer, Joshua Greene points ought that both Mill and Kant intended their theories 
to describe a more perfect system of moral thinking; a moral maturity for people to aspire 
to. To this end, neuroscience cannot and should not necessarily influence philosophical 
thought. What it can do, however, is to help better describe how humans generate their 
current moral judgments, which may help inform philosophical debates. Casebeer’s 
claims seek to define which philosophical theories may be true, based on how people 
behave, not how they ought to behave. The use of neuroscience to investigate what 
people believe ought to be moral requires entirely different questions. 
Casebeer’s critics, especially Michael Ruse, also feel that his naturalized ethics49 
only “hack away” at the is/ought problem without addressing the larger naturalistic 
fallacy (i.e., ethical realism)50. Ruse believes instead in ethical non-realism – the idea that 
there are no real moral absolutes defined by our biology (or maybe even otherwise). 
Other philosophers have had greater success in using moral neuroscience to 
investigate the merits of philosophical claims. Jesse Prinz has used findings from fMRI 
studies to investigate the debate between moral rationalism and moral 
sentimentalism/intuition51. His research has taken him so far as to write a compelling 
integration of appraisal theory and the somatic marker hypothesis. Walter Sinnott-
Armstrong has used psychological research to develop a theory of affect heuristics – 
mental shortcuts for moral situations52. These findings will be discussed further in later 
                                                 
49 Especially as described in Casebeer’s recent book Naturalized Ethical Facts. Casebeer, W. D. (2003). 
Natural Ethical Facts: Evolution, Connectionism, and Moral Cognition. Cambridge, MA, The MIT Press. 
50 Ruse, M. (2004). "Book Review: Natural Ethical Facts: Evolution, Connectivism, and Moral Cognition 
by William D. Casebeer, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2003." Evolutionary Psychology 2: 89-91. 
51Prinz, J. (2006). "The Emotional Basis of Moral Judgments." Philosophical Explorations 9(1): 29-43. 
52 Sinnott-Armstrong, W. (2008). Framing moral intuitions. In Moral psychology, volume 2: the cognitive 
science of morality. W. Sinnott-Armstrong. Cambridge: MIT, Bradford Books: 47–76.  
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parts of this work. In order to better understand the context from which these and other 
moral researchers view moral cognition, it is important to understand the framework that 
has been developed. Specifically, one must understand the division of moral cognition 
into two component parts: moral intuition and moral reasoning. 
 
Moral Intuition: 
The philosophical debate about the source of moral cognition is typified by the 
work of David Hume and Immanuel Kant. Kant believed so strongly in rationalism that 
he felt that behaving immorally could be nothing other than irrational. “The fundamental 
principle of morality — the categorical imperative — is none other than the law of an 
autonomous will. Thus, at the heart of Kant's moral philosophy is a conception of reason 
whose reach in practical affairs goes well beyond that of a Humean ‘slave’ to the 
passions53.” Hume, on the other hand, famously stated that “Reason is, and ought only to 
be, the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and 
obey them54.” This philosophical debate has informed thinking about moral cognition for 
hundreds of years. Work in psychology and recently in neuroscience has contributed 
empirical data to the question. As data have begun to accumulate about the neural 
mechanisms of moral cognition, theories have begun to arise to explain them. While 
variations abound, some consensus about the basic building blocks of moral cognition 
has begun to emerge. (1)Moral cognition appears to be a whole brain, distributed process, 
                                                 
53 Johnson, R. (2008). Kant's Moral Philosophy. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. E. N. Zalta. 
54 Hume's most famous sentence occurs at Treatise, II, III, iii from Hume, D. (2003). A Treatise of Human 
Nature, Project Gutenberg. 
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rather than a ‘moral module’. Initial evidence from lesion patients like Phineas Gage55 
suggested the opposite – that patients with specific brain damage could selectively lose 
their ability to make moral choices in daily life. (These findings will be discussed in more 
detail later in this section.) However, recent work suggests that these patients had subtle 
underlying deficits in other cognitive domains as well. (2) Moral cognition involves both 
intuition and abstract reasoning and these may be dissociable processes.  
Moral intuition is a fast, automatic evaluation that provides an immediate 
perception of right- or wrong-ness. Moral reasoning is a cognitively-intense, relatively 
slow process characterized by ‘thinking’ about the problem. (Details of these two systems 
can be seen in Figure 3.) John Allman, a biologist, has proposed that moral intuition 
arises in part from a unique class of bipolar cells found only in great apes and humans56; 
the von Economo neurons (VENs)57. VENs are located in the frontoinsular cortex (FI) 
and anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), regions responsible for interoception. These cells 
(especially because of their large size) may help to integrate ‘gut feelings’ (literally) with 
situational social information to produce moral intuitions. This is in keeping with 
Damasio’s somatic marker hypothesis (discussed later) and Haidt and Prinz’s models of 
embodied appraisals. In philosophy and psychology, rationalist models – which held that 
moral reasoning caused moral judgment – dominated academic thinking about moral 
                                                 
55 Phineas Gage was a railroad worker who, in 1848, received a very traumatic brain injury when a tamping 
rod was blasted through his head. Remarkably, Gage was able to walk away from the accident, but a large 
part of his frontal lobe was destroyed. Although his intellectual abilities remained intact, Gage was a 
changed man, according to his family and friends. Always a responsible man before the accident, he 
became impatient, inconsiderate and quite profane in his language.  Damasio, A. R. (1994). Descartes' 
Error: emotion, reason, and the human brain. New York, Grosset/Putnam. 
56 Allman, J. M., Watson, K.K., Tetreault, N.A., Hakeem, A.Y. (2005). "Intuition and autism: a possible 
role for Von Economo neurons." Trends in Cognitive Sciences 9: 367–373. 
Allman, J. M., A. Hakeem, et al. (2001). "Anterior cingulate cortex: the evolution of an interface between 
emotion and cognition." Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences 935: 107–117. 
57 Allman, J. and J. Woodward (2007). "Moral intuition: Its neural substrates and normative significance." 
Journal of Physiology – Paris 101: 179-202. 
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judgment until recently. Work by Jonathan Haidt proposed an alternative view: the social 
intuitionist model58,59. This model focuses on the intuitive feelings of right or wrong that 
emerge without conscious consideration when faced with a moral situation. Haidt stresses 
that both intuition and reasoning require cognition and that intuition should not be 
considered synonymous with emotional appraisal. Despite this distinction in the social 
intuitionist model, many think about intuitive processing as an external representation of 
emotional appraisals of the moral situation. 
Philosophers, psychologists and neuroscientists investigating moral intuition often 
frame the idea of moral intuition in the following way: ‘When faced with a moral choice, 
if it feels bad, it is morally wrong’. There are a number of assumptions in this statement 
that may make it biologically or psychologically implausible. Moral non-realism 
questions whether there are any moral absolutes. Biology (especially in the field of vision 
research) makes us question whether conscious perceptions bear any similarity to the 
brain processes that lead to those perceptions. Despite many questions about the validity 
of this statement, it seems correct. It represents our conscious report about how we make 
some moral judgments – “they just feel wrong”60. Given the pervasiveness of this 
statement in considering moral cognition, many researchers have chosen to study moral 
intuition (and by extension moral reasoning) from this perspective. 
                                                 
58 Haidt, J. (2001). "The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail: A Social Intuitionist Approach to Moral 
Judgment." Psychological Reviews 108(4): 814-834. 
59 At nearly the same time, philosopher John Bolender published a similar model: a two-tiered cognitive 
architecture. Bolender’s work, however, did not receive nearly the acclaim that Haidt’s did. Bolender, J. 
(2001). "A Two-Tiered Cognitive Architecture For Moral Reasoning." Biology and Philosophy 16: 339-
356. 
60 It is important to note here that often people create reasons for their moral judgments that do not really fit 
the situation and when challenged on those beliefs revert to the above statement. The social intuitionist 
model considers these to be post-hoc reasoning. See Haidt, J. (2001). "The Emotional Dog and Its Rational 
Tail: A Social Intuitionist Approach to Moral Judgment." Psychological Reviews 108(4): 814-834. p. 818. 
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Jonathan Baron and Walter Sinnott-Armstrong independently argue that moral 
intuitions can be best understood as heuristics – rules of thumb that help guide our daily 
behavior61,62. Baron suggests that these moral heuristics may be equivalent to the ‘naïve 
theories’63 that people apply in other contexts. That is, moral heuristics are based on 
general understandings of the world around us, but are not necessarily reliable in all 
situations. ‘If it feels bad, it is morally wrong’ may not be correct in all situations, but it 
feels like it should be. Schnall, Haidt and Jordan64 demonstrated that externally imposed 
feelings of disgust (arising from disgusting smells, sights or recollections) can influence 
the moral judgments that people make about unrelated moral scenarios. In this 
circumstance, ‘feeling bad’ was manipulated to make things ‘morally wrong’. 
Sinnott-Armstrong claims that moral intuitions are an affect heuristic and that, as 
such, “work well in common circumstances, but also lead to systematic errors in unusual 
situations.”65 Sinnott-Armstrong cites research that many heuristics employed by people 
on a daily basis (the ‘representativeness heuristic’66, the ‘recognition heuristic’67) can be 
unreliable. The implications of this unreliability are debated by psychologists. 
                                                 
61 Baron, J. (1995). "A Psychological View of Moral Intuition." The Harvard Review of Philosophy 
Spring: 36-40. 
62 Sinnott-Armstrong, W. (2008). Framing moral intuitions. In Moral Psychology, Volume 2: The 
Cognitive Science of Morality. W. Sinnott-Armstrong. Cambridge: MIT, Bradford Books: 47–76.  
63 These ‘naïve theories’ are often demonstrated with respect to physics. Baron gives the following 
example: “In one study, students graduating from Harvard were asked why it was hot in the summer and 
cold in the winter. Many students said that the earth was closer to the sun in the summer. This is 
reasonable: if you move closer to a fire, you get warmer. If this were the explanation, though, it would be 
warmer in July than in January in the Southern Hemisphere too. People's intuitions about science are often 
based on everyday experience, but this experience can mislead.” From Baron, J. (1995). "A Psychological 
View of Moral Intuition." The Harvard Review of Philosophy Spring: 36-40. 
64 Schnall, S. (2008). "Disgust as embodied moral judgment." Personality & Social Psychology Bulletin 
34(8): 1096-1109. 
65 Seminar Materials:  Sinnott-Armstrong, W. (2008). Moral Intuitions and Heuristics. William Bennett 
Munro Memorial Seminar Pasadena, CA, California Institute of Technology. 
66 Tversky, A. and D. Kahneman (1974). "Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases." Science 
185(4157): 1124-1131. 
67 Goldstein, D. G. and G. Gigerenzer (2002). "Models of Ecological Rationality: The Recognition 
Heuristic." Psychological Review 109(1): 75-90. 
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Gigerenzer, for example, suggests that heuristics are an adaptive tool, allowing humans to 
develop with a strategy that serves us well most of the time, rather than one that fits the 
rules of formal logic68,69. This unreliability, however, troubles Sinnott-Armstrong when 
applied to moral situations.  “[T]he view that moral intuitions result from heuristics raises 
doubts about whether and when we should trust moral intuitions. Just as non-moral heuristics 
lack accuracy in unusual situations, so do moral intuitions, if they are based on moral 
heuristics. It would be interesting and important (though challenging) to do the empirical 
work needed to determine which moral intuitions are reliable in which circumstances.”70 
While this dissertation does not address the veracity of moral intuition directly, the data 
presented within do provide the tools to do exactly the work Sinnott-Armstrong proposes. 
This is one great strength of this work: the data are available to address a wide range of 
research questions. In this case, real moral narratives are available to address the role of 
moral intuition in circumstances that participants have experienced themselves. 
 
Moral Emotions and the Somatic Marker Hypothesis: 
 Emotions are hypothesized to play a role in complex decision making and social 
behavior. The somatic marker hypothesis (SMH), postulated by Antonio Damasio71, 
posits that representations of emotions as bodily states stored in the orbitofrontal cortex 
are used during complex cognitive tasks to weight possible options. This biasing can be 
                                                 
68 Gigerenzer, G. (2006). Bounded and Rational. Oxford, Blackwell. 
69 Michael DePaul feels similarly: “[T]hese days the majority of moral intuitionists hold that moral 
intuitions are only prima facie justified, that one should reflect on them and attempt to integrate them into a 
coherent moral system, and that they are to be rejected if this cannot be done. Even supposing moral 
intuitions are the products of the affect heuristic, it is not at all clear that they are so unreliable that they 
cannot play the role contemporary intuitionists assign to them.” DePaul, M. "Comments on Walter Sinnott-
Armstrong."   Retrieved September 16, 2008, from http://www.slu.edu/colleges/AS/philos/PDF/depaul.pdf. 
70 Sinnott-Armstrong, W. (2008). Framing moral intuitions. In Moral Psychology, Volume 2: The 
Cognitive Science of Morality. W. Sinnott-Armstrong. Cambridge: MIT, Bradford Books: 47–76.  
71 Damasio, A. R. (1994). Descartes' Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain. New York, 
Grosset/Putnam. 
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either unconscious or conscious, depending on the situation. Evidence for the SMH 
comes from research done with subjects who have damage to the ventromedial prefrontal 
cortex (VMPFC). In the Iowa Gambling Task, Bechara et al. found that subjects with 
VMPFC damage were unable to discriminate disadvantageous decks of cards, while 
normal subjects were unconsciously biased against these decks72.  
Described narrowly, the somatic marker hypothesis suggests a specific link 
between emotion and cognition. Drawn more broadly, the SMH suggests a link between 
moral emotions and social behavior as well. Moral emotions can be distinguished from 
basic emotions by their social component. Embarrassment, for example, can only exist in 
a social context – you would never be embarrassed (a moral emotion) that you had an 
apple unless there was another person’s opinion involved. By comparison, you might be 
quite happy (a basic emotion) that you had an apple without any other input. Moral 
emotions are defined by this social input and can include:  guilt, shame, pride, 
embarrassment, envy, schadenfreude73, empathy/sympathy, compassion, contempt and 
gratitude. In some situations, some of the basic emotions can also take on a moral 
character, such as disgust, awe and indignation or moral anger. There is evidence from 
primatology and evolutionary biology that moral emotions have evolved over time. Von 
Economo neurons in the frontoinsular cortex and anterior cingulate cortex of humans and 
great apes are thought to play a role in shame and guilt74. Work by Frans deWaal and 
                                                 
72 Bechara, A., H. Damasio, et al. (2000). "Emotion, Decision Making and the Orbitofrontal Cortex." 
Cerebral Cortex 10: 295-307. 
73 Schadenfreude is a German word which has no direct English translation. It is usually translated as taking 
pleasure in another person’s misfortune. (2006). Schadenfreude. Dictionary.com, Random House, Inc. 
Unabridged (v 1.1).  
74 Allman, J. and J. Woodward (2007). "Moral intuition: Its neural substrates and normative significance." 
Journal of Physiology – Paris 101: 179-202. 
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others have shown that great apes demonstrate empathy, reciprocity and altruism75. 
Joshua Greene suggests that the distinction between personal and impersonal moral 
violations is evolutionary in nature. He describes this as the ‘ME HURT YOU’ criterion. 
Personal violations involve an acting agent who is specifically inflicting damage (ME), a 
primitive type of harm (like “assault, not tax evasion”) (HURT) and a victim (YOU)76. 
Greene suggests that these are the kinds of violations that a chimpanzee could understand 
and might reflect the degree of sophistication with which human moral intuition still 
operates.  
 
Moral Neuroscientists: 
 Joshua Greene, a cognitive neuroscientist and philosopher, has made important 
progress in expanding the study of moral cognition using biological methods. In his 
seminal work, Greene chose to use fMRI and the trolley problem as a way to investigate 
the parts of the brain that make moral decisions77. Importantly, Greene was particularly 
interested in whether fMRI could be used to help elucidate some of the debate between 
moral reasoning and moral intuition. Greene designates these using the more 
philosophical terms ‘cognitive’ and ‘emotional’ judgment, which reflects the 
utilitarian/deontological divide that prompted this work. 
In this initial study78, subjects read a variety of moral dilemmas while in the MRI 
and responded about the appropriateness of each moral choice. Greene theorized that 
                                                 
75 de Waal, F. B. M., Ed. (2002). Tree of Origin: What Primate Behavior Can Tell Us About Human Social 
Evolution, Harvard University Press. 
76 Greene, J. D. and J. Haidt (2002). "How (and where) does moral judgment work?" Trends in Cognitive 
Sciences 6(12): 517-523. 
77 Greene, J. D., R. B. Sommerville, et al. (2001). "An fMRI Investigation of Emotional Engagement in 
Moral Judgment." Science 293: 2105-2108.  
78 Greene, J. D., R. B. Sommerville, et al. (2001). "An fMRI Investigation of Emotional Engagement in 
Moral Judgment." Science 293: 2105-2108. 
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moral choices that involved personal violations (like that of the ‘footbridge dilemma’) 
would selectively elicit brain activation in emotional processing areas, when compared to 
impersonal violations (like that of the trolley problem)79. As hypothesized, Greene found 
that judgments about personal violations selectively activated the medial frontal gyrus 
(Brodmann’s Areas 9 and 10), posterior cingulate gyrus (BA 31) and angular gyrus (BA 
39), as compared to moral impersonal or non-moral judgments. In addition, Greene found 
that working memory structures which are known to be less active during emotional 
processing (right middle frontal gyrus and bilateral parietal lobe) were significantly less 
active during the personal dilemma judgments. In addition to these findings, they found 
that the reaction time when subjects judged personal violations as appropriate was longer 
than when they judged them as inappropriate.   
In a subsequent paper, Greene and colleagues hypothesized that the differences in 
how long it took subjects to judge each moral dilemma not only depended on the 
subject’s final judgment but was also concomitant with the level of difficulty80. (As an 
example, the ‘crying baby’ problem was found to be much more difficult than the 
‘infanticide’ problem81.) Dilemmas with long reaction times were presumed to create 
                                                 
79 In subsequent work, Greene operationalizes the personal/impersonal distinction. To be personal, a moral 
violation must meet three requirements: 1. be “likely to cause serious bodily harm”; 2. “to a particular 
person”; 3. “in such a way that the harm does not result from the deflection of an existing threat onto a 
different party”. Greene, J. D. (2005). Cognitive neuroscience and the structure of the moral mind. The 
Innate Mind: Structure and Contents. S. Laurence, P. Carruthers and S. Stich. New York, Oxford 
University Press..  Recently, Greene has noted that he feels that the third criterion needs to be revised. 
Greene, J. D., S. A. Morelli, et al. (2008). "Cognitive load selectively interferes with utilitarian moral 
judgment." Cognition 107: 1144-1154. 
80 Greene, J. D., L. E. Nystrom, et al. (2004). "The Neural Bases of Cognitive Conflict and Control in 
Moral Judgment." Neuron 44: 389-400. 
81 The crying baby problem from the original study is slightly different from the one used in our study. The 
wording from the original study is as follows: “Enemy soldiers have taken over your village. They have 
orders to kill all remaining civilians. You and some of your townspeople have sought refuge in the cellar of 
a large house. Outside you hear the voices of soldiers who have come to search the house for valuables.  
Your baby begins to cry loudly. You cover his mouth to block the sound. If you remove your hand from his 
mouth his crying will summon the attention of the soldiers who will kill you, your child, and the others 
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more conflict between emotional processing (intuitive responses) and cognitive 
processing (reasoned responses). On an individual basis, subjects were tested in the MRI 
on putative ‘easy’ and ‘difficult’ dilemmas. When comparing the brain activity between 
difficult moral dilemmas and easy ones, difficult dilemmas showed increased activation 
bilaterally of the anterior DLPFC (BA 10/46) and inferior parietal lobes (BA 40/39), as 
expected for problems that required more cognitive control. This contrast also showed 
activation of the ACC (hypothesized to be involved in ‘conflict monitoring’) and 
posterior cingulate cortex (an activation that has not yet been explained). These findings 
suggest that some moral dilemmas do require more cognitive input (‘reasoning’) than 
others and there is a distinct pattern in brain activation that represents that cognitive 
input. To address the philosophical idea that the differences between the trolley problem 
and the footbridge problem are due to a struggle between emotional and cognitive 
processes, they compared subjects’ brain activations when they accepted a utilitarian 
decision as appropriate (a personal violation that helped more people) to those where they 
rejected the utilitarian decision (e.g., said it was inappropriate to push the fat man off the 
footbridge). As before, brain areas involved in cognitive control were more strongly 
activated during utilitarian than non-utilitarian decisions. Specifically, bilateral anterior 
DLPFC (BA 10) and right inferior parietal lobe (BA 40) were activated in this contrast. 
These findings, while significant, were not the only activations found with this 
                                                                                                                                                 
hiding out in the cellar. To save yourself and the others you must smother your child to death. Is it 
appropriate for you to smother your child in order to save yourself and the other townspeople?” 
The infanticide problem is as follows: “You are a fifteen-year-old girl who has become pregnant. By 
wearing loose clothing and deliberately putting on weight you have managed to keep your pregnancy a 
secret. One day, while at school, your water breaks. You run to the girls locker room and hide for several 
hours while you deliver the baby. You are sure that you are not prepared to care for this baby. You think  to 
yourself that it would be such a relief to simply clean up the mess you’ve made in the locker room, wrap 
the baby in some towels, throw the baby in the dumpster behind the school, and act as if nothing had ever 
happened. Is it appropriate for you to throw your baby in the dumpster in order to move on with your life?” 
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comparison or in subsequent whole brain analyses, suggesting to this researcher that the 
utilitarian/non-utilitarian distinction may not be as clearly delineated in the brain as the 
previous finding suggests. 
From this work, Greene began to develop a dual-process theory of moral decision 
making, which “associates utilitarian moral judgments (approving of harmful actions that 
maximize good consequences) with controlled cognitive processes and associates non-
utilitarian moral judgment with automatic emotional responses.” 82  More simply, the 
footbridge dilemma is best understood as a conflict between two competing systems: a 
cognitive system and an emotional system. This theory suggests that a manipulation of 
the cognitive load would inhibit a subject’s ability to make utilitarian judgments. To test 
this, Greene and colleagues required subjects to respond to a standard battery of moral 
dilemmas while simultaneously completing a digit search task83. This digit search task 
significantly increased the cognitive load that subjects were under when responding to 
moral dilemmas. As hypothesized, increasing the cognitive difficulty of the task 
significantly increased the amount of time that it took subjects to make utilitarian 
judgments. The same effect was not found for non-utilitarian judgments84. Importantly, 
the cognitive load did not change the likelihood that subjects would make utilitarian 
judgments, only the length of time that it took them to make the decision. Greene 
suggests that this finding provides true evidence for post-hoc analysis of moral decisions. 
                                                 
82 Greene, J. D., S. A. Morelli, et al. (2008). "Cognitive load selectively interferes with utilitarian moral 
judgment." Cognition 107: 1144-1154. 
83 In this task, digits were streamed across the bottom of the screen during the entire task and subjects were 
instructed to hit a button each time the number 5 appeared. The subjects were told that they would be 
judged for accuracy and the rate of the digit stream increased partway through the task to account for 
subjects’ adjustment to the task. 
84 It is worth noting that these results were computed using only the ‘high-conflict’ dilemmas (as identified 
in Koenigs, et al.) rather than in all the personal moral dilemmas. Koenigs, M., L. Young, et al. (2007). 
"Damage to the prefrontal cortex increases utilitarian moral judgements." Nature 446: 908–911.  
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The increase in reaction time without an impact on the subject’s decision implies that 
subjects are making the decision and then thinking about it (longer under increased 
cognitive load) and then pressing the decision button. (This is in keeping with Haidt’s 
social intuitionist model discussed above.) Greene’s work establishes that dissociable 
processes are at work when we make moral decisions about these philosophical 
dilemmas. Further work, using the data in this dissertation may be able to assess the role 
that these processes play in every day decision making. 
 
Marc Hauser, a psychologist and evolutionary biologist, believes that the 
automatic moral processing investigated by others as moral intuition arises from a deeper 
underlying neural process: a moral ‘grammar’. In 1971, John Rawls suggested that Noam 
Chomsky’s critical insight about linguistics could be applied to morality as well85. In the 
1950s, Chomsky postulated that all language was based on an innate, universal 
grammar86. This hard-wired set of rules provides a flexible base from which many 
languages can evolve. An important element of universal grammar is that the rules of 
grammar are often inaccessible to the speakers of that language. (It is easy to know that a 
sentence is grammatically incorrect, but often difficult to explain why.) Rawls considered 
that moral rules might be similarly inaccessible, allowing people to know when an action 
was wrong but not necessarily be able to explain why. Since Rawls, only a few 
researchers have considered the idea of a universal moral grammar87. Hauser, however, 
finds that the linguistic analogy parallels strongly with his own insights from 
                                                 
85 Rawls, J. (1971). A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, Harvard University Press. 
86 Chomsky, N. (1955). The Logical Structure of Linguistic Theory. Cambridge, MA, MIT.  
87A notable exception to this is John Mikhail. Mikhail, J. (2007). "Universal moral grammar: theory, 
evidence and the future." Trends in Cognitive Science 11(4): 144-152. 
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evolutionary biology and has recently written extensively on the idea of an innate moral 
faculty.  
Hauser claims that there are two ways to interpret the linguistic analogy, a strong 
and a weak interpretation. The strong interpretation suggests that moral processing and 
language processing are quite similar processes. This includes suggesting that moral 
judgment has the same features that have been discovered about linguistics. The system 
must have dedicated machinery that is encapsulated from other systems; its principles 
must be unconscious and inaccessible; and the system must provide constraints on the 
possible moralities available. The weak interpretation suggests that there is no real 
parallel between the actual neural constructs of language and morality, but instead that 
looking at moral decision making differently may be as beneficial for its study as it was 
for language. Hauser says that the weak interpretation provides researchers with a new set 
of questions about morality; questions that address the underlying, unconscious behavior 
as well as the evolutionary and developmental aspects of moral judgment.   
Hauser is particularly interested in the differentiation of moral decision making 
among cultures, as this may provide insight about the roots (i.e., ‘phonemes’) of a moral 
faculty. To investigate the variation among cultures, he developed the Moral Sense Test, 
an internet-based version of many moral dilemmas88. During the first year that the MST 
was online, data were collected from more than 30,000 subjects from 120 countries, 
distributed across age, gender, religion and education89. The MST is also designed to 
compare subjects’ explicit justifications for their moral decisions with their choices on 
                                                 
88 The Moral Sense Test can be found online at: Hauser, M. "The Moral Sense Test." 2008, from 
http://moral.wjh.harvard.edu/index.html. 
89Hauser, M. D., F. Cushman, et al. (2007). "A dissociation between moral judgments and justifications." 
Mind & Language 22(1): 1-21. Quote from p. 18. 
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harm-based dilemmas. Subjects who visited the Moral Sense Test website90 were asked 
to respond to 19 moral dilemmas involving harm to innocent people. As is typical, some 
of these dilemmas involved action and some omission of action. Differing from the 
dilemmas used by Greene, these dilemmas assign names to the subjects in each narrative 
(e.g., “Frank is standing on a footbridge above the railroad tracks …”91). Subjects were 
asked whether it was permissible for ‘Frank’ to make the salient choice, rather than 
whether it was appropriate for the first-person subject to make the choice92. After 
responding to all of the moral dilemmas, subjects were provided with pairs of dilemmas 
where the subjects provided incongruent responses (for example, the trolley/footbridge 
dilemmas) and asked to provide short, written justifications for each of their decisions. 
Hauser refers to these pairs of dilemmas where subjects provide incongruous responses as 
manifestations of the ‘principle of double effect’93. Hauser found that the principle of 
double effect was demonstrated among all social, cultural and demographic groups that 
contained enough members to compute statistical significance, suggesting that the 
principle of double effect is common at a very basic level of moral decision making. In 
addition, a majority of subjects were not able to justify the differences in their decisions. 
Hauser finds that the inability to provide rational, explicit justifications supports the idea 
that at least some moral judgments are inaccessible to conscious reasoning. 
                                                 
90 {Hauser,  #95} 
91 Hauser, M. D., F. Cushman, et al. (2007). "A dissociation between moral judgments and justifications." 
Mind & Language 22(1): 1-21. 
92 While this may be an unimportant difference, I personally feel that the variations in the dilemmas used as 
‘standards’ may be quite significant. The judgment one makes about another person may be quite different 
than the judgment one makes for herself. Is Frank more culpable for pushing someone than you would be 
yourself? Is the distinction between something being ‘permissible’ and ‘appropriate’ morally relevant? 
These are important, but unexplored questions. 
93 The principle (or doctrine) of double effect is a philosophical description of a case where an otherwise 
legitimate action will result in an additional, foreseen, negative outcome. E.g. Killing someone to prevent 
them from killing you involves protecting yourself (legitimate action) and killing someone (not permitted 
action). However, the unpermitted action is a necessary consequence of the legitimate action.  
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 While Hauser provides a great deal of support for the strong interpretation of the 
linguistic analogy in his recent book, Moral Minds,94 this position is not without its 
detractors. Philosopher Jesse Prinz argues that the linguistic analogy is simply a different 
route to return to ethical naturalism, with all of the pitfalls that philosophers have 
described before95. Prinz argues that all of the data that support the idea of innate moral 
processes can also be interpreted to support the idea of the specialized use of general 
cognitive systems for moral cognition. In addition, he finds that without deeper 
understanding, the presence of similar moral rules in all cultures to be insufficient to 
establish that those rules are innate96. Dupoux and Jacob97, on the other hand, find that 
there is no evidence to specifically dispute a nativist argument for moral cognition, but 
rather find weakness in Hauser’s weak claim – that the linguistic analogy provides new 
and important questions for investigating moral behavior. Dupoux and Jacob find that 
there is not enough similarity between moral behavior and linguistic behavior to assert a 
moral grammar (e.g., moral competence lacks grammatical structure) and that using the 
linguistic analogy to drive investigations of moral cognition only confounds the 
research98. 
 
 While work by Greene and Hauser has progressed from theory to brain 
experiments, other researchers have chosen to begin with examination the brain to 
                                                 
94 Hauser, M. D. (2006). Moral Minds: How Nature Designed a Universal Sense of Right and Wrong. New 
York, Harper Collins. 
95 Prinz, J. J. (2007). Is Morality Innate? Moral Psychology, vol. 1: Evolution of Morals. W. Sinnott-
Armstrong. Cambridge, MA, MIT Press. 
96 As an example, Prinz points out that fire, clothing and marriage are universal or nearly universal cultural 
behaviors, but are not generally thought to be innate.  
97 Dupoux E, J. P. (2007). "Universal moral grammar: a critical appraisal." Trends in Cognitive Sciences 
11(9): 373-378. 
98 Dupoux, E. and P. Jacob (2008). "Response to Dwyer and Hauser: Sounding the retreat?" Trends in 
Cognitive Sciences 12(1): 2-3. 
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uncover the features of moral cognition. Functional MRI has helped researchers 
investigate the brain networks that support moral cognition in normal subjects as well as  
in studying subjects with brain damage that show deficits in moral behaviors. Jorge Moll 
and his colleagues did a meta-analysis of fMRI and lesion data from studies of moral 
cognition. While the tasks varied greatly (from pictorial to written stimuli), the areas of 
activation were remarkably consistent across modalities and task requirements99. Orbital 
frontal cortex (OFC) (BA 10/11/25) is activated, particularly the medial OFC and damage 
to mOFC may cause deficiencies in pride, embarrassment and regret. Posterior superior 
temporal sulcus (STS) (BA 21/39) is thought to be a key area for social perception100 and 
damage to this area may result in problems attributing intentionality (as in autism) which 
may reduce the experience of pride and embarrassment101. The anterior temporal lobes 
(BA20/21/38) are activated reliably and it is known that developmental damage to these 
areas can impair moral behavior. Other areas of activation include the insula, precuneus 
(BA 7/31), and anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) (BA 24, 32). ACC activation has been 
shown, however, to be correlated to the difficulty of the moral decision. The anterior PFC 
(including the frontal polar cortex, BA 9/10) is highly activated, however these findings 
were mediated by task somewhat. Anterior PFC is activated by moral judgments when 
compared to non-emotional factual judgments, but not when compared to a social-
emotional condition. (In that case a more ventral region of the PFC was activated.)  Moll 
                                                 
99 Moll J., Z. R., de Oliveira-Souza R., Krueger F., Grafman J. (2005). "The neural basis of human moral 
cognition." Nature Reviews Neuroscience 6(10): 799–809. 
100 It is worth nothing that the STS is thought to do more than just social perception. Heberlein, A. S. and R. 
Adolphs (2005). The anatomy of human social cognition. The Cognitive Neuroscience of Social Behaviour. 
A. E. Easton, Nathan. Philadelphia, Psychology Press: 157-194. “These three component processes – 
recognition of body form and biological motion, recognition of goal directedness, and mental state 
attribution – are all components of social cognition, and recent evidence indicates that distinct regions 
within posterior STS cortices subserve each of these three processes.”  
101 Problems with the STS in autism are thought to be caused by difficulty with neuronal targeting rather 
than damage, per se. 
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suggests that there is emerging evidence for a “partially dissociable PFC-temporal- 
limbic” network that represents moral emotions like guilt and embarrassment.  
 In other work, Moll and colleagues have shown that moral emotions (evoked with 
visual stimuli) selectively activate the OFC, medial PFC and STS when compared to 
evoked basic emotions102. They found similar results when using a sentence verification 
task to show that the left medial OFC, temporal pole and STS show selective activation to 
moral judgments but not to unpleasant emotional (non-moral) judgments103. Recently, 
they have found that a fronto-mesolimbic network is activated by charitable donations, 
including the medial and lateral OFC. Most interestingly, they found that more anterior 
areas of the PFC were activated when subjects made altruistic choices instead of selfish 
ones104.  
Moll proposes that understanding the neural architecture that underlies moral 
behavior presents evidence for a new model of moral cognition105. Specifically, “moral 
cognitive phenomena emerge from the integration of content- and context-dependent 
representations in cortical-limbic networks.”106 This model asserts that event-feature-
emotion complexes (EFECs) give rise to moral behaviors. Briefly, this framework 
encorporates the ability to represent large numbers of possible outcomes, evaluate them 
based on their emotional salience and their relevance to social features and make 
                                                 
102 Moll, J., R. de Oliveira-Souza, et al. (2002). "The neural correlates of moral sensitivity: A functional 
magnetic resonance imaging investigation of basic and moral emotions." The Journal of Neuroscience 
22(7): 2730-2736. 
103 Moll, J., de Oliveira-Souza, Ricardo, Bramati, Ivanei E., Grafman, Jordan (2002). "Functional networks 
in emotional moral and nonmoral social judgments." NeuroImage 16(3): 696-703. 
104 Moll, J. (2006). "Human fronto-mesolimbic networks guide decisions about charitable donation." 
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 103(42): 15623. 
105 Moll J., Z. R., de Oliveira-Souza R., Krueger F., Grafman J. (2005). "The neural basis of human moral 
cognition." Nature Reviews Neuroscience 6(10): 799–809. Moll, J., de Oliveira-Souza, Ricardo,  Eslinger, 
Paul J. (2003). "Morals and the human brain: a working model." Neuroreport 14(3): 299-305. 
106 Moll J., Z. R., de Oliveira-Souza R., Krueger F., Grafman J. (2005). "The neural basis of human moral 
cognition." Nature Reviews Neuroscience 6(10): 799–809. p. 804. 
  37 
decisions that result in behavior that we perceive as moral. As an aside, it is interesting to 
consider the ramifications of this model for a naturalized moral position. Moll suggests 
that this neural framework arises out of neural structures that produce some proto-moral 
emotions in other primates (empathy, altruism). However, this model leaves open the 
possibility that while structures that produce these behaviors may be similar throughout 
the human population, that the behaviors that are produced by these EFECs could be 
dramatically different across the globe.  
  
 A number of researchers have shown that adult onset-damage to the PFC creates a 
selective deficit in actual moral behavior without impairing explicit moral knowledge107. 
Work by Anderson, et al. demonstrated that this dissociation did not exist in subjects 
whose brain damage was incurred in childhood108. These subjects had intact cognitive 
abilities but were unable to learn appropriate moral conventions (despite behavioral 
training); and showed abnormal skin conductance responses (SCRs) to the Iowa 
Gambling Task, suggesting an insensitivity to risky behavior. It is worth noting that this 
is distinctly different than the findings in psychopaths, who appear to behave abnormally 
from childhood, show abnormal SCRs, but have the ability to explicitly describe moral 
rules (but not distinguish them from conventional (non-moral rules)109.  
                                                 
107 Damasio, A. R. (1994). Descartes' Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain. New York, 
Grosset/Putnam. Grafman, J. (1995). Similarities and distinctions among current models of prefrontal 
cortical functions. Structure and Functions of the Human Prefrontal Cortex. K. J. H. J. Grafman, & F. 
Boller. New York, New York Academy of Sciences: 337-368. 
108 Anderson, S. W., A. Bechara, et al. (1999). "Impairment of social and moral behavior related to early 
damage in human prefrontal cortex." Nature Neuroscience 2: 1032-1037. 
109 Psychopathy and its intersection with moral neuroscience has been extensively studied by scientists like 
Adrian Raine and James Blair, but a detailed discussion of that work is beyond the scope of this 
dissertation. 
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These findings prompted researchers in philosophy, psychology and neuroscience 
to consider their theories in an empirical light. Adina Roskies, a philosopher and 
neuroscientist, used data about adult-onset damage to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex 
(VMPFC) to challenge the philosophical theory of ‘motive internalism’, the idea that 
moral judgments and their motivating factors are fundamentally connected110. Shaun 
Nichols, an empirical philosopher, has used data about psychopaths to argue that moral 
rationalism is challenged by the findings that psychopathy is fundamentally an emotional 
disorder, not due to disordered reasoning111.  
Michael Koenigs and colleagues used the standard Greene dilemmas to test the 
utilitarian judgments of subjects with adult-onset VMPFC damage112,113. The personal 
moral dilemmas were categorized as high conflict or low conflict based on the reaction 
times necessary for subjects to respond. (This yielded a similar set to the ones that Greene 
used.) As in Greene’s work, reaction time was used to measure the difficulty subjects 
were likely having when balancing strong emotional reactions with the more pragmatic 
(or utilitarian) choice to save more people. Subjects with damage to the VMPFC were 
much more likely to endorse a utilitarian choice (e.g., push the man off the footbridge) 
than the normal or brain damaged control subjects when faced with high conflict 
dilemmas. There was no difference from controls, however, on the low conflict 
dilemmas, suggesting that subjects with VMPFC damage do not have the same emotional 
                                                 
110Roskies, A. (2006). "Patients with ventromedial frontal damage have moral beliefs." Philosophical 
Psychology 19(5): 617-627. Cummiskey, D. (1996). Kantian Consequentialism, Oxford University Press. 
111Nichols, S. (2002). "How Psychopaths Threaten Moral Rationalism, or Is it Irrational to Be Amoral?" 
The Monist 85: 285-304. 
112 Koenigs, M., L. Young, et al. (2007). "Damage to the prefrontal cortex increases utilitarian moral 
judgements." Nature 446: 908–911. 
113Ciaramelli et al conducted a quite similar experiment with nearly identical findings. Ciaramelli, E., M. 
Muccioli, et al. (2007). "Selective deficit in personal moral judgment following damage to ventromedial 
prefrontal cortex." Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience 2(2): 84-92. 
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conflict that normal subjects do. The interpretation of these findings has been publicly 
debated by Greene and by Moll, et al.114 Both groups feel that these data can be used to 
exclusively support their model of moral decision making. Koenigs, et al. have also 
publicly responded to philosophical arguments that their chosen dilemmas do not 
adequately reflect utilitarian choices115, by reanalyzing their data in terms of 
consequence, duty and self-interest. These analyses further supported the original 
finding116, showing that subjects with VMPFC damage differ only in scenarios that were 
designated ‘consequence vs. duty’. The debates that surround these research serve to 
highlight the interdisciplinary interest in moral cognition and the need for further research 
in this field. 
 A small number of neuroscientists have also begun using stimuli other than the 
trolley problem dilemmas to investigate moral judgment. Heekeren, et al. asked subjects 
to judge the correctness of sentences presented to them117. These sentences contained 
moral content (e.g., stealing a car) and grammatical errors. Before each trial, subjects 
were told to either judge the moral correctness or the grammatical correctness of the 
sentence. fMRI analysis showed that posterior STS and VMPFC were activated during 
the ethical dilemmas but not the grammatical ones. Borg, et al., investigated a range of 
philosophical theories (consequentialism, doctrine of doing and allowing, doctrine of 
                                                 
114 Greene, J. D. (2007). "Why are VMPFC patients more utilitarian? A dual-process theory of moral 
judgment explains." Trends in Cognitive Sciences 11(8): 322-323. Moll, J., and de Oliveira-Souza, R. 
(2007). "Response to Greene: Moral sentiments and reason: friends or foes?" Trends in Cognitive Sciences 
11(8): 323-324. 
115 Kahane, G. and N. Shackel (2008). "Do abnormal responses show utilitarian bias?" Nature 452(7185): 
E5-E5. 
116 Koenigs, M., L. Young, R. Adolphs, D. Tranel, F. Cushman, M. Hauser, A. Damasio Ibid."Koenigs et 
al. reply." E5-E6. 
117 Heekeren, H. R., I. Wartenburger, et al. (2003). "An fMRI study of simple ethical decision-making." 
Neuroreport 14(9): 1215-1219. 
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double effect) using systematically varied, third-person, moral scenarios118. Subjects were 
asked about the moral correctness of each scenario and whether they would do the action 
in the scenario. fMRI showed that these various philosophical perspectives could be 
differentiated by the types of activation each elicited. Berthoz, et al., used first-person 
and third-person scenarios to examine whether intentionality and personal involvement 
interacted in moral judgment119. They found differential amygdala activation for 
situations where the subject imagined themselves to be personally involved in the 
transgression. Young, et al., investigated intentionality using scenarios developed by 
Knobe120 with subjects with VMPFC damage121. These third-person scenarios have been 
used to show an asymmetry of assigning intention when hurting is compared to 
helping122. VMPFC damage does not affect the way that subjects respond to these 
dilemmas, suggesting that attribution of intention is not an emotional process123.  
                                                 
118 Borg, J. S., C. Hynes, et al. (2006). "Consequences, Action, and Intention as Factors in Moral 
Judgments: An fMRI Investigation." Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience 18(5): 803-817. 
119 Berthoz, S., J. Grezes, et al. (2006). "Affective response to one’s own moral violations." NeuroImage 
31: 945-950. 
120 Knobe, J. (2003). "Intentional action and side effects in ordinary language." Analysis 63: 190-193. 
121 Young, L., F. Cushman, et al. (2006). "Does Emotion Mediate the Effect of an Action’s Moral Status on 
its Intentional Status? Neuropsychological Evidence." Journal of Cognition and Culture 6: 291-304. 
122 An example of the Knobe scenarios: 
Harm vignette: 
The vice-president of a company went to the chairman of the board and said, "We are thinking of 
starting a new program. It will help us increase profits, and it will also harm the environment." 
The chairman of the board answered, "I don’t care at all about harming the environment. I just 
want to make as much profit as I can. Let’s start the new program." They started the new program. 
Sure enough, the environment was harmed. Did the chairman intentionally harm the 
environment? 
Help vignette: 
The vice-president of a company went to the chairman of the board and said, "We are thinking of 
starting a new program. It will help us increase profits, and it will also help the environment." 
The chairman of the board answered, "I don’t care at all about helping the environment. I just 
want to make as much profit as I can. Let’s start the new program." They started the new program. 
Sure enough, the environment was helped. Did the chairman intentionally help the environment? 
123 Of course, this assumes that emotional deficits cause the problems with moral judgment shown in other 
studies. 
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All of the stimuli used by these researchers have been designed to elicit results 
based on specific models. They vary in realism, style and perspective. One of the goals of 
this work is to provide a set of standardized stimuli from which many researchers can 
draw, independent from the models or ideas that they are interested in studying. For 
example, a researcher could choose a large set of stimuli with which to study 
intentionality from the database. These narratives could be modified in much the way 
Knobe did in order to create harm/help variations. The distinction lies in the way that the 
subjects perceive the narrative. Using real narrative provides a sense of understanding 
that is missing when reading a third-person narrative about a ‘chairman of the board’. 
The collaboration of these researchers over time will contribute even further to the 
characterization of these narratives. These narratives provide a uniform set of stimuli 
from which to draw, facilitating the study of moral cognition. 
In biology, there is always an interplay between in vivo and in vitro studies. 
Scientists need the simplicity of experiments in a petri dish to understand what is 
happening in a live animal. However, the effects in an experimental system are never 
assumed to be the same as the effects in real life. Similarly, current moral neuroscientists 
feel that there is a need for both of these techniques for studying moral cognition. Moll 
highlights the need for realistic moral stimuli saying, “The making of moral judgements 
[sic] on extreme and unfamiliar situations, such as those posed by classic moral 
dilemmas, offers interesting ways to probe philosophical points of view, but can hardly 
be taken as a proxy for everyday moral reasoning”, while Hauser justifies using the 
trolley problem in moral neuroscience in a similar way:  
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“[B]y using artificial cases we can guarantee that subjects will have no familiarity 
with or personal attachment to the particular details of the case. … [E]ach case 
can be modified in critical ways in order to isolate salient dimensions. 
Consequently, the use of artificial moral dilemmas to explore our moral 
psychology is like the use of theoretical or statistical models with different 
parameters; parameters can be added or subtracted in order to determine which 
parameters contribute most significantly to the output.124” 
This point is well-taken and there is a valid position for moral dilemmas in studying 
moral cognition. However, as in other biological systems, these findings do not tell us 
what happens in normal brains making everyday moral judgments, only in brains 
analyzing moral dilemmas. 
 The permutation of the trolley problem by ‘adding or subtracting parameters’ has 
taken these dilemmas far from the realm of believability. Foot’s original trolley problem 
involved a tram with a driver at the wheel125, a situation that is not so hard to imagine in 
San Francisco in the 1970s. The current version used by Greene, Hauser and others 
requires the subject to imagine him or herself as a bystander to a runaway trolley in a 
remote location with hikers on two parallel tracks and a switch nearby. These scenarios 
lack any element of realism. The presentation of only two possibilities and the way that 
the binary choice is worded, “Is it permissible?” or “Should the person switch the 
trolley?” further requires the subject to make a non-natural decision. Why can’t the 
bystander yell to the hikers on the track? How do we know that the hikers will be killed? 
                                                 
124 Hauser, M. D., F. Cushman, et al. (2007). "A dissociation between moral judgments and justifications." 
Mind & Language 22(1): 1-21. 
125 Foot, P. (1978). The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of the Double Effect in Virtues and Vices 
and Other Essays in Moral Philosophy. Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press. 
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In Foot’s original paper, she cites the possibility that the single person won’t come to 
harm as a reason why we might find the switching action acceptable. “In real life it would 
hardly ever be certain that the man on the narrow track would be killed. Perhaps he might 
find a foothold on the side of the tunnel and cling on as the vehicle hurtled by. The driver 
of the tram does not then leap off and brain him with a crowbar.126” 
 Realistic moral stimuli, like the ones included in this database, will allow 
researchers to investigate the nuances of moral judgments that people make in their daily 
lives. These insights, combined with the findings from more ‘experimental systems’ like 
the trolley problem may help to elucidate the mechanisms of moral judgment, the role of 
decision-making and the brain areas that subsume these processes. 
 
Commentary on Moral Reasoning: 
In their paper, “How (and where) does moral judgment work?”, Greene and Haidt 
make a strong case for moral intuition dominating moral reasoning in human behavior. 
They specifically cite evidence from evolutionary biology, primatology and psychology 
that suggests that the human ability to make moral decisions evolved from altruistic 
behaviors within groups, cheating and cooperative behaviors. These arguments are 
convincing and I believe that moral intuition likely drives much of human moral decision 
making and perception. However, in documenting the evidence for moral emotions as the 
primary player, they relegate moral reasoning to a position of ‘has-been’; a post-hoc 
explanatory tool for why we make choices that are hidden from our conscious perception. 
I suspect that this downplays moral reasoning too much. I would suggest that moral 
                                                 
126 Foot, P. (1978). The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of the Double Effect in Virtues and Vices 
and Other Essays in Moral Philosophy. Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press. p. 23 
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reasoning evolved to help us with a problem that Greene and Haidt have also relegated to 
the back burner – the problem that Kohlberg defined as the delineation between people 
who achieve the conventional stage and those who arrive at post-conventional reasoning. 
More simply, this is the problem of perspective-taking. We encounter many situations 
that require us to weigh multiple perspectives when making a decision. An example:  
A staunch liberal rises through the ranks of an industry and eventually is able to 
start a business of his own. Throughout his days as a worker, he was a union 
member and staunch supporter of union workers. His new business, however, is 
suffering from the heavy burden of union wages and may be forced to close if he 
does not choose to hire workers who are non-union (thus less expensive). 
This business owner has several choices available to him and will make some decision 
about what to do. Moral intuition would focus our attention on the owner’s possible 
choices and how he feels about them in determining his decision. Whatever his decision 
was, we would claim that his purported reasons for deciding were merely a post-hoc 
interpretation of his ‘gut’ feelings. And I do not dispute that this may be what the owner 
does when he makes his choice. However, I would argue that moral reasoning is available 
for doing something different. It is allowing the owner to weigh different ‘gut’ feelings. If 
he puts himself in the shoes of a business owner, he finds that he feels strongly that he 
must protect his company from harm. From this perspective, the union workers who want 
more money are greedy; bad people damaging his company. We know that he once was a 
union worker and may be able to put himself in the union worker’s shoes. From that 
perspective, the union workers are not greedy; they’re only trying to make enough money 
to feed their families. They need the money and they are good people, trying to earn a 
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living. (Additionally, there are probably many other perspectives – his stockholders, his 
family, etc.) The owner may use moral intuition to decide which of these perspectives is 
best, which ‘feels’ right, but I suggest that this may be an iterative process, rather than a 
singular one. The owner cannot merely ‘feel’ what the right decision is, he must ‘feel’ 
many things and then ‘feel’ the choice that he decides upon. One can argue that this is 
merely iterative moral intuition, but I think that as the choices become more difficult, as 
the perception of moral ‘rightness’ becomes more cloudy, conscious perspective-taking 
becomes necessary for people to parse out what exactly they ‘feel’, and that is moral 
‘reasoning’. 
 There is some support for this idea in the current literature. Moll, et al.’s model of 
EFECs seems to incorporate this view of moral reasoning nicely. “Our view posits a 
central role for the human ability to represent and evaluate large sets of possible event 
outcomes, which are linked to motivational salience through cortical-limbic 
integration127.” The brain structures involved in Moll’s model seem to support moral 
reasoning acting as a mental simulation of moral intuition under various circumstances. 
Dupoux and Jacob suggest that “moral dilemmas are cases in which moral judgment is 
achieved by a process of adjudication between two (or more) conflicting intuitions, and 
that an agent’s explicit moral beliefs might contribute to this process128.” Experimental 
philosophers like Shaun Nichols feel that “judgments of whether an action is wrong, all 
things considered, implicate a complex set of psychological processes, including 
                                                 
127 Moll J., Z. R., de Oliveira-Souza R., Krueger F., Grafman J. (2005). "The neural basis of human moral 
cognition." Nature Reviews Neuroscience 6(10): 799–809. p. 806. 
128 Dupoux, E. and P. Jacob (2008). "Response to Dwyer and Hauser: Sounding the retreat?" Trends in 
Cognitive Sciences 12(1): 2-3. 
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representations of rules, emotional responses, and assessments of costs and benefits129.” 
More research may provide further data about the role of moral reasoning in moral 
cognition. The current trend, however, of dismissing it entirely because rationalism does 
not dominate moral cognition seems short-sighted, at least to this scientist. 
 
Section 4: Autobiographical Memory 
 
 
“Life is that property of matter whereby it can remember.  Matter which can remember 
is living; matter which cannot remember is dead.  Life, then, is memory.” 
 -Samuel Butler, Life and Habit (1910) 
 
While the primary aim of my dissertation was to investigate moral events that 
people experience in everyday life, the method for obtaining descriptions of those moral 
events was, of necessity, through memory. Thus, the corpus of data represented in the 
database of moral events (Chapter 3) is filtered through the lens of autobiographical 
memory, which we review briefly in this section. 
Textbooks and lectures on memory in its broadest sense typically subdivide it into 
two broad kinds:  declarative and nondeclarative. These two kinds show different 
psychological properties, and are known to rely on different neural systems130. While 
declarative memory is relatively homogeneous and depends primarily on a single 
memory system, non-declarative memory is heterogeneous and lumps together forms of 
memory as diverse as Pavlovian fear conditioning (which depends on the amygdala), 
                                                 
129 Nichols, S. and R. Mallon (2006). "Moral dilemmas and moral rules." Cognition 100(3): 530-542. 
130Squire, L. R. (1986). "Mechanisms of memory." Science 232: 1612-1619.; Squire, L. R. and S. M. Zola 
(1996). "Structure and function of declarative and nondeclarative memory systems." PNAS 93: 13515-
13522. 
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eyeblink conditioning (which depends on the cerebellum), skill learning (which depends 
on the basal ganglia), and forms of motor and perceptual learning (which can depend on 
specific sensory cortices). Non-declarative memory is essentially defined by exclusion:  
all of those forms of memory that are not declarative. (Figure 4 shows the organization of 
memory.) Since this dissertation only concerns declarative memory, this is briefly 
discussed next. 
Declarative memory is that form of memory that we can recollect, talk about, 
think about, and experience in consciousness. However, since its initial psychological 
definition, there have been several other views that try to get at the essence of declarative 
memory. One currently popular view is that declarative memory is distinguished by the 
large number of relationships between stored items. Thus, “declarative memory” is 
sometimes rephrased as “relational memory”, and has been studied in animals as well as 
in humans as the ability to encode relationships, which can be temporal, spatial, or 
semantic131.  Spatial memory is one aspect of declarative memory that has been studied in 
great detail in rodents, for instance in their ability to remember where a hidden platform 
is located in a water tank in relation to the configuration of a number of spatial cues. 
Declarative memory in humans is usually divided into two further categories. One 
is semantic memory, the other is episodic memory. Semantic memory is memory for 
facts, such as knowing that Canada is located north of the USA or that Paris is the capital 
of France. Episodic memory, the form that is relevant to this dissertation, is memory for a 
particular, dated, personal, episode of experience. Thus, if you were able to recollect a 
specific experience (say, sitting in class in grade school on one sunny morning) where 
                                                 
131 Eichenbaum, H., T. Otto, et al. (1994). "Two functional components of the hippocampal memory 
system." Behavioral & Brain Sciences 17: 449-518. 
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you learned that Paris is the capital of France, this would count as episodic memory 
(technically, a form of episodic memory that is called “source memory”, since it is 
memory for the source of a semantic memory). 
Episodic memory is the form of memory that is most prominent in our 
autobiography (although autobiographical memory can also include semantic 
components, such as knowing your name and age, for example). The psychologist Endel 
Tulving132  first elaborated on the nature of episodic memory, and stressed one of its 
essential features:  the recollection of episodic memories is always accompanied by the 
conscious re-experience of the episode, often complete with strong personal emotions.  
Tulving called this aspect of episodic memory “autonoetic memory” to emphasize its 
personal nature. Episodic memories include all specific memories that we can 
consciously bring to mind as particular events when we recollect them, but it is important 
to emphasize several criteria that have become standard in memory research for ensuring 
that the memory is really episodic. These are criteria I also used in order to select 
memories in the studies described in this dissertation. 
 
(a) It must be a specific event. Generic memories that abstract over several events are 
not episodic memory. Typically, a subject should be able to date the memory, or 
to locate it within a temporal context (what came before, and what came 
afterwards). 
(b) It must be a personal memory. Memories for things that happened to other people 
but were not personally witnessed are not episodic. 
                                                 
132 Tulving, E. (1972). Episodic and semantic memory. Organization of Memory. New York, Academic Press: 381-
403. 
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(c) It must be a memory that can be recollected in vivid conscious detail. Typically, 
the recollection of episodic memories involves sensory experiences in the same 
modalities as those in which the experienced memory initially occurs. For 
instance, remembering the explosion of the Challenger space shuttle typically 
involves a visual re-experience of seeing the explosion on TV and may include 
auditory experiences of the voice of the newscaster, etc. 
(d) Episodic memories are usually emotionally laden, often highly so. Strongly 
emotional personal memories are a particular class of episodic memory that has 
been studied in great detail.  These are the kinds of memories most relevant to this 
dissertation. 
 
While there is essentially unanimous agreement that nondeclarative memory types are 
found in most other animals, and while there is agreement that declarative memory is 
found in many higher animals, there is heated debate about the phylogenetic continuity of 
episodic memory. Because episodic memory, at least according to Tulving’s view, 
essentially involves a specific link to space, time, and person, and because it involves 
conscious experience, it has been difficult to demonstrate in animals. There is some 
evidence that other animals, notably corvid birds, exhibit the specificity in space, time, 
and person, but it is unclear how to assess the ingredient of conscious re-experience. 
Declarative memory is known to depend on the medial temporal lobe, notably the 
hippocampus and adjacent perirhinal and parahippocampal cortices. It also involves other 
structures of the brain, such as the basal forebrain, the anterior thalamus, and the 
mamillary bodies. The best studied neuronal circuit that is an essential component of 
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declarative memory is long-term potentiation in the hippocampus, a mechanism that has 
been investigated in molecular detail and that is known to involve a particular form of 
Hebbian learning mechanism involving a specific subtype of the glutamate receptor. 
However, the neural basis of episodic memory more specifically has been much more 
elusive. Functional imaging studies in humans have suggested that the frontal lobes are 
particularly important, although all of the structures more generally involved in 
declarative memory, including the hippocampus, are also essential. 
Human lesion studies have clearly and famously tied declarative memory to the 
medial temporal lobe. Following the description of Milner and Scoville’s famous patient 
H.M. (who had bilateral medial temporal lobe lesions and a severe amnesia)133, 
subsequent studies have argued that damage to specific sectors of the hippocampal 
formation is sufficient to prevent the encoding of new declarative memories134. The kind 
of amnesia produced by medial temporal lobe lesions has two important features. First, it 
is mainly anterograde, that is, an inability to encode new memories. Second, there is a 
lesser impairment in the retrograde direction (the time prior to the onset of the lesion), but 
this is graded in time such that memories that were encoded close in time to the point of 
the lesion are the most damaged, whereas remote memories that were acquired long 
before the lesion are intact. This feature supports the hypothesis that the hippocampus is 
essential for encoding new declarative memories, but that over time the declarative 
memories become independent of the hippocampus, a process called “consolidation”. 
There is vigorous debate about the role of the hippocampal formation in episodic 
                                                 
133 Scoville, W. and B. Milner (1957). "Loss of recent memory after hippocampal lesions." Journal of 
Neurology, Neurosurgery and Psychiatry 20: 11-21. 
134  Zola-Morgan, S., L. R. Squire, et al. (1986). "Human amnesia and the medial temporal region: enduring 
memory impairment following a bilateral lesion limited to field CA1 of the hippocampus." The Journal of 
Neuroscience 6(10): 2950-2967. 
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declarative memories, with some arguments that the hippocampus may be necessary at all 
times for the encoding, consolidation and possibly even recollection of episodic events. 
Finally, it is worth noting that emotional episodic memories, as already hinted above, 
are a category of memory of particular interest to psychologists and have been studied in 
great detail. Part of the reason is that they in fact constitute the most salient part of our 
autobiography. Another part is that it is known that emotional memories are encoded 
preferentially over less emotional memories, with the result that we remember best those 
events in our lives that were the most emotionally arousing. And the topic is, of course, 
of interest also from the perspective of traumatic memories and eyewitness testimony. 
The neural systems involved in emotional memory have been studied by a number of 
people, perhaps most notably James McGaugh at U.C. Irvine135. Studies in both animals 
and humans have argued that emotional memory depends on modulation of hippocampal-
dependent memory by other structures, such as the amygdala. In humans, lesions of the 
amygdala impair the acquisition of emotional episodic memories, and in functional 
imaging studies, investigators have found reliable activation of the amygdala when 
people encode emotional, but not neutral, events into declarative memory136. 
The type of memory involved in producing the collection of moral events described 
in this dissertation is a form of emotional, episodic memory. It is autobiographical, 
personal, dated, and specific, and as far as the selection of moral memories is concerned, 
it is typically emotional. It would thus be expected to feature some of the attributes of 
                                                 
135McGaugh, J. L. (1990). "Significance and remembrance: the role of neuromodulatory systems." 
Psychological Science 1: 15-25. McGaugh, J. L. (2000). "Memory-- a century of consolidation." Science 
287: 248-251. McGaugh, J. L. (2002). "Memory consolidation and the amygdala: a systems perspective." 
TINS 25: 456-461. McGaugh, J. L. (2004). "The amygdala modulates the consolidation of memories of 
emotionally arousing experiences." Annual Review of Neuroscience 27: 1-28. 
136 Cahill, L., R. J. Haier, et al. (1996). "Amygdala activity at encoding correlated with long-term, free 
recall of emotional information." Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 93: 8016-8021. 
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emotional memories in general – the memories should be vivid, highly memorable, and 
able to re-evoke the emotions with which they were associated at encoding. All of these 
features no doubt contributed to the rich and detailed data that was obtained on our task.  
Some additional features of emotional memory contributed to the hypotheses that we 
tested on our data, described in Chapter 4 – for instance, we expected them to depend on 
the prefrontal cortex and we expected their recollection to show a particular temporal 
distribution that might highlight adolescence/early adulthood, when the highest density of 
emotional events is normally encountered in life. 
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Chapter 1: Figures and Tables 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“A man's moral worth is not measured by what his religious beliefs are but rather by what 
emotional impulses he has received from Nature during his lifetime.” 
-- Albert Einstein 
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Figure 1: Timeline of Writing about Morality 
 
427 BCE Plato born in Athens 
384 BCE Aristotle born in Northern Greece 
1751 David Hume publishes "An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals" 
1785 Immanuel Kant publishes "Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals" 
1789 
Jeremy Bentham publishes "An Introduction to the Principles of Morals 
and Legislation" 
1861 John Stuart Mill publishes "Utilitarianism" 
1930 C.D. Broad coins the term 'deontology' 
1932 Jean Piaget publishes "The Moral Judgment of the Child" 
1958 
Lawrence Kohlberg publishes "The Development Modes of Thinking and 
Choices in Years 10 to 16", his PhD work on moral development 
1974 John Rawls makes the linguistic analogy in "A Theory of Justice" 
1977 
Carol Gilligan publishes "In a Different Voice: Women's Conceptions of 
Self and Morality" 
1978 
Philippa Foot publishes the trolley problem in "Virtues and Vices and 
Other Essays in Moral Philosophy" 
2001 
Jonathan Haidt publishes "The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail: A 
Social Intuitionist Approach to Moral Psychology" 
2001 
Joshua Greene publishes "An fMRI Investigation of Emotional 
Engagement in Moral Judgment" 
2003 Marc Hauser puts "The Moral Sense Test" online 
Present Publications in moral neuroscience become much more frequent 
427 
BCE 
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Figure 2: Kohlberg’s Stages of Moral Development 
 
 Approximate Age Range Stage Sub-Stage 
View of 
Person 
Social 
Perspective 
Level 
6 
Personal 
moral 
standards 
Sees how 
human 
fallibility and 
frailty are 
impacted by 
communication 
Mutual 
respect as a 
universal 
principle 
5 
Age 20+, maybe 
never Postconventional
Agreed 
upon rights 
Recognizes 
that contracts 
will allow 
persons to 
increase 
welfare of both 
Contractual 
perspective 
4 Duty & Guilty 
Able to see 
abstract 
normative 
systems 
Social 
systems 
perspective 
3 
Age 9 to 20 Conventional 
Gain 
approval 
and avoid 
disapproval 
Recognize 
good and bad 
intentions 
Social 
relationships 
perspective 
2 Gain Reward 
Sees that a) 
others have 
goals and 
preferences, b) 
wither conform 
to or deviate 
from norms 
Intrumental 
egoism 
1 
Birth to 9 Preconventional 
Avoid 
punishment 
No VOP: only 
self & norm 
are recognized 
Blind 
egoism 
 
This figure was compiled from two existing figures: one found in (Walker, 1989) and one 
found online (Huff). 
  56 
Figure 3: Features of the Two Cognitive Processing Systems 
 
General Features of the Two Systems 
The intuitive system The reasoning system 
Fast and effortless 
Process is unintentional and runs 
automatically 
Process is inaccessible; only results enter 
awareness 
Does not demand attentional resources 
Parallel distributed processing 
Pattern matching; thought is metaphorical, 
holistic 
Common to all mammals 
Context dependent 
Platform dependent (depends on the brain 
and body that houses it) 
 
Slow and effortful 
Process is intentional and controllable 
Process is consciously accessible and 
viewable 
Demands attentional resources, which are 
limited 
Serial processing 
Symbol manipulation; thought is truth 
preserving, analytical 
Unique to humans over age 2 and perhaps 
some language-trained apes 
Context independent 
Platform independent (the process can be 
transported to any rule following 
organism or machine) 
 
 
This figure is reproduced from (Haidt, 2001). 
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Figure 4: Structure of Memory 
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Chapter 2: Methods and Materials 
 
This dissertation had two main aims. First, I wanted to characterize in detail 
representative moral events, as remembered by typical people. This meant recruiting a 
representative sample of participants in the first place, then probing their recollections of 
real-life moral events in as unbiased a manner as possible. To this end, I recruited 
participants with diverse gender, ethnicity and socioeconomic status and queried their 
memories with an evenly distributed set of cue words. These data were entered into a 
comprehensive database for the second main aim: to investigate their semantic structure, 
temporal distribution and association with demographic or psychological factors. This 
second aim tested several specific hypotheses about the nature of moral events that 
people would have encountered in real life. In addition to these two main aims, we also 
carried out an independent study in neurological patients in order to gain some 
preliminary insight into the possible role that certain brain structures (notably the 
ventromedial prefrontal cortex) might play in recollecting moral events. Finally, by 
setting up such a database containing the transcripts of real-life moral events together 
with their eliciting cues and the characteristics of the people who generated them, these 
narratives can be made available as stimuli for future experiments and the database for 
further data mining. 
 To address all these aims, we first needed to develop a database of real-life moral 
memories that were well-characterized in all respects. We recruited participants to 
participate in a cued memory recall protocol, designed to elicit morally laden memories.  
These were subsequently selected, transcribed, entered into a database described in 
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Chapter 3, and analyzed to yield results to several experimental questions described in 
Chapter 4.  
 
Section 1: Participants 
 
Participants contacted us in response to an advertisement, were screened over the 
phone and in the lab, provided informed consent once they met our 
inclusionary/exclusionary criteria, then filled out background demographic and 
psychological information, before proceeding to the experimental task. 
  
Recruitment: 
Healthy adults (final n =100) were recruited at Caltech (Pasadena, CA) using an 
online job posting website, Craig’s List137. Participants were paid $15/hour for their time 
throughout the experiment and the recruitment advertisement stated that participants 
could make $100 or more. (Most participants made slightly more than $100.) This sample 
was self-selecting and all had access to computers, but given the wide availability of 
computers in local libraries and job resource centers, we do not believe that we skewed 
the distribution by using a computerized recruiting technique. Prospective participants 
were initially screened over the telephone and additionally screened in the lab. The 
following criteria were used to determine our experimental pool.  
 
Inclusionary criteria: All participants were between 40 and 60 years old and were 
screened for coherence and fluency in their English language skills, although they were 
                                                 
137 Craig’s List Los Angeles can be found at: http://www.losangeles.craigslist.com. 
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not required to be native English speakers. All must have been residents of Southern 
California for the past 15 years or more.  In addition, all participants were asked to 
provide their occupation and permanent address in order to be included in the study. 
 
Exclusionary criteria: We excluded participants if they were currently under the 
care of a neurologist or had any history of head injury or seizures, tumor or brain surgery. 
Participants were also excluded if they had ever been diagnosed with any major 
psychiatric illness or were currently taking any medications normally prescribed for 
psychiatric conditions (such as antidepressants). Participants who were habitually 
unemployed or homeless were excluded from the study, as were those with a history of 
schizophrenia or major depressive or bipolar disorder.   
These inclusionary and exclusionary criteria provided us with a diverse sample of 
participants fairly representative of the population of California. Our sample was limited 
in that it only included English-speaking, healthy adults. 
 
Demographic Information: 
Demographic information was collected about each participant through a series of 
pencil and paper questionnaires. The population demographics of this group matched the 
California census averages on IQ (mean = 110), gender distribution and ethnicity.  The 
mean income range was $15,000 - $30,000 per year and participants’ ages were evenly 
distributed within the range (mean = 48.9). We included the expected proportion of right 
and left handed people and participants varied in occupation, sexual orientation, political, 
religious and cultural backgrounds. Overall, we believe our experimental group was a 
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representative sampling of the general, healthy, English-speaking population in Southern 
California within the given age range. Chapter 4 presents detailed demographic and 
psychological characterization of the participants. 
 
General Assessment: 
We administered a battery of background information and neuropsychological 
tests to gather further information about our participants. (These are described in detail 
later in this chapter.) This information was necessary both to characterize and examine 
the characteristics of the people who generated the moral memories for our database and 
for providing a further filter for exclusion. 
 
Further Exclusionary Criteria:  Participants were excluded from the study after the 
first testing session if they did not meet certain minimum standards. Any participant 
whose IQ was measured in the lab to be below 80 was excluded. A short, very easy 
measure of general memory was given to each participant (including questions about the 
identity of the current president and capital of the state they were born in). All 
participants passed this memory measure, but any participant who hadn’t would have 
been excluded. Participants who were non-fluent English speakers or who spoke with an 
accent or speech impediment that made it difficult to understand them were excluded. 
(Since all data were spoken and needed to be transcribed, this was a necessity of the 
study.) Participants who displayed emotional or erratic behavior to the experimenter who 
was conducting the IQ test were excluded. Participants who took too long (greater than 2 
hours) to complete the preliminary questionnaires were not invited to complete the rest of 
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the study. (Most participants took about 1 hour to complete this task.) Participants were 
excluded from continuing the study if they provided inappropriate, incomplete or 
incomprehensible memories during the cued recall protocol. 11 participants were 
excluded after Session 1 due to these criteria; 7 participants were excluded after Session 
2. While several of these criteria were judgment calls on the part of the experimenters, all 
exclusionary criteria were made blind to the content of the moral memories a participant 
produced. 
Participants answered a variety of questions about their cultural background, 
religious and political viewpoints.  To assess cultural background, a paper and pencil 
questionnaire was administered. Each participant was asked to describe the cultural 
background in which they grew up. If the participants felt that their current culture was 
different than the one that they grew up in, they were asked to describe their current 
culture as well. Similar questions were asked about past and current religious affiliations. 
Participants wrote, on average, between one and three sentences for each of these 
questions.  
  
Section 2: Methods 
 
Initial Recruitment and Screening: 
Following telephone recruitment and screening, participants were scheduled for a 
four hour testing session to complete the initial assessments and the recall protocol. All 
participants were tested individually, in closed testing rooms, where they interacted only 
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with the two primary experimenters138 and the testing computer. There was no telephone 
or general computer access available. Throughout the testing session, participants were 
encouraged to take breaks as needed and were provided with snacks and drinks. Tissues 
were also available for emotional participants. For the researchers’ convenience, the first 
testing session was divided into two parts, participant assessment (Session One) and cued 
memory recall (Session Two).  
 
Session One Protocol: 
During Session One testing, the participants completed a group of assessments. 
After having the study explained and providing informed consent, participants began with 
a pencil and paper background questionnaire which included general demographic 
information and open-ended questions about religion and culture. Subsequent to 
completion of the background questionnaire, the Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of 
Intelligence (WASI)139 was administered by one of the primary experimenters, to test the 
participant’s IQ. The WASI is typically used for measuring IQ when the amount of time 
available is short. Our administration of the WASI took approximately 20 minutes and 
provided us with a measure of full scale IQ (FSIQ) only.  
Following the WASI, participants completed the battery of neuropsychological 
assessments (described below), in a computerized format. They were encouraged to take 
breaks between each task or as needed. Instructions were provided on the computer 
screen before each task began. Detailed descriptions of each of these tasks can be found 
                                                 
138 The two primary experimenters were Jessica Escobedo, graduate student, and Jessica Stockburger, 
Summer Undergraduate Research Fellow.  
139 Wechsler, D. (1999). Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence. San Antonio, Psychological 
Corporation. 
  64 
in Chapter 4, Section 1. The task order was fixed and tasks were presented in the 
following order:  
1. NEO Personality Inventory140. The NEO Five Factor Inventory (NEO-FFI) was 
used to evaluate participants’ personality profiles. These 5 factors describe a participant’s 
overall approach to situations and problem solving. This measure took approximately 20 
minutes to complete.  
2. Schwartz Human Value Inventory (SVI)141,142. This measure generates 10 
dimensions that measure cultural values and can be compared cross-culturally using the 
data from the European Social Survey. This task took approximately 15 minutes. 
3. Political Values Questionnaire. The political values questionnaire consisted of 
scenarios based on current political issues (including abortion, pollution and taxes). 
Participants were given three viewpoints about each issue (one conservative, one 
intermediate, one liberal) and were asked to choose the viewpoint that best fit their own. 
The task included 6 questions and took approximately 5 minutes to complete. 
4. Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS)143. The PANAS was used to 
measure a participant’s general mood and affect. We intended to use this measure to 
exclude participants who scored exceptionally high on negative affect but did not 
encounter any participants who needed to be excluded on this criterion. (This is likely 
due to the prior screenings to exclude participants with psychiatric disorders.) The test 
takes approximately 10 minutes to administer. 
                                                 
140 Costa, P. T. and R. R. McCrae (1992). NEO PI-R Professional Manual. Lutz, FL. 
141 Schwartz, S. H. (1992). "Universals in the content and structure of values: Theoretical advances and 
empirical tests in 20 countries." Advances in Experimental Social Psychology 25: 1-65. 
142 This version of the SVI was taken from (2007). "European Social Survey." from 
http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/. 
143 Watson D, C. L., Tellegen A. (1988). "Development and validation of brief measures of positive and 
negative affect: the PANAS scales." Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 54(6): 1063-1070. 
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5. Ethical Position Questionnaire (EPQ)144. The EPQ was used to measure 
participants’ degree of idealism and relativism. The newer version of the EPQ, using a 5 
point scale instead of the original 9 point scale, was administered for this study. Testing 
took approximately 5 minutes.  
 6. Religious Value Questionnaire: The religious values questionnaire was adapted 
from a test available on the internet called the Belief-O-Matic145, which measures the 
degree to which a person’s beliefs fit each major religion. This task uses 6 questions to 
evaluate participants’ religious values. It took approximately 15 minutes to complete.  
This task data is available, but scoring proved problematic and these data are not included 
in the database.  
 7. Bem Sex Role Inventory (BEM)146. The BEM is designed to measure degree of 
sexual androgyny or differentiation in participants. We initially felt that gender might 
play a role in moral recollection and wanted to include a measure that allowed us to more 
finely discriminate participants. We were not satisfied with the results from this measure 
and chose not to include them in the database. This task took approximately 10 minutes 
to complete. 
 
The computer assessments took most participants approximately one hour and a 
half to complete. Participants who had low IQ (<80), difficulty using the computer or 
difficulty completing the assessments in a reasonable amount of time were excluded at 
                                                 
144 Forsyth, D. (1980). "A Taxonomy of Ethical Ideologies." Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 
39(1): 175-184. 
145 (2000-2008). "Belief-O-Matic - A personality quiz about your religious and spiritual beliefs." from 
www.beliefnet.com/story/76/story_7665_1.html. 
146 Bem, S. L. (1981). Bem Sex-Role Inventory. Redwood City, CA, Mind Garden; Consulting 
Psychologists Press, Inc. 
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this stage. The latter was generally, but not always, due to poor literacy skills. These 
background and neuropsychological tasks were administered for two reasons. The first 
was to characterize our participants as broadly as possible. In some cases, this 
characterization provided us with covariates for our analyses. For example, we expected 
that the NEO personality types might interact with moral recollection. In other cases, 
these data provided us with criteria for matching participants in our analyses. It was 
important to measure participants’ IQ for this reason (as well as for screening purposes). 
The second reason these tasks were administered was to provide a wide range of 
measures for other researchers who might use these data. We considered that researchers 
from disciplines as diverse as anthropology and philosophy might be interested in these 
data as stimuli and included measures that we thought were applicable to these 
disciplines (e.g., cultural measures, moral dilemmas). 
 
Session Two Protocol: 
 After completion of the Session One tasks, participants were encouraged to take a 
break and then the cued memory recall task was explained. To elicit autobiographical 
memories of morally laden events, we designed a cued memory recall protocol. (The 
complete task can be found in Appendix B.) Participants received both verbal and written 
instructions about the task and were reassured at this point that their recollections would 
be confidential.  Participants were set up alone in a closed, comfortable room. They 
spoke into a microphone and their recollections were digitally recorded in two formats: to 
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the computer hard drive and to an external recording device147. These recordings were 
later transcribed by research assistants.  
 The computer-administered task began by asking participants to recall a 
memorable life experience. Participants were instructed to try to make each memory 
approximately 3 minutes in length and a countdown timer was provided for their 
reference. The timer did not require that the participants stop at the end of three minutes 
and continuing to the next memory was controlled by the participant. After completing 
their first recollection, participants were asked to recall an additional 4 memorable life 
experiences. These recollections served to familiarize the participants with the equipment 
and the timing and provided them the opportunity to request help from the researchers 
before beginning the experimental portion of the task.  
 After participants completed the memorable experiences portion of the task, they 
began the cued recall portion. It is important to note that at no point were participants 
informed that this task was specifically about moral memories. The computer presented a 
cue word in the form of a sentence (e.g., “Please talk about a time when you did 
something that made you feel embarrassed.”), and participants were asked to relate a 
memory that matched the cue, in the same way that they had done in the previous section. 
Participants continued this way through the first set of cue words, the emotion cues, and 
then through the second and third sets of cues, the action words and the superlative cues. 
(The details of the cue words used in this task can be seen in Section 3 of this chapter.) 
After each section, participants were encouraged to take a break. Many participants 
                                                 
147 This backup system proved invaluable since some participants seemed to have an unerring ability to turn 
off the computer recording. 
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became emotional during the telling of their memories. Participants spent approximately 
four hours (including breaks) completing the Session Two task.  
 
Section Two Exit Questionnaire: 
After completing Session Two, participants were asked to complete an exit 
questionnaire. This questionnaire was designed to elicit information about the amount of 
time pressure that participants felt during the recall protocol, whether the Session Two 
task affected their mood/emotions and whether participants thought that it would affect 
their general thoughts in the near future. Participants generally endorsed ratings on their 
exit questionnaire that indicated a high level of emotional involvement (mean = 7.16 
±1.89)148. In addition, participants generally did not feel very pressured by the time limit 
and the amount of pressure a participant reported did not change the length of their 
narratives (R2 = 0.02, p = 0.61). 
 
Data Transcription and Processing: 
 The data from Session Two were manually transcribed from the original 
recordings by twelve different research assistants who were blind to the identity of the 
participants. The transcribers were instructed to replace any names and locations in the 
recollection. Transcribers made every effort to replace names with other names that 
retained the age, regional location and ethnicity of the name being replaced. Locations 
were similarly substituted with other similar locations (e.g., replacing large cities with 
other large cities in the region). After reading each participant’s corpus, the memories 
                                                 
148 These participants were responding to the question: “How emotional did you feel during this study?” 
using a Likert scale that ranged from 1 = not at all to 10 = very.  
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which met our criteria for ‘moral’ were selected; the remainder of this dissertation 
discusses only data pertaining to that subset of ‘moral’ memories. (Chapter 3 contains a 
detailed explanation of the criteria used for moral memory selection.) These memories 
were edited for grammar, coherence and readability, but vernacular and agrammatical 
figures of speech were maintained as much as possible, to allow the memories to retain 
the participant’s natural speech patterns. The average participant generated 6 moral 
memories from the 35 cues provided149. 
 
Session Three Protocol: 
 
After the memories were transcribed, edited and moral memories were selected, 
participants were scheduled for a second four hour testing session, Session Three. 
Typically, 1 to 3 months elapsed between testing sessions. This length of time was built 
into the testing procedure to ensure that participants were not still feeling emotional from 
the initial recollection. During Session Three, participants were provided with transcripts 
of their moral memories and asked to provide ratings about their own memories.  
As in Session Two, participants were provided with a confidential and 
comfortable environment and all instructions were given on the computer. They were 
given a folder with transcripts of their moral memories, but again they were not told that 
this research was specifically about moral behavior. They were shown that the names and 
locations in their transcripts had been changed, further reinforcing the confidentiality of 
this process. Participants were instructed to read each transcript closely and make any 
                                                 
149 This is the mode; the mean number of memories generated was 7.66. 
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corrections necessary. Typically, corrections were due to transcriber difficulties, not to 
the major content of the memories.  
After correcting each memory, participants were asked to answer the computer-
administered questionnaire provided. (The complete testing protocol can be seen in 
Appendix C.)  This 52 item questionnaire was intended to elicit information about several 
factors: general background information about the action in the memory, the emotions the 
participant felt about their behavior in the memory and moral judgments about their 
behavior in the memory. The moral judgments were subdivided; we asked participants to 
rate and explain their behavior at the time the memory occurred, their perceptions of their 
actions now as they look back on the memory, their beliefs about how others would view 
their actions and general questions about how ethical they believed themselves to be. 
Finally, we asked participants to provide any further justification of their actions that they 
felt were warranted. These questions were repeated for each moral memory that the 
participant had generated. The number of memories varied widely among participants 
(between 3 and 17 memories), so the length of time on this task varied as well. Generally, 
participants took between 2 and 4 hours to complete this task. 
 
Moral Dilemmas: 
 After completing the Session Three questionnaires for each memory, the 
participants also completed a 33 question, computer-administered version of the standard 
moral philosophy problems. (The complete set of these dilemmas can be seen in 
Appendix D). These dilemmas were provided by Greene150 and have been discussed in 
                                                 
150 Greene, J. D., R. B. Sommerville, et al. (2001). "An fMRI Investigation of Emotional Engagement in 
Moral Judgment." Science 293: 2105-2108. 
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Chapter 1. These questions are similar to (and included) the trolley problem. These 
questions are forced-choice, yes or no decisions, based on short paragraphs explaining 
each scenario. This took most participants about 20 minutes to complete.  
 
Session Three Exit Questionnaire: 
After completing the moral dilemmas, participants were asked to complete a short 
questionnaire about their sexual preferences, hormone and steroid use and menstrual 
cycle. These data are not included in the database.  
 
Section 3: Cue Words 
 
Cue Word Selection: 
To begin selecting cue words that might elicit moral recollections, we generated 
88 potential cues during a brainstorming session among several researchers. These words 
encompassed a wide variety of words related to morality. After examining these words, it 
became clear that they fell into two major categories: words that described moral feelings 
and words that described moral actions. Since both feelings and actions are important 
triggers for recollection, the decision was made to split the cued recall task into two 
sections. (This was later expanded to three sections with the addition of superlative cues.)  
In order to better select among the potential cue words, the MRC Psycholinguistic 
Database151 was used to provide initial examination of their linguistic properties. The 
                                                 
151These data were collected using the Wilson, M. (1987 ). "MRC Psycholinguistic Database: Machine 
Usable Dictionary. Version 2.00."  from http://www.psy.uwa.edu.au/mrcdatabase/uwa_mrc.htm. 
Version 1 of the MRC Database is published as: Coltheart, M. (1981). "The MRC Psycholinguistic 
Database." Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology 33A: 497-505. and as Coltheart, M. (1981a). 
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MRC database contains 150,837 words and provides information about 26 different 
linguistic properties, including the Kucera-Francis word frequencies152 and measures of 
concreteness, familiarity, imageability and meaningfulness153. (Table 1 shows the final 
cue words and these measures.) Concreteness, familiarity, imageability and 
meaningfulness were used to eliminate words that were obvious outliers. It is important 
to note that the size of the databases from which each of these measures is taken varies 
and thus many words do not have values for all of these measurements. Words were not 
eliminated if measurements of them were not available; however, priority was given to 
words where data were available. While words that were obvious outliers were 
eliminated, a few words with low written frequencies (from the Kucera-Francis 
normative values)154 were ultimately added back into the list. These words included: 
                                                                                                                                                 
"MRC Psycholinguistic Database User Manual: Version 1." from 
http://www.psych.rl.ac.uk/User_Manual_v1_0.html.  
152 Kucera-Francis word frequencies are taken from: Kucera, H. and W. N. Francis (1967). Computational 
Analysis of Present-Day American English. Providence, Brown University Press.  
153 Details for the concreteness, familiarity, imaginability and meaningfulness measures are as follows, 
taken from the MRC website referenced above. 
Concreteness: “is derived from a merging of the Pavio, Colerado, and Gilhooly-Logie norms: details of 
merging are given in Appendix 2 of the MRC Psycholinguistic Database User Manual (Coltheart, 1981a).  
Concreteness values are integer, in the range 100 to 700 (min 158; max 670; mean 438; s.d. 120).” 
Imageability: “is derived from merging the three sets of norms referred to above, and having values in the 
range 100 to 700 (min 129; max 669; mean 450; s.d. 108).” 
Familiarity refers to “printed familiarity. The values were derived from merging three sets of familiarity 
norms: Pavio (unpublished), Toglia and Battig (1978) and Gilhooly and Logie (1980). The method by 
which these three sets of norms were merged is described in detail in Appendix 2 of the MRC 
Psycholinguistic Database User Manual (Coltheart, 1981). This method may not meet with everyone's 
approval. FAM values lie in the range 100 to 700 with the maximum entry of 657, a mean of 488 and a 
standard deviation of 99: note that they are integer values (in the original norms the equivalent range was 
1.00 to 7.00).” 
Meaningfulness ratings are taken from “the Toglia and Battig (1978) [paper], multiplied by 100 to produce 
a range from 100 to 700 (min 127; max 667; mean 415; s.d. 78).” 
Pavio, A., Yuille, J.C. and Madigan, S.A. (1968). Concreteness, imagery and meaningfulness values for 
925 words. Journal of Experimental Psychology Monograph Supplement, 76 (3, part 2). The MRC website 
notes that in addition to the data in this paper, further unpublished work was included in the MRC database. 
Toglia, M.P. and Battig, W.R. (1978). Handbook of Semantic Word Norms. New York: Erlbaum. 
Gilhooly, K.J. and Logie, R.H. (1980). Age of acquisition, imagery, concreteness, familiarity and ambiguity 
measures for 1944 words. Behaviour Research Methods and Instrumentation, 12, 395-427. 
154 Kucera, H. and W. N. Francis (1967). Computational Analysis of Present-Day American English. 
Providence, Brown University Press. 
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‘bittersweet’ – a word that was needed to balance the emotional valences of the emotion 
cues; and ‘unfaithful’ which was included in the action cues because we felt that it was an 
important concept for moral behaviors. The final set of cue words was also checked for 
outliers in word length (mean = 7.95 ± 2.37, range = 4-13 letters) and written frequency 
(mean = 21.35 ± 23.14, range = 1 -71).  
  In addition to the linguistic properties, we wanted to balance the cue words’ 
emotional impact. Using the Affective Norms for English Words (ANEW)155, we 
examined the potential cue words’ affect. ANEW measures words on three dimensions: 
valence, arousal and dominance. Each word is rated on a 9 point scale from most 
unhappy/calm/controlled by others (1) to most happy/excited/in control (9). Slightly less 
than half (47.8%) of the potential cue words were rated in the ANEW set, which was not 
enough to choose words based on their ANEW valence, but available valence ratings 
correlated with ratings given to the cue words by independent raters (described in 
Chapter 4).  Available valences were also used to help organize the final emotional cue 
words based on how positive or negative they were.  The final set contains three positive 
cues, four intermediate cues and three cues intended to evoke negative moral memories. 
The ANEW was most important in normalization of the arousal of the cue word set. It is 
often difficult to match the arousal felt on pleasant things with the arousal felt by 
unpleasant things156 so it was especially important to keep the arousal of the cues as 
similar as possible. With only half of the cues’ arousal values available, the absolute 
arousal value of each set can not be calculated, but the available values all fall within one 
                                                 
155 Bradley, M. M. and P. J. Lang (1999). Affective norms for English words (ANEW): Stimuli, instruction 
manual and affective ratings. Technical report C-1. Gainesville, FL, The Center for Research in 
Psychophysiology, University of Florida. 
156 Lewis, P. A., H. D. Critchley, et al. (2007). "Neural Correlates of Processing Valence and Arousal in 
Affective Words." Cerebral Cortex 17(3): 742–748. 
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standard deviation of the mean arousal score. (This can be seen in the final column of 
Table 1.)  
 
Development of Cue Word Testing Procedure: 
The chosen cue words were separated in two categories: emotions (10 cues) and 
actions (10 cues). A third category was added to help participants recollect the very best 
and worst moral events in their lives. This ‘superlatives’ category contained 6 cues. Four 
control words (2 emotions, 2 actions) were added to the sets to use for comparison. 
Control words were common words that fit well into the category (i.e., were not obvious 
as controls) but that were not expected to elicit any moral memories157. Memories elicited 
by these cue words could be used for comparison to those that elicited moral memories, 
with respect to basic variables such as the average number of words contained in a 
memory or its recency. The complete list of cues in their presentation order can be seen 
in Appendix E. 
The testing protocol was designed with 5 open recollections that were not biased 
by any experience with cue words, a procedure common in many studies of 
autobiographical memory. The question: “Please tell us about a very memorable thing 
that you have done” was used to help participants adjust to the testing setup, timing and 
equipment. While these cues were not specifically intended to elicit moral memories, 
occasionally (n=20), participants recalled moral memories that met our criteria during 
this phase. These memories are included in the database under the cue ‘memorable’.  
                                                 
157 In fact, this is the case for 3 of the 4 control words as can be seen in Chapter 4, Figure 30.  
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The first testing category used emotional cue words to help the participant recollect 
experiences that felt morally laden. Each cue was presented in the form: “Please talk 
about a time when you did something that made you feel ______.” The emotional cues 
were chosen to span the valence spectrum, with three positive cues – proud, 
compassionate and virtuous; four intermediate cues – responsible, relieved, bittersweet 
and doubtful; and three negative cues – regretful, embarrassed and guilty. 
 The second testing category used cue words that described morally laden actions 
like hurting someone or being honest. These cues filled in the sentence: “Please talk 
about a time when you ______.” While the action cues were not as specifically valenced 
as the emotion cues, concepts were chosen to elicit both good and bad past moral 
experiences (which was corroborated by the available valences from the ANEW). 
 The final category, superlatives, was used to elicit the most meaningful moral 
experiences in the participants’ lives. For these cues, participants were asked to “Please 
talk about _____.” This sentence was filled in with three of the best things the participant 
has ever done (e.g., the thing you are most proud of having done) and three of the worst 
things (e.g., the thing that you would most like to change if you could go back and do it 
differently).  
 During the testing session, these cues were presented in a randomized but fixed158 
order within each category, as shown in Appendix 1. The cues were randomized within 
each category to determine the final order of presentation, but each group was kept 
together. Thus, the participants recalled all of their emotional, moral memories first, then 
their moral behaviors and finally their moral superlatives. A fixed order was chosen to 
                                                 
158 All randomization was done using the random number generator at Random.org. Haahr, M. (1998-
2008). "random.org." from http://www.random.org/. 
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reduce the variation caused by cuing from previous recollections. Although this increases 
the likelihood that participants might all tell slightly less happy memories because the cue 
‘happy’ followed the negative cue ‘regretful’, it eliminated the need for corrections due to 
between participants cue order. Typically, one might use a randomized presentation to 
avoid this, but we suspected that some cues might have considerably stronger effects than 
others and our participant sample size was modest relative to the number of cue words 
used, so keeping them in the same order was a more effective way of avoiding between 
participant order effects. For example, participants often thought of more than one 
memory when the cue ‘cheated’ was given. These memories often percolated down 
through the next cues to the cue ‘sneaky’, where participants would tell another memory 
about cheating. We were particularly interested in the effects that demographics and other 
personality factors might have on the memories more than we were interested in the 
priming effects of particular cues. By presenting them in a fixed order, all participants 
generated memories that would have been participant to the same order effects, allowing 
us to disregard order effects in our analyses. However, when examining these data for the 
types of moral memories people generally recall, it should be borne in mind that the 
presentation order was fixed and likely had some (unknown) effect. 
 
Validity Testing: 
 Our participants were provided with a private environment and assurances of 
anonymity before beginning the cued recall protocol. They were encouraged to be as 
honest as possible with their recollections. However, we felt it was still prudent to assess 
the validity of these memories. In some research protocols, family members or friends 
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can be polled to measure the accuracy of memories. In this case, preserving the 
anonymity of the participants prevented us from using that technique. Instead, we 
developed a two part process that allowed participants to be contacted by a research 
assistant who did not know who they were. 
 Two years after testing, we attempted to contact all of the original 100 
participants by telephone159. 44 were still available for this validity testing. These 
participants were told that we were doing a follow-up to the original experiment about 
honesty and asked whether they told the truth during the experiment. All 44 reported that 
they did tell the truth, although 2 participants said that they may have elaborated their 
memories somewhat. Several participants expressed surprise that anyone might have not 
told the truth, especially in a scientific experiment. Other responses included “I had no 
reason to lie”, “I was exceptionally honest” and “I was gruesomely, painfully honest and 
telling those memories still haunts me to this day.” Not one of the 44 participants asked 
gave any response that would have led us to question their truthfulness in recounting the 
original memories. 
 In addition to collecting these self-reports of honesty, participants were asked if 
they would be willing to speak to an assistant about the memories they had produced. 
They were provided with a participant ID and a separate phone number to call if they 
were interested in participating. This second layer of testing protected the participants’ 
anonymity, since the research assistant only had access to the participant’s ID, not their 
name or phone number. 11 participants participated in this second testing session160. The 
                                                 
159 It is our hope that the large time gap between the initial testing and this calling would encourage 
participants to give us honest answers.  
160 A twelfth subject called in to participate but stated that although he “was totally honest but the memories 
are too painful to recall.” 
  78 
research assistant prompted the participant to re-tell a memory by providing a short 
sentence about the original memory. For example, “You told a story about returning a 
lost wallet. Can you tell me about that?” Each participant was asked to recall three 
memories and the assistant rated each recollection as a 0 (no recollection), 1 (vague 
recollection, not detailed or descriptive), or 2 (very descriptive, clearly recalls the 
situation). All 11 participants received a score of 2 on all memories. While there is an 
inherent bias in this second part of the validity testing (i.e., perhaps only honest 
participants chose to participate), we feel that these results combined with surveying 
nearly half of the original participants in the first part of this testing gives us confidence 
in the validity of the memories included in the database. The second part, in particular, 
also suggests that the memories were reliable in the details. 
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Chapter 2: Figures and Tables 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“We have, in fact, two kinds of morality side by side; one which we preach but do not 
practice, and another which we practice but seldom preach.” 
-- Bertrand Russell 
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Table 1: Linguistic and Valence Properties of Cue Words 
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Emotion Cues        
Proud 50 327 570 434 446 8.03 (1.56) 5.56 (3.01) 
Compassionate 2             
Virtuous* 6         6.22 (2.06) 4.52 (2.52) 
Responsible 71   588 348       
Relieved 13             
Bittersweet 1             
Doubtful 22             
Regretful* 9 260 529 359   2.28 (1.42) 5.74 (2.32) 
Embarrassed           3.03 (1.85) 5.87 (2.55) 
Guilty* 29 299 559 381 421 2.63 (1.98) 6.04 (2.76) 
Action Cues        
Honest 47   607 366   7.7 (1.43) 5.32 (1.92) 
Tempted* 2 283 495 437 443     
Qualms               
Reckless 9   517 395       
Sneaky 2             
Hurtful* 37 368 579 465 530 1.9 (1.26) 5.85 (2.49) 
Cheated* 3 329 549 457 446     
Lied* 59 357 548 385 447 2.79 (1.92) 5.96 (2.63) 
Unfaithful 1         2.05 (1.55) 6.2 (2.7) 
Control Cues        
Happy 98 355 621 511 568 8.21 (1.82) 6.49 (2.77) 
Tired 48   630 419       
Exercised 58         7.13 (1.58) 6.84 (2.06) 
Funny 41   617 468       
 
Table 1: It is important to note that the cue ‘took something that didn’t belong to you’ is 
left out of this table. The word ‘steal’ was used for comparison purposes during the initial 
process of choosing cue words. The superlative cues are also not included because they 
were concepts rather than single words. *Cue words with this notation did not have 
measures of concreteness, familiarity, imageability, meaningfulness and/or valence. 
These data are taken from closely related words – typically from the present tense of each 
verb (i.e., ‘cheat’ for the cue ‘cheated’). This was done to increase the amount of 
comparison that could be done among cue words.  
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Chapter 3: Moral Narrative Database 
 
We constructed a database of 758 transcribed personal, episodic, moral memories 
using multiple steps.  Raw transcripts of spoken memories were selected by two 
experimenters, edited using in several careful steps detailed below and finally given back 
to the participants who originally produced them to check for accuracy. Editing was done 
with particular attention to retaining the unique vernacular and slang of each participant.  
The final memory transcripts were stored, together with background information about 
the participants and ratings of the memories, in a searchable database.  Also entered into 
the database were ratings of the moral memories obtained from an independent set of 
raters.  Since one aim of this study was to construct a detailed database that could be 
utilized by other researchers, we included considerably more variables in this database 
than were analyzed within the scope of this dissertation. 
 
Section 1: Rationale for a Moral Narrative Database: 
 
Three underlying rationales drove the creation of a moral narrative database:  The 
first was to obtain an inventory of real-life autobiographical moral memories that could 
be compared with more theoretical accounts of moral events and behaviors. The second 
was to obtain a rich characterization of the causes, intentions and justifications that 
accompany those moral events. This will help explore the semantic structure of moral 
events in everyday life. The third rationale was to allow the use of these data as stimuli 
about which moral judgments can be made. The construction of this database from a 
unique body of moral recollections generates a truly novel stimulus set for the 
understanding of moral events, behaviors and decision making. 
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The purpose for collecting true moral memories from a relatively typical and 
representative group of participants was to create a corpus of moral autobiographical 
events experienced in real life. These memories provide insight into the types of moral 
challenges people experience during their daily lives as well as data about how they face 
these challenges. This body of data contains information about both good and bad 
choices; ones that the participants felt were right and ones that were wrong. Using the 
cued recall protocol, 3,300 memories were elicited from these participants about all 
aspects of their lives. This chapter describes the methods by which nearly 800 moral 
recollections were selected from this group and carefully edited into a database of moral 
narratives.  
A database of autobiographical moral narratives also provides a rich dataset to use 
in characterizing the types of moral events experienced by normal adults. Using a group 
of volunteer raters, the moral narrative database was sorted and rated into its many 
component parts. These elements of moral experiences can be used to understand the 
behaviors underlying normal moral decision making and the milieu in which these 
decisions are made.  
Finally, the creation of a well-characterized database of moral narratives provides 
a unique set of stimuli for a myriad of research purposes. A searchable database was 
designed to allow researchers from many fields to use these data to explore questions of 
moral behavior. Future research, from cultural anthropology to functional MRI, can be 
facilitated by the existence of a consistent, excellent stimulus set for testing participants. 
When creating a database with this intent, three characteristics were required. The data 
must have widespread usability, the database must be highly characterized and it must be 
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easily searchable. These features were built into the design of the database and 
implemented throughout, from the selection of moral memories to the construction of a 
Microsoft Access database, searchable with SQL. The database has also been converted 
to Filemaker to allow easier access for Macintosh users.  
 
Section 2: Narrative Selection 
 
During the cued recall testing session (Session Two), participants generated 
memories for each of 35 cued recall questions. While the cues were intended to elicit as 
many moral memories as possible, only a subset of the memories generated by each 
participant was expected to be moral. A set of criteria were developed to select which 
memories would become narratives in the database. These criteria were made 
intentionally broad after considering many different definitions of morality. By including 
narratives that fit many different schools of thought, the database retains the greatest 
possible usability for the greatest number of researchers. The criteria were applied in the 
order presented below to progressively eliminate memories at each level. The criteria 
used to select each narrative were: 
 
1. Is the memory episodic and personal?  
The first criterion defines features that are critical to describing a ‘narrative’. 
These memories are told in the first-person about a specific event or events. This criterion 
is necessary to eliminate memories where the participant simply spoke about the cue 
word in general. For example, a participant given the cue, ‘Please talk about a time when 
you lied’ might have discussed the act of lying itself, whether telling white lies was bad 
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or how they never liked lying to friends. While many of these memories might involve 
moral beliefs, they are not specific enough to lend themselves well to research stimuli 
and therefore were removed. We followed the convention in the memory literature here 
to choose only episodic memories – that is, memories about specific, personal events to 
which a date could be assigned, in principle.  
 
2. Does the memory involve the speaker making a decision or choice? 
The second criterion addresses the idea that a moral action requires some specific 
choice about the situation, whether that choice is an action or an omission of action161. 
Requiring that each narrative involves some sort of decision making process, selects for 
memories where the action was intentional. For example, a memory about a time when a 
participant hit someone with a baseball by accident would not meet this criterion, even 
though it meets the first criterion, while a memory about deciding to throw a ball at 
someone to exact revenge would meet this criterion. This criterion further ensured that 
our moral memories reflected moral judgments, choices or outcomes related to the 
participant in a direct way and it ties in with conceptions of moral responsibility that 
typically require an agent’s choice or decision in order to assign blame or praise. 
  
3. Does the memory involve harm or prevention of harm?  
-or-  
   Does the memory involve feelings of right or wrong? 
                                                 
161 Action versus omission of an action is often discussed in deontology. Alexander, L. and M. Moore. (Fall 
2008 Edition). "Deontological Ethics." The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 2008, from 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/ethics-deontological/. 
  85 
These criteria constitute of the core definition of the sense of “moral” used in this 
project. For an action, behavior or choice to count as moral, it must involve harm (or the 
prevention of harm) or feelings of right or wrong.  While by itself this criterion would 
yield a definition of morality that would be very broad and overinclusive, together with 
the other criteria above it yields a concept of “moral” that is consistent with both intuitive 
and technical senses of the term162.  Keeping our concept of “moral” relatively broad is 
an intentional strength of the database. Rather than choosing a particular definition of 
‘moral’ from one of the many schools of thought, this definition was created to include as 
many different definitions of the idea of morality as possible. In order to accomplish this, 
we focused on two features.  First, the feature of harm: The distinction between harm and 
the prevention of harm is a critical feature of the consequentialist debate in moral 
philosophy163. Consequentialism claims that doing harm to someone is no worse that 
allowing harm to come to them while deontology stands firmly against this claim. By 
including memories with either harmful actions or omissions that resulted in harm, both 
these points of view were included. Second, the feature of ‘right or wrong’: Using the 
concept of right or wrong as a defining feature of a moral memory was a simple way to 
encapsulate a number of other theories of morality. Almost any lay definition of moral 
generates the words ‘right’ and ‘wrong’; Merriam-Webster’s defines moral as “of or 
relating to principles of right and wrong in behavior. ”164 Virtue ethics (a branch of moral 
                                                 
162 Borg, J. S., C. Hynes, et al. (2006). "Consequences, Action, and Intention as Factors in Moral 
Judgments: An fMRI Investigation." Journal of Cognitive Neurosciene 18(5): 803-817. 
163Hooker, B. (Fall 2008 Edition). "Rule Consequentialism " The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 
from http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/consequentialism-rule/. 
164 Definition taken from the Dictionary, M.-W. O. "moral." from http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/moral.. This is the first of three definitions given by this source for the word 
‘moral’.  
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philosophy discussed in Chapter 1) and a number of moral psychology theories can also 
be included under this umbrella theme.  
 
4.  Are the feelings of right or wrong in this memory based on religious interpretations of 
morality? If so, discard unless the participant specifically discussed their personal beliefs. 
Religion and morality are often intertwined in Western belief systems but within 
this database they were defined as separate ideations. The final criterion in selecting 
memories was designed to assess whether a religious bias had influenced the inclusion of 
this memory. Ideas of what is moral vary among religions and since the participants 
providing these memories were a normally distributed sample, their religious beliefs 
varied as well. (See Chapter 4, Section 1 for details about participants’ religious beliefs.) 
In addition, the database was developed to be used for a wide range of scientific pursuits 
and therefore it seemed prudent to eliminate narratives which depended on their moral 
status entirely by invoking particular beliefs from specific religions. However, moral 
behavior can certainly be influenced by religious beliefs and some participants were 
specific about their choices being both moral and religious. These memories were 
included in the database. For example, most memories where participants had abortions 
were excluded from the database because the decision of whether this was a case of ‘right 
or wrong’ was based in religious beliefs. However, in circumstances where the 
participant explicitly discussed basing her personal decision about having an abortion on 
her religious beliefs, the memory was included. This criterion was applied stringently to 
only include memories where the participant was detailed and specific about his or her 
beliefs, so that it was clear that an action was ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ from the personal 
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perspective of the participant, rather than only from the inferred perspective of any 
particular religion. 
  
Section 3: Methods  
 
To select the memories on the basis of the criteria enumerated above, two 
independent readers were used. The readers received transcriptions of each participant’s 
cued recall testing session (Session Two). These transcriptions typically included 30 – 35 
distinct memories. (On average, participants skipped 1.7 cues during the cued recall 
protocol.) The first reader read the entire transcription and chose all the memories that 
she felt met all the criteria. This reader applied a liberal interpretation of these criteria, to 
select all memories that might be appropriate for the database. The second reader only 
read the memories selected by the first reader. We found that this allowed her to be more 
objective than the first reader about the moral content of the memories. The second 
reader applied a more conservative standard in selecting the final memories. In every 
case, the memory needed to meet all the criteria listed above, except in cases where more 
than one episode had been related during one memory. These were moved forward to the 
editing process where they were split up into narratives that contained only a single 
episode. The first and second readers were always the same and always read the 
transcriptions in the same order to impose as much similarity on the selection process as 
possible. The first reader selected 788 memories to pass along to the second reader, the 
second selected 758 final memories for the database. Both readers were blind with 
respect to information about the participants’ background information (e.g., gender, 
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ethnicity), although some of this information could be gleaned from the text of the 
narratives themselves.  
While most of the criteria were straightforward, the readers received further 
specific instructions to ensure consistency with our aims. The first reader was instructed 
to be cognizant of cases where the participant talked about the same episode during 
different cued memories and include all of these possible narratives in the group provided 
to the second reader. In some cases, these memories were joined during the editing 
process to provide the most coherent narrative. When applying the question, “Does the 
memory involve feelings of right or wrong?” to each memory, the reader was instructed 
to interpret this from two perspectives, her own and that of the narrator of the memory. 
The reason for this was to include memories where others (in this case the reader) felt the 
participant had clearly done something wrong but the participant did not state that they 
felt that way or vice versa. When evaluating memories in terms of the fourth criterion 
(the underlying religious bias), readers were asked to deeply consider their own religious 
beliefs and frequently check that they were not applying them to the memory selection 
process. While it is impossible to say that no religious bias was used when selecting the 
memories, the readers made every effort to avoid this. It is also important to note that we 
analyzed the demographic and neuropsychological profiles of the participants after 
selection to ensure that there was no systematic bias in the selection process. 
 
Creating Narratives out of Memories: 
After selecting memories that met all the criteria, the memories were edited into 
narratives by the second reader. This process began with splitting memories that 
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contained multiple episodes and joining memories that were told during multiple cues. 
Splitting memories occurred when participants told more than one story during the 3 
minute recording session for each cue. Generally, these were simply recollections of two 
separate incidents where the participant felt the cue pertained. For example, given the cue 
“guilty”, Subject 1313 told three stories, one about her husband, one about an accident 
and one about unintentional stealing. In this case, two of the three memories met our 
criteria for inclusion in the database. These two memories were separated and given 
separate story numbers and ratings. Both memories were noted as having the same 
eliciting cue word. The same was done for all other similar cases (n=3)165.   
In some cases, the final edited version of a memory came from two cue words. 
This resulted from situations where a participant talked about the same situation during 
two separate cue words. Typically, participants would say something like, “Now, I was 
telling you before, when I …” and then proceed to give more detail about the situation. In 
most circumstances, only one version of this memory was used. In some cases, however, 
the participant gave different, pertinent details in each retelling. In order to have the most 
accurate and complete memories in the database, these memories were combined. As 
such, these memories have two (n=13) or three (n=3) eliciting cue words. This adds a 
small degree of complication to some of the data entry and analysis. For the purposes of 
the database, only one eliciting cue word was entered. Since choosing which cue word 
contributed more to the final memory is quite subjective, the cue word entered was 
chosen by random number generation166. However, the additional data was retained for 
                                                 
165 There were 4 total cases of this. Subject 1094 on two different cues, Subject 1313 and Subject 1317. 
166 Random number generation was done with the generator at Random.org. Haahr, M. (1998-2008). 
"random.org." from http://www.random.org/. 
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use in future analyses, as needed. After joining or splitting, these memories were added to 
the collection for editing.  
Each memory was edited for length, readability and coherence. Editing for length 
included eliminating memories that were too short and too long. Length was a 
particularly subjective measure, but the second reader made every effort to include all 
memories that told a specific story, no matter how short or long, in order to prevent 
introducing a length bias into the database. There are narratives as short as 36 words and 
as long as 837 that were included.  Only short memories that did not tell a detailed 
enough story to become a useable stimulus in an experiment were purged167. Similarly, 
memories that were quite long were included as intact as possible. However, in some of 
these cases (approximately 10 – 15 memories), the memory was embedded in 
unnecessary reminiscences and these were removed while retaining the moral memory 
within.  Editing for readability was done as sparsely as possible to retain the participant’s 
personal vernacular and word choice. This was very significant in retaining the 
uniqueness of each narrative. The individual voice in each narrative makes them quite 
different from the stimuli used by other researchers to study moral behavior. Typically, 
editing for readability included adding or correcting punctuation168, reorganizing 
sentences into clearer paragraphs and correcting pronouns and tense changes that 
disrupted comprehension of the narrative. Tangents made by the participant during the 
                                                 
167 Here is an example of a very short narrative that was included in the database: Memory 5235. “I 
remember when public transportation buses started charging a dollar. My friends and I would tear the dollar 
into 4 pieces and fold it up so it looked like a dollar. I would use a dollar for four rides.”  
168 The transcribers did their best to represent the participants’ pauses with punctuation. These often were 
revised during the editing process since the pauses of the original narrator didn’t contribute to the flow of 
the narrative. 
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retelling were rearranged into more logical flow or eliminated when unrelated to the 
moral episode.  
  Finally, the rough draft of each narrative was reread and compared against the 
criteria that shaped the database. During this process, the narratives were selectively 
edited for content. In some cases, the entire memory was included in the narrative, even 
though only part of the memory was specific to a particular episode. In those cases, the 
rest was typically included because the participant was elaborating on their beliefs that 
shaped the actions or choices in the narrative. In other cases, extraneous recollections 
were removed from the narratives to pare them down to be better stimuli. Throughout the 
editing process as little was changed from the original memory as possible in order to 
retain the true character of each participant’s recollection in the final narrative. 
 In addition to this editing, each participant read their own final narratives during 
Session Three (as described in Chapter 2). They were provided with red pens and allowed 
to edit anything in the narrative that was incorrect. These corrections were made to the 
final narratives. Most of these corrections were trivial, but a few participants found 
significant transcription mistakes (usually involving the wrong pronoun) that would 
otherwise have gone uncorrected. Overall, the editing techniques used were as consistent, 
unobtrusive and accurate as possible which produced concise and unique narratives for 
the database.  
 
Section 4: Descriptive Database Statistics 
 
The database provides rapid access to almost any information one would like to 
know about the contents. A few statistics that describe the overall scope of the database 
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are listed here. The database contains 758 moral narratives, 382 told by women and 376 
told by men. On average, each participant told 7.66 moral memories; the maximum 
number of moral memories told by a participant was 17 and the minimum was 3. (Figure 
5 shows this distribution.) The mean word count was 217.6 words per narrative; the range 
was from 36 – 837 words. The word count distribution for the entire database can be seen 
in Figure 6. The database contains narratives that were elicited by 28 of the 31 unique 
cues. The three cues that did not elicit any moral narratives were control words that were 
not intended to elicit moral memories. One of our four control cues, happy, elicited 7 of 
the narratives included in the database, suggesting that it was not truly a control.   
The Language and Inquiry Word Count 2007 analysis program was used to 
evaluate the content of the narratives, as well as providing a measure of how normal the 
narratives are compared to other sample narratives. These data are described in Table 2. 
The narratives in the database are compared to three LIWC control samples; the first 
from participants who wrote on “deeply emotional topics”, the second from participants 
who wrote on “relatively trivial topics, such as plans for the day” and the third from 
people who were “tape-recorded while engaging in conversations with others.”169 While 
none of these categories individually capture the contents of the narratives, a similar 
structure can be found in the intersection of the three. As shown in the table, the 
narratives are quite comparable to the control data as well as the control memories 
collected from our own participants. 
 
 
                                                 
169 Pennebaker, J. W., Chung, Cindy K., Ireland, Molly, Gonzales, Amy, & Booth, Roger J.  (2007). The 
development and psychometric properties of LIWC2007. Austin, TX, LIWC.net. 
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Section 5: Characterization of Moral Events 
 
 The compilation of these moral narratives into a searchable database was a natural 
extension of this work. The narratives could be sorted by cue word, word count and 
participant characteristics, but although the narratives were rich with detail, there was no 
data available to use to sort the narratives by content. In order to create a truly searchable 
database, the narratives needed to be extensively characterized. In addition to facilitating 
the creation of a searchable database, characterization of the narratives provided an 
opportunity to examine the structure of the narratives more closely. Detailed 
characterization allowed investigation of the types of moral judgment included in the 
database and the temporal dynamics of autobiographical moral recall. 
 A rating system was devised to collect detailed characterizations of each 
narrative.  Each narrative would be read and characterized (rated) by a number of 
volunteer ‘raters’. A rating tool was created to ensure uniform characterization of each 
narrative. The completed rating tool can be found in Appendix G, in the form of the 
worksheet these raters completed. Raters received a set of instructions with the rating 
sheet to explain the details of each category. These instructions are detailed later in the 
text. 
 
Part 1: Development of the Rating Tool 
 A subsample of 100 narratives was chosen randomly from the database170 to use 
during development of the rating tool. The development of the rating tool was done by 
                                                 
170 All randomizations done in this work used the random number generator found at Random.org. Haahr, 
M. (1998-2008). "random.org." from http://www.random.org/. 
  94 
two researchers171 in tandem to ensure completeness. After reading the subsample, a 
standard journalistic style of “Who, What When, Where, Why and How?” emerged as a 
clear way to categorize the narratives. These categories provided broad coverage of the 
elements of each narrative and organized them in a manner with which raters would be 
familiar. Creating a tool that raters would be able to easily use was critical to this process 
because the ease of use of the tool would directly affect the quality of the ratings 
acquired. The six major categories (below) used in the final rating tool evolved from this 
initial journalistic style inquiry. Throughout the discussion of each category below, the 
term ‘narrator’ is used to refer to the participant who told the original memory narrative.  
To develop the items that comprise each category of the rating tool, the following 
technique was used throughout. Simultaneously, each of the two readers carefully read a 
narrative from the subsample. After reading, each reader generated as many ‘actions in 
the narrative’ as possible. These ‘actions’ included actual actions, reasons given by the 
narrator for their behavior and feelings the narrator explicitly talked about. (You may see 
here how these evolved into the categories in the rating tool.) The readers also listed all 
the locations in each narrative. Upon completing this process with all of the narratives in 
the subsample, the items were refined and categorized appropriately. The final rating tool 
was edited into a worksheet for the raters to mark their answers.  
This worksheet, referred to as ‘the rating sheet’ throughout this discussion, was 
comprised of two parts: the rating tool (Part One) and an additional group of rating 
questions intended to address research hypotheses (Part Two).  A pilot set of ratings was 
collected on the rating sheet using narratives that were not in the 100 story subsample, 
using lab members as the raters. These pilot data were used to further refine a number of 
                                                 
171 Myself and J. Stockburger. 
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the items in Part One, primarily to clarify the wording. Several new items that were 
generated by multiple pilot raters were also added to the list. Room for write-in choices 
was also added to the three large categories.    
 
Designing the Rating Tool (Part One of the Rating Sheet): 
 The Who? category was developed to characterize the reader’s perception of who 
the narrator was. Specifically, it was used to ascertain the perceived gender of the 
narrator. It is critical to understand that this ‘gender’ as found in the database table 
‘Rating Data’ is the rater’s perception, not the actual gender of the participant who told 
the story. This rating was augmented by a question about how certain the rater was of 
their decision about gender of the narrator. This question is represented on the rating 
sheet with the choice ‘Guess?’ These two questions were designed specifically for two 
purposes: to identify narratives where the gender was unknown and to ascertain how 
accurate the raters were in guessing the narrator’s gender. In both cases, these findings 
were intended to facilitate research about gender and moral judgment being conducted 
using the database narratives.  (The findings from some of this research can be found in 
Chapter 4, Section 4.) To ascertain characteristics about the narrator besides gender that 
might be relevant to the narrative, the tool includes a question about the age of the 
narrator. We hypothesized that within the same category of moral behavior (i.e., taking 
something that doesn’t belong to you), the age of the narrator might play a critical role in 
generating a moral judgment about the actions in the narrative. Given this hypothesis, it 
was important to include a characterization of the age of the narrator. Similarly, 
characteristics like race and religion might be of particular importance in some narratives. 
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A write-in space was included to allow raters to note race and religion, if relevant, and to 
write in other group affiliations that were particularly important to the content of the 
narrative.  
 The Where? category was developed to assess the types of milieus in which the 
narratives took place. The purpose for this category grew out of the intuition that the 
moral rules people apply to their decision making may change depending on specific 
circumstances. For example, a business person might obscure the truth (or outright lie) 
frequently at work but would never lie at home or to family. To identify these specific 
locations and situations, the readers listed every relevant scene of the action in each 
narrative. These scenes included non-location context like family and animals because 
there was a general feeling from the readers that these were also important to the 
narratives in the subsample. During the course of data collection a number of other 
scenes were written in. This was expected; while the subsample could be expected to 
cover almost all of the actions in the database, it could not possibly contain all of the 
locations encountered by the participants in their lifetimes.  
 The three large categories in the rating sheet cover three major features of the 
narratives: What did the narrator do in the narrative?; Why did the narrator say they did 
the actions in the narrative?; How did the narrator feel about their actions? The purpose 
of the What, Why and How? categories was twofold. First, detailing the actions and 
behaviors in the database provides insight into the range of moral behaviors in a normal 
sample of participants. Developing the items in these categories using the readers’ 
compilation technique described above initially produced a list of the activities and 
feelings of those participants. The data collected using this category, however, were 
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necessary to understand the relative frequencies of these activities. Secondly, the ratings 
in these categories are integral to the development of the database as a tool to sort the 
narratives. The ability to select narratives based specifically on what actions were (or 
were not) performed in the story is much more powerful than selecting narratives based 
on the relatively general cue words that elicited them. 
To further define the items in each category, a scale from 0 to 3 was assigned to 
each item. An item was to be given a score of three when it was an excellent example of 
the action described in the item. A score of zero was given when the action was not 
included in the narrative at all. This allows the narratives to be further subdivided based 
on the specific content of the item. It is important to note that acts as well as omissions 
are considered to be part of any given item. A time when the narrator chooses not to hit 
someone is as much a part of the item ‘physical harm to someone’ as a story where 
someone chooses to start a fight. Within each category the items were grouped based on 
the readers’ general sense of how similar the items were. The decision to group the items 
rather than randomize them within each category was made to increase the reliability the 
ratings. Given the number of items in each category, organizing them (in any fashion) 
seemed likely to facilitate the accuracy of the raters. Analysis of inter-rater reliability can 
be found later in this chapter.   
The category Why Did They Say They Did It? was specifically designed with 
considerations from moral philosophy in mind. The items in the category were gleaned in 
the same way as the other categories, from the reading of the subsample. These items 
were then evaluated with philosophical discussions about moral decision making in mind. 
As discussed in Chapter 1, consequentialism and deontology are two competing schools 
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of philosophical thought about moral behavior. Two of the items listed by the readers 
dovetailed nicely with these two schools of thought and the philosophical positions were 
noted with the item. Thus, ‘Doing lesser harm to prevent greater harm’ had the label 
‘consequentialist’ added to it; and the ‘Means do NOT justify the ends’ had the label 
‘deontological’ added to it172.  
 The question “Did the narrator rationalize his or her behavior?” was added to the 
rating tool after consideration of the questions answered by the participants in Session 
Three. In Session Three the participants were asked to read their own memories and 
answer questions about them. (For more details, see Chapter 2.) In particular, the 
participants were allowed to provide a justification for their actions. After reading the 
subsample, it became clear that many participants provided justifications or 
rationalizations for their actions during the narrative itself. This category was developed 
to identify narratives with strong rationalizations already included, so that they could be 
compared to narratives with rationalizations added after the initial recall173. The 
identification of rationalizations is also a powerful sorting choice to add to the database 
for other researchers.  
 
Part Two of the Rating Sheet: 
 The collection of rating data for sorting and analysis purposes (as described 
above) provided an opportunity to address other research questions that arose during the 
collection of the moral narratives with a greater number of independent raters than would 
                                                 
172 It is worth noting that some raters did not like the fact that this item was reversed from the way it is 
often given in common parlance: ‘the ends do not justify the means’. We chose to keep the item as the 
readers had originally listed it. 
173 As it turns out, this will need to be a future direction for the research. 
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otherwise be available. Specifically, Part Two of the rating sheet was designed to: 
examine the accuracy of the cue words as descriptors of the narratives; collect pilot data 
about the moral correctness of the actions in each narrative; and to investigate Richard 
Lazarus’ theory of core relational themes.  
 The ‘Cue Word’ section of the rating sheet was used to address two issues with 
the moral narratives. The first is the accuracy with which the cue word can be applied to 
the narrative. During narrative selection the readers noticed that there were circumstances 
where, when responding to an eliciting cue in the cued recall protocol, participants gave 
memories that were not actually related to the cue word. This presents a problem for 
using the eliciting cue word as a category for sorting the database. Quantifying these 
occurrences using the rating data provides better data for the database as well as 
generating information that may help to refine the cued recall protocol. While accuracy 
was a small issue that was addressed when designing the rating sheet, a much larger one 
was the co-occurrence of multiple cue concepts within a single narrative. For example, a 
narrative elicited by the cue ‘unfaithful’ might also include feelings of guilt and regret174. 
While it is important to know which cue elicited the narrative, it seems equally useful to 
know which other cue word elements exist in the text. To collect these data, the rating 
sheet was designed with a list of all the cue words175 and the instructions to circle all the 
items that applied. 
                                                 
174 Also embarrassment, relief, bittersweetness, lying, having qualms, etc. 
175 The cue ‘a very memorable thing that you have done’ was left out of this list because it was confusing in 
pilot studies. 
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 The ‘Judgment’ question was designed to collect preliminary176 data about the 
moral valence of each narrative, using a Likert scale from -5 to +5. The usefulness for a 
moral valence rating in the database is illustrated by other research tools like the 
International Affective Picture System, which allows researchers to choose visual stimuli 
based on widely accepted normative ratings of their valence. Normative ratings of moral 
valence will allow researchers to consistently select narratives based on a standard rating 
rather than on personal belief or individual pilot data. Data about how our raters rated 
these narratives would facilitate these research questions and therefore was added to the 
rating sheet. This question also provides a way of sorting the data using these 
approximate ratings of valence for other research questions using the narratives. Given 
the relatively small number of raters, we did not make any effort to examine how normal 
these ratings are, however they may help researchers select narratives on which they can 
generate their own normative ratings177. In addition, we are developing a website that will 
allow us to collect data from the general population through the internet in the future. 
This methodology has been used by Marc Hauser178 to generate thousands of ratings for 
moral dilemmas and we hope will one day produce normative ratings for this database. 
 The final section of the rating sheet was designed based on Richard Lazarus’ 
theory of emotions as adaptive tools. Lazarus claims that emotions are generated out of 
an appraisal process and that each emotion can be defined by the action that provokes it. 
Lazarus defines these actions quite specifically (as detailed on the rating sheet). Given 
that the rating tool was intended to elicit both the actions in each narrative as well as the 
                                                 
176 It is important to note at the outset that the raters used to collect these data were not a statistically 
normal sample. This is discussed in detail below (in the Raters section) but it bears brief mention here as 
well. 
177 It is our hope that the database project will remain active and collect these data as they are produced. 
178 Hauser, M. "The Moral Sense Test." 2008, from http://moral.wjh.harvard.edu/index.html. 
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feelings experienced while engaged in those actions, the narratives provided a rich 
opportunity to explore Lazarus’ appraisal structure in relation to real-life moral events.  
The wide range of actions contained in the database, the inclusion of emotions in every 
narrative and the normal distribution of the narrators who generated these memories 
made this a uniquely appropriate dataset with which to examine Lazarus’ claims.  
Furthermore, psychologists working in appraisal theory might wish to select stimuli 
(narratives) based on particular appraisal categories as described by Lazarus. 
 
Similarity Ratings: 
 The rating tool was designed to sort the narratives into categories generated by 
researchers reading the 100 story subsample. These categories were based on the 
knowledge, intuition and experience of those researchers. While this categorization 
system is an excellent way of classifying the narratives, it is inherently biased by the 
researchers’ perceptions. We were curious about other possible underlying categories, 
those that might be inherent in the data but not accessible (or at least not obvious) to a 
researcher categorizing the narratives. A similarity rating scale was designed to generate 
data that would allow us to find other categories in the data. Its purpose was merely to 
generate a rating of how similar any two given narratives were judged to be, using a 
Likert scale from -2 to +2, without providing the raters with any specific dimension or 
category with respect to which to make this similarity judgment. With enough unique 
pairwise comparisons of narratives, these data could allow us to create a 
multidimensional space that contained the complete contents of the database, and to 
examine this space for particular category structures (using tools such as principal 
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components analysis, clustering, or multidimensional scaling). In order to facilitate the 
rating process, these data were collected on a separate worksheet, not on the rating sheet. 
 
Part 2: Raters  
 
 Raters were initially recruited from a group of local colleagues who were 
interested in the database narratives, but it became clear that the sheer number of ratings 
needed was going to require more volunteers to rate the entire database. Alumni from the 
California Institute of Technology were approached through the alumni email list as a 
volunteer pool. This pool was ideal for a rater group because, as a whole, they were 
interested in the science being done at their alma mater, they were all college graduates, 
and they were easily accessible by email. Raters, both alumni and colleagues, were 
approached with the understanding that all of their ratings would be anonymous. No 
demographic information was collected about any raters. The only piece of information 
that is consistent about all raters is that they have (or are in the process of achieving) at 
least a bachelor’s degree. This was important in the choice of raters for two reasons: 1. 
Raters all share a minimum level of reading comprehension. Since participants in the 
database have a normal distribution of IQs, the narratives in the database vary in reading 
level. Given their educational background, all raters needed to be capable of easily 
reading the narratives with the highest level of vocabulary. 2. Raters were able to follow 
the long set of directions that accompanied their rating packet. Although the rating 
process was relatively simple, the instructions that went along with the rating were 
detailed, in order to ensure consistent rating. Setting a minimum level of education for the 
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raters made certain that all raters would be able to complete the rating process accurately. 
(For the complete set of rating instructions and the rating sheet, see Appendix H and 
Appendix G.)   
 While, for the purpose of obtaining consistent if preliminary ratings, we had 
chosen a relatively homogeneous and educated group of raters, the raters nonetheless 
varied somewhat in age, gender, and education. Although there is no demographic 
information, it can also be assumed that they varied to some extent in ethnicity and 
religion. In total, 55 raters179 were used to generate the 2169 ratings collected. It is 
important to reiterate, however, that there is no way of knowing how ‘normal’ a group 
the raters are. The rating data was intended for use as a categorization tool, not to 
generate normative data of any kind. The data about “right or wrong” generated by the 
raters should never be used as normative or standardized ratings. In any study where a 
subset of the database is used, researchers should be sure to generate their own normal 
ratings. It is hoped that over time, as various researchers generate normal rating data for 
particular narratives, the database will begin to have a pool of normal ratings which can 
be used for those purposes. 
 
Rater Tasks: 
 After being recruited, raters received an email explaining the rating project. This 
email informed raters that the content of the narratives would range from very positive to 
very negative. Additionally, it assured raters that they were under no obligation to rate 
any narratives that made them uncomfortable and they could stop rating at any point in 
the process.  
                                                 
179 74 raters were recruited. Of those, 55 completed at least one rating. 
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  Raters were given the option of doing their ratings on paper and mailing them 
back to the laboratory or completing a spreadsheet with the ratings and emailing them 
back. This system allowed us to recruit the greatest number of raters since volunteers had 
different preferences about the style of rating that would be most comfortable for them. 
(Several raters lived in other countries and felt more comfortable emailing their ratings, 
for example.) Each rater began with 30 narratives to rate, however the number of ratings 
completed by each rater varied from 2 to 194 ratings. 
Each rater received a link to an individual website after initial recruitment. The 
website included a downloadable packet of 30 narratives, a set of instructions about how 
to rate each narrative and the rating sheet and similarity worksheet. Each website also 
included contact information. Raters were encouraged to email questions about the rating 
instructions before beginning and during the rating process as they came up. 
Approximately 10% of raters sent in questions; these were clarified by the experimenters 
in all cases. 
 
The Rating Instructions: 
 The rating sheet contained 9 distinct categories, as described above. These were: 
Who?, Where?, What Did They Do?, Why Did They Say They Did It?, How Did They 
Feel?, Did They Rationalize?, Cue Word Choice, Judgment and Core Relational Themes. 
(The “they” in all of these categories refers to the narrator of the narrative being read.) 
For each category, the rating instructions were quite detailed, in order to obtain the 
greatest reliability from the ratings.  In the ‘Who?’ category, raters were first asked to 
guess the gender of the narrator of the story. This was the only rating category where 
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raters were supposed to guess at anything. In a previous study, we had hypothesized that 
many of the narratives could be gender-interchangeable. This guess was necessary to 
substantiate that hypothesis. (Results of this and other gender related research can be 
found in Chapter 4, Section 4.) Raters were also asked to report whether they were 
certain about their choice of gender or uncertain. Second in the ‘Who?’ category, raters 
were asked to designate the age of the narrator, only if it was important to the story. 
Specifically, raters were told, “… being an adult is not relevant to the story”. However, 
many raters appeared to be slightly overzealous in this categorization and frequently 
chose ‘adult’ when it may not have been relevant to the narrative. Lastly, raters were 
asked to identify any race, religion or other “category” which might be relevant to the 
story. Other categories that raters identified included Little League, single parent 
households and homosexuality. The goal of this category was to provide additional 
insight about other organizations, groups or affiliations that might be an interesting way 
to categorize the narratives. 
 The ‘Where?’ category was subtitled ‘Scene of the Action’ and was intended to 
gather information about locations where the narrative took place. We hypothesized that 
the participants might have behaved differently in different parts of their lives. For 
example, there were several narratives where participants talked about doing things of 
questionable morality while on vacation; things they would not have done at home. We 
were interested in whether this pattern could be seen more generally in the database as a 
whole. This category included items such as ‘family’ and ‘animals’ as well, under the 
assumption that these might also affect how a person chooses to apply their moral 
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standards. Raters were encouraged to write in additional scenes and their write-ins 
included scenes as varied as: Church, Rehab, Online and Funeral. 
 The three major categories, ‘What Did They Do?’, ‘Why Did They Say They Did 
It?’ and ‘How Did They Feel?’ were all rated the same way. The instructions given asked 
the raters to “…put each story in EVERY category that it belongs in.” They were asked 
to rate each item in these categories on a scale from zero to three. (For a complete list of 
the items in each category, see Appendix G.)  Zero was to be used when the actions in the 
narrative did not apply to the category at all. Three was to be used when the actions in the 
narrative were a great exemplar of the category. Raters were told to consider that a story 
about a child taking a piece of candy and a professional jewel thief who robs a museum 
are both stories where someone stole something and should both be categorized as 
‘stealing/taking someone else’s money’ but that they might not earn the same degree of 
rating. Raters were specifically not given any actual instructions on how to rate these two 
examples, to prevent biasing the rating process.  In addition to rating stories where the 
narrator did the action in the category, raters were also instructed to look for omissions of 
the action. In the case where the narrator talks about deciding not to shoplift, for example, 
that story would be categorized as an ‘omission of stealing’. Omissions were designated 
with negative signs, to distinguish them from actions. This is critical to remember when 
using the rating data in the database. Negative signs are simply a convenient code for 
‘omission’. They are not indicative of a negative action. The raters were not asked to rate 
on a Likert scale from -3 to +3. (They were not, in fact, asked to rate on a Likert scale at 
all.) Omissions are a useful part of the category for any kind of action since they provide 
an additional aspect to moral decision making – that of making a concrete decision not to 
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act. The morality of making a decision to act or omit an action has been discussed by 
moral philosophers for many years.  For research purposes, all stories that are rated 
higher than one are considered members of that category. Further subdividing them based 
on their score between one and three (or negative one and negative three) should be used 
on a case-by-case basis.  
 For their last zero to three judgment, raters were asked to answer the question, 
“Did they rationalize an action or behavior?” Again, “they” refers to the narrator in each 
narrative. In response to preliminary rater questions about how to apply a scale to a yes or 
no question, the instruction sheet clarified this question as: “How strongly does 
rationalization play a role in this story?” 
 The category ‘Cue Word’ was used to generate a more complete list of the cues 
that could have prompted each narrative. Raters understood that each narrative they were 
reading had been produced using a cued recall protocol, using a single cue word. During 
the initial editing process of turning spoken memories into narratives, we had discovered 
that many of the narratives contained elements of several cues. For example, a story 
about cheating on a spouse, cued by ‘cheating’ might also have been cued by the cues 
‘guilty’, ‘regretful’ and ‘worst thing you ever did’. Additionally, the priming effect that 
has been discussed in Chapter 2 meant that some cue words overlapped with each other 
in the participants’ minds. A good example of this would be the cues ‘cheating’ and 
‘unfaithful’. Often participants told a story about cheating on a spouse when given the 
cue ‘cheating’, but then were stymied when the cue ‘unfaithful’ came up and instead told 
a story about cheating on a test. To characterize these effects, the raters were asked to 
select every word in the cue word list that could have elicited the narrative they just read. 
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The raters were also instructed not to “over-think this category; just do it quickly and 
move on.” This prevented raters from adding too much extraneous information from their 
own experience to the choices they made. 
 The category ‘Judgment’ is perhaps the most interesting of the categorizations 
that the raters completed. However, as has been discussed above, the rater judgments in 
this category cannot be used as ‘normal’ ratings for these narratives. They are merely for 
initial investigation purposes. Raters were given a visual representation of a Likert scale 
from -5 to +5 and asked to provide their own judgment of the following question: “How 
right or wrong do YOU think the action in the story is?” Negative five was designated 
“completely wrong”, positive five was designated “completely right” and zero was 
specifically labeled ‘gray area’. In the instructions, the raters were further told that zero 
meant “completely morally ambiguous” or “equally right and wrong”. They were also 
told to write the words ‘not moral’ in the rating space if they believe that there was no 
moral component to the narrative. These specific instructions about zero were intended to 
prevent a discontinuity at that point on the scale and to re-emphasize the continuous 
nature of a Likert scale to the raters. The raters were also told in the instructions that this 
rating was unique because it was purely their own subjective opinion about the actions in 
the narrative. They did not need to take into account the beliefs of the narrator, only their 
own beliefs. This was important, for example, when considering a narrative that involved 
an action like taking a family member off life support.  
 The final category that raters completed was ‘Core Relational Themes’. This 
section was based on Richard Lazarus’ concept of the core relational themes of emotion. 
Briefly, Lazarus claims that each core emotion is generated from a specific action. For 
  109 
example, “A demeaning offense against me and mine” would cause one to feel angry. He 
has a core relational theme for each of fifteen emotions. The raters did not receive any 
background about Lazarus’ theory because it was felt that they could choose the actions 
in their narrative without further explanation. Instead, they were asked to choose all the 
themes that applied to their narrative “based on the description of the theme, NOT the 
emotion word.” They were also told to leave this blank if none of the themes fit their 
narrative. Analyzing these data is outside the scope of this current project; however, the 
data can be found in the database for other research projects.  
 
Similarity Rating Instructions: 
 The similarity rating sheet was explained to the raters with a separate set of 
instructions. These instructions explained that they were to generate a rating on a Likert 
scale from -2 to +2 of how similar two narratives were. Specifically, they were told that 
“similarity ratings [may] help identify “categories” that might not be intuitively obvious”. 
They were told to complete these pairwise ratings after completing one rating sheet and 
reading the next narrative, before filling out its rating sheet. In this way, they were best 
able to compare their intuitive sense of how similar the two narratives were. To 
emphasize the organic nature of this rating, raters were told to “do [this rating] by feel”. 
This part of the rating task generated many questions, both during pilot ratings and from 
the alumni raters over email. Many raters were concerned about what ‘similar’ meant in 
this context. Rather than giving examples, raters were simply encouraged to go with their 
instincts. They were also told that they didn’t need to have a reason for why the two 
narratives were similar, just a sense of how similar they were. In this way, we hoped to 
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generate the most objective similarity ratings with the least researcher bias. In order to 
generate as many unique pairwise comparisons between narratives as possible, the raters 
were encouraged to read the narratives in any order they chose. Each packet with a 
particular set of 30 narratives sent out was only sent to a maximum of two raters and 
since most raters printed out their narratives, their similarity ratings were not likely to be 
done in the same order. 
 
Returning Rating Data: 
When raters completed the rating process, they emailed and indicated whether 
they would like a pre-paid mailing envelope mailed to them through the US Postal 
Service so that they could return their rating sheets cost-free. Most raters opted for this 
choice, but a few emailed their ratings in instead. After the ratings were received, they 
were either manually entered into the database (if they were received on paper) or 
digitally transferred into the database (if they were received as spreadsheets).   
 
Section 6: Inter-rater reliability: 
To assess the reliability of ratings among raters, we evaluated ratings from 111 
narratives (all the narratives with exactly 5 raters, approximately 15% of the database). 
Since ratings were inclusive and different raters may have had different tolerances for 
inclusion, we calculated the number of narratives where at least 4 of the raters agreed on 
at least one category as our minimum standard for rater agreement. Under these 
conditions we found that 105 out of 111 narratives showed rater agreement. (Using a 
more stringent standard where all 5 raters must agree found 76 of 111 narratives had 
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agreement.) By comparison, when the ratings were shuffled (within raters but among 
narratives), only 26 of 111 narratives showed rater agreement. These findings give us 
confidence that there is consistency among raters and the ratings can be considered 
reliable.  
 
Section 7: Database Development 
 
 After some consideration about the requirements of the database, Microsoft 
Access was chosen as the platform for this database. Several items were influential in 
choosing Access. 1. It is readily available to most researchers because it is included in the 
Microsoft Office Professional Suite. Also, the fact that it is a Microsoft product suggests 
that it is likely to be available and supported for the foreseeable computing future. 2. 
Access databases are relatively easy to implement. This was critical for creating a well-
organized database with features such as accurate primary keys. 3. Access databases can 
be searched with SQL, a common computer language used for databases. Although 
Access is somewhat difficult to use on a Macintosh computer, the SQL compatibility 
means that researchers using only Macs can still use the database. 4. Access databases 
can be placed on websites to allow remote users the ability to view the data. This 
substantially improves the ease with which the database can be administrated. In 
particular, we hope that other researchers will contribute ratings to the database and allow 
it to grow with time. In order to add new data while preserving the integrity of the 
original data, it is important to maintain a ‘primary’ database where all researchers can 
come to view data that has been newly added.  5. Lastly, Access is straightforward to use. 
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This provides ease of use for future users as well as a minimum of support that needs to 
be maintained for the database. The database has also been converted to Filemaker, a 
database program that can be used on Macintosh computers. These file formats allow 
users to access the data in the two most commonly used database programs. 
  
Section 8: Database Documentation: A Guide to the Tables in the Database 
 
All tables are organized using the field ‘Subject ID’ or ‘Story ID’ as the primary key. 
This allows for straightforward linking between the demographic data and the rating data. 
These descriptions are provided in alphabetical order, for ease of reference. For a better 
understanding of the structure of the tables, refer to Figure 7. 
Commonly recurring fields: 
Subject ID – All subjects were given a four digit code between 1000 and 2000 upon entry 
into the study. These are unique identifiers.  
Story ID – All narratives were given a four digit code between 5000 and 6000. These are 
unique identifiers. To ensure that the narrative identifiers could not be used to identify 
subjects, a table of random numbers was used to select the Story ID.  
Rater ID – All raters were given a two letter, two digit code of the form: (RA or RR)(01-
54). Each Rater ID is a unique identifier. The distinction between RA and RR was for 
internal purposes only and should be disregarded for research purposes. There is no 
difference between the two groups. 
In the text describing each table, ‘subjects’ refers to the 100 participants who told 
the narratives that comprise the database. ‘Raters’ refers to the 55 anonymous people who 
read and rated each story based on the information it contained.  
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Biographical Subject Data: 
This table contains all of the demographic data collected about the subjects during 
their initial intake into the study. The headings in this table are:  
Subject ID – This field is the primary key in this table. 
Year of Birth – All subjects were between the ages of 40 and 60 when the study was 
conducted, so all years of birth are between 1943 and 1965. 
Gender – Subjects were only given a choice between Male and Female. All subjects 
chose to identify themselves by these labels. 
Marital Status – Subjects wrote in their marital status. From these write-ins, a list of 
possible marital statuses was generated: Single, Married, Divorced, Widowed, Separated 
and Partnered. 
Children – Subjects provided a numerical answer to how many children they had.   
Ethnicity – Subjects chose from a list of ethnicity labels: American Indian, Asian/Pacific 
Islander, Black, Caucasian, Hispanic, Multiracial, Other. The label Hispanic was included 
separately from Caucasian to allow demographic distinction between these two 
populations. This was especially important in this study because the population of 
Southern California has a large Hispanic population.  
Education – Subjects chose the highest degree of education completed from the list of: 
Elementary School, Middle School, Some High School, High School, Some College, 
Bachelor’s Degree, Master’s Degree, Graduate Degree. 
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Income – Subjects chose from a list of possible income ranges. Data in this column refer 
to the following key: 1- $0 – $15,000; 2- $15,000 - $30,000; 3- $30,000 - $60,000; 4- 
$60,000 - $90,000; 5- $90,000 – 100,000; 6- $100,000 - $200,000; 7- Over $200,000.   
Occupation – Subjects provided a written answer about their occupation. Data in this 
column are transcribed exactly. Some cells include multiple occupations; some include 
prior occupations (before retirement or unemployment). 
Handedness – Subjects chose from the list: Right Handed, Left Handed, Ambidextrous. 
Subjects also completed a modified Edinburgh Handedness Inventory and their answers 
were checked against these choices for accuracy.  
Other Language – Subjects provided a written answer about any other languages they 
spoke fluently.  
Religion Then – Subjects were given room to write a short explanation of their religious 
background. An independent rater read these and extracted the religion or religions that 
the subject grew up with. Some cells may include multiple religions. 
Religion Now – Subjects were given room to write a short explanation of their current 
religious beliefs and practices. As with previous column, a rater extracted the current 
religion that subjects practiced. Cells are non-uniform as the subjects’ own descriptions 
were used wherever possible. 
Degree of Religious Influence – After reading the subjects’ descriptions of their 
childhood and current religions, two independent raters gave each subject a subjective 
score on degree of religious influence in their life. A 0 was scored if subjects did not have 
any religious influence in their lives. A 1 was scored if subjects: were raised with a 
religion and did not currently practice a religion; were occasionally involved in some 
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religious activity; or appeared to have some religious influence that was not strongly 
significant in their lives. A 2 was scored if subjects identified themselves as practicing 
members of a religion. Raters did not discriminate between established religious 
organizations and atypical forms of religious belief.  All data in this column are whole 
numbers; any disagreement between the two raters was resolved by a third rater. 
Sexual Orientation – Subjects chose from the following list: Heterosexual, Homosexual, 
Bisexual, Transgender, Polyamorous, None. There is one cell that contains a write-in 
answer. A small number (n=6) of subjects chose not to answer this question. A blank cell 
is distinct from the answer None. 
 
Cue Word Ratings: 
This table contains the data collected from raters about cue words.  Raters were 
given a table of all cue words and asked to select every word that might have elicited the 
story they just read. In this table, all three fields combined provide the primary key.  All 
fields are duplicated, but the combination is unique since Story ID and Rater ID are each 
unique identifiers. The headings in this table are: Story ID, Rater ID and Cue Word.  
Cue Word – Data in this field were chosen from the table ‘LookupCues’ and include the 
31 possible choices given to the raters. 
 
Eliciting Cue Word: 
This table contains the cue word that elicited each narrative. For more detail about the 
cue words and cued recall protocol, see Methods and Materials. The headings in this table 
are Story ID and Cue Word.  
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Story ID – This field is the primary key in this table. 
Cue Word – Data in this field were chosen from the table ‘LookupCues’. They are the 31 
unique cues given to subjects during the cued recall protocol.  
 
Eliciting Cue Word (Multiple Cues): 
This table contains data about the narratives that were elicited by multiple cue 
words. In some circumstances, subjects told the same story more than once during the 
cued recall protocol. In most cases, only one of these narratives was selected for the 
database, but in a few (n=16) cases the stories were combined to provide the best 
narrative. (This is explained more fully elsewhere.) In these cases, multiple cues (2 or 3) 
elicited a single story. The headings in this table are Story ID and Cue Word. The 
primary key is the combination of both fields. 
Cue Word – Data in this field were chosen from the table ‘LookupCues’.  
 
LIWC Data: 
This table contains the results from a complete Language Inquiry and Word Count 
2007 analysis of each narrative in the database. (For more information about LIWC 
analysis, see Chapter 4. For more information about LIWC, see the LIWC2007 Language 
Manual180.) The headings for each field were not altered from the LIWC output to allow 
easier comparison between these data and other LIWC analyses. For easier 
comprehension in this database, each field is briefly described below. For examples of 
each field, see the LIWC2007 Language Manual, Table 1. The headings in this table are 
                                                 
180Pennebaker, J. W., C. K. Chung, et al. (2007). The development and psychometric properties of 
LIWC2007. Austin, TX, LIWC.net. 
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divided into categories below based on the hierarchical structure of the LIWC dictionary. 
Be sure to understand the hierarchy before using these data. 
Story ID – This field is the primary key in this table. 
WC – Word Count. Note that each narrative includes the words “Memory 5xxx” in the 
text that was analyzed, so this word count is two words longer than the actual length of 
the narrative. 
WPS – Number of words per sentence. 
Sixltr – Number of words with greater than six letters.  
Dic – Percentage of words in the text that appeared in the LIWC dictionary. 
 
All data in the fields below are given as percentages of the total narrative. As an 
example, the heading ‘pronoun’ calculates the number of pronouns in the text and 
presents it as a percentage of the total length of the narrative.   
 
funct – Function words. Included in this hierarchy are the headings:  
pronoun – Total pronouns, which includes:  
ppron – Personal pronouns, which includes: 
i – 1st person singular; we – 1st person plural; you – 2nd person; shehe –  3rd person 
singular; they – 3rd person plural 
ipron – Impersonal pronouns; 
article – Articles; 
verb – Common verbs. Some verbs are included in total function words and some are not. 
For details be sure to read the LIWC manual. The category verb includes: 
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auxverb – Auxiliary verbs; past – Past tense verbs; present – Present tense verbs; future – 
Future tense verbs;  
adverb – Adverbs; preps – Prepositions; conj – Conjunctions; negate – Negations; quant 
– Quantifiers; number – Numbers;  
swear – Swear words 
Psychological Processes: The words in this category are all related to psychological 
behaviors and include: 
social – Social processes, which includes: 
family – Family; friend – Friends; humans – Humans; 
affect – Affective processes; which includes:  
posemo – Positive emotion;  
negemo – Negative emotion, which includes: 
anx – Anxiety; anger – Anger; sad –Sadness; 
cogmech – Cognitive processes, which includes: 
insight – Insight; cause – Causation; discrep – Discrepancy; tentat – Tentative; certain – 
Certainty; inhib – Inhibition; incl – Inclusive; excl – Exclusive;  
percept – Perceptual processes, which includes: 
see – See; hear – Hear; feel – Feel; 
bio – Biological processes, which includes: 
body – Body; health – Health; sexual – Sexual; ingest – Ingestion; 
relative – Relativity, which includes: 
motion – Motion; space – Space; time – Time; 
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Personal Concerns: The words in this category are all related to personal behavior and 
include:  
work – Work; achieve – Achievement; leisure – Leisure; home – Home; money – Money; 
relig – Religion; death – Death; 
Spoken Categories: The words in this category have to do with word usage that is unique 
to spoken words (as compared to written word) and include: 
assent – Assent words, like “OK”;  nonfl – Nonfluencies, like “err” ;   
filler – Filler words, like “I mean”; 
Punctuation Marks: This field calculates the total percentage of the text that is comprised 
of each type of punctuation. These types of punctuation include: 
Period – Periods; Comma – Commas; Colon – Colons; SemiC – Semicolons;  
QMark – Question marks; Exclam – Exclamation points; Dash – Dashes;  
Quote – Quotes; Apostro – Apostrophes; Parenth – Parentheses; OtherP – Other 
punctuation marks;  
AllPct – Total of all the punctuation marks in the text.  
 
LookupCues: 
This is a lookup table used to generate identical lists of cue words throughout the 
database. Lookup tables are used to eliminate data errors based on spelling or 
capitalization inconsistencies. Throughout this work, there are references to the 35 cues 
in the cued recall protocol. There are only 31 choices in this table because the cue “Talk 
about a memorable experience” was repeated 5 times for the subjects, bringing the total 
number of unique cue words to 31. The heading in this table is Cue Word.  
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Cue Word – Cue words were presented to subjects in complete sentences in the form, 
“Talk about a time when you did something that made you feel _____” or “Talk about a 
time when you ____”. A complete list of these cues can be seen in Table 1.  Most of the 
words used in this lookup table are exactly the cue words used. However, some of the 
cues used longer prompts and were abbreviated for length in this table. Those cues are 
listed with each heading below: 
Best Thing – Please talk about the best thing you ever did. 
Memorable – Please tell us about a very memorable thing that you have done. 
Most Afraid – Please talk about the thing that you are most afraid that other people will 
find out that you did. 
Most Like Others to Know – Please talk about the thing that you would most like other 
people to know that you did. 
Most Like to Change – Please talk about the think that you would most like to change if 
you could go back and do it differently. 
Most Proud – Please talk about the thing that you are most proud of having done.  
Worst Thing – Please talk about the worst thing you ever did. 
 
LookupEmotions: 
This is a lookup table for the table ‘Session Three: Emotion Data’. It contains a 
list of the 12 emotion choices subjects were given to choose from when rating their own 
narratives during Session Three. There were no write-in options given in this choice. 
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LookupScenes: 
This is a lookup table that contains a list of all of the ‘scenes’ chosen by raters. 
For each narrative, raters were asked to choose the location (or scene) of the story from 
the following choices: Job/Business Situation; Family/Close Friend; Abroad/Vacation; 
Home/Neighborhood; School; Animal; Party/Club; Car. Raters also wrote in additional 
locations and the lookup table was used to codify those choices. This prevented items like 
‘clinic’ and ‘doctor’s office’ from appearing separately, rather than together.   
 
Neuropsychological Subject Data: 
This table contains all of the neuropsychological data collected from subjects 
during their initial intake into the study.  For more complete descriptions of each of these 
tests, see Chapter 4, Section 1. The headings in this table are:  
Subject ID – This field is the primary key in this table. 
IQ – Full-scale intelligence quotient (FSIQ) was tested in the laboratory using the 2-
subtest Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence. 
NEO-FFI Scores – The NEO personality inventory generates five scores based on five 
personality factors: Neuroticism, Extroversion, Openness, Agreeableness and 
Conscientiousness. Scores are reported as T scores. These headings include: N NEO T 
Score, E NEO T Score, O NEO T Score, A NEO T Score and C NEO T Score. 
PolV – Subjects completed a questionnaire about their political values, which generated a 
score between 1 and 3. A low score (1) indicates more conservative values, an 
intermediate score (2) indicates middle of the road values and a high score (3) indicates 
more liberal values.  
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PANAS Scores – The Positive and Negative Affect Schedule generates two scores to 
assess general mood, the positive affect score (PA) and the negative affect score (NA). 
PA and NA are orthogonal, not opposite dimensions. (For more discussion of this, see 
Results.) The PANAS headings include: PA PANAS and NA PANAS. 
Ethical Position Questionnaire (EPQ) Scores – The Ethical Position Questionnaire is used 
to measure ethical ideologies. It creates two subscores, relativism and idealism, as well as 
an overall score. Although the overall score can be used, the two subscores (particularly 
the idealism score) are more commonly reported in the literature, so they have been 
included in the database. The headings in the table are: Idealism EPQ, Relativism EPQ, 
Total EPQ. 
Weighted Utilitarian Score – Subjects completed a 30 question version of philosophical 
moral dilemmas, including the standard trolley problem. A score of each subject’s 
utilitarianism was generated from the results of these dilemmas. These scores were 
weighted based on the severity of the dilemma. Lower scores indicate subjects who are 
less utilitarian in their decision making, higher scores indicate subjects who are more 
utilitarian. 
Schwartz Value Inventory (SVI) Scores – The Schwartz Value Inventory is used to 
measure differences in human value structures. It generates 10 scores based on 10 core 
human values. For greater discussion of each of these headings, see Chapter 4, Section 1 
and Table 6. The SVI headings include: Conformity SVI, Tradition SVI, Benevolence 
SVI, Universalism SVI, Self-Direction SVI, Simulation SVI, Hedonism SVI, 
Achievement SVI, Power SVI, Security SVI. 
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Rating Data: 
This table contains all of the data collected from the raters about narratives. The 
rating process and information about the raters can be found earlier in this chapter. Raters 
were asked to make decisions about 3 major categories: What Did They Do?; Why Did 
They Do It?; and How Did They Feel?. In the description of the fields below, ratings will 
be grouped by category. Within these categories fall the majority of the fields in this 
table. For each item, raters gave a rating between 0 and 3 based on how well the narrative 
they were reading typified the action. A negative sign was used to designate narratives 
where the person specifically chose not to perform the item.  
The headings in this table are: 
Story ID – This field is combined with Rater ID to create the primary key for this table. 
Rater ID – As above. 
Gender? – This field is the rater’s guess about the gender of the author. It is NOT the 
actual gender of the author. The question marks in headings throughout this table are 
intended to designate the raters’ opinions or feelings, not those of the subjects. 
Gender Guess? – Raters were asked if they were certain of their choice of gender for each 
narrative. If raters felt that they were guessing, the answer is yes. If they were certain of 
the gender of the person in the narrative (the narrator), the answer is no. It is worth 
nothing that although raters believed they were certain, there are many cases in which 
they were still wrong. (This is discussed in Chapter 4, Section 4.) 
Age – Raters chose the age of the narrator based on the information in the narrative, only 
if they were relevant to the narrative. Specifically, the raters were told that being an adult 
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was typically not relevant. The choices given to choose from are: Child, Preteen, 
Adolescent, Adult. 
Other Feature? – This field is unique in its open-endedness. Raters were instructed to 
note any group affiliations that might be relevant to the story. This included ethnicity and 
religion in the instructions to the raters. The items that raters generated also included 
things as diverse as scouting groups, single parenting and more.  
What Did They Do? Headings – The headings in this category include: Helping someone, 
Protecting someone, Taking care of someone, Being kind to someone, Self-sacrifice, 
Cheating in school/work, Cheating in business, Sneaking into a movie theatre, Falsifying 
a document, Tricking someone else, Physically unfaithful, Mentally unfaithful, 
Neglecting someone, Being hurtful to someone, Being unkind to someone, Lying, Telling 
a white lie, Stealing/Spending someone’s money, Stealing an idea/plagiarizing, 
Shoplifting, Returning lost money/wallet/things, Bank error/too much 
change/undercharged, Enlisting someone’s help to do the wrong thing, Enlisting 
someone’s help to do the right thing, Fighting for someone else’s rights, Taking 
advantage of someone, Breaking a rule/law, Vandalism/Damaged property 
Other What? – In this field, raters were able to write in any additional actions that they 
felt were missing from the What Did They Do? headings.  
Why Did They Do It? Headings – The headings in this category include: Taking the high 
road, Doing the wrong thing, Doing the right thing, Making extra effort to do the right 
thing, Making extra effort to do the wrong thing, Doing lesser harm to prevent greater 
harm, Means do NOT justify the ends, Fear of retribution/karma, Cheating ‘the 
system’/’the man’, Righting a wrong, Peer pressure/social pressure, Altruism, Teaching a 
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lesson/revenge, Self-preservation, Getting out of a tight spot, Selfishness, Taking a 
chance, Because of money. 
Other Why? – This field is the same as Other What?. The raters generated additional 
reasons that they felt the narrator had acted the way that he or she did. The raters were 
not limited to reasons specifically stated in the narrative; they could add their own 
intuition about the narrator’s reasons in this category as well. 
How Did They Feel? Headings – The headings in this category include: Regret about 
doing the right thing, Regret about doing the wrong thing, Regret about behavior, 
Knowledge of personal moral weakness, Knowledge of personal moral strength, 
Uncertainty about moral correctness of action, Not taking responsibility for actions, 
Taking responsibility for actions, Learning a lesson, Putting self in someone else’s shoes, 
Shame/ashamed, Powerful. 
Other How? – This field is the same as the other Other headings. Raters were allowed to 
write in their any rationale that they felt was not included above. 
Did They Rationalize? – Raters judged the degree to which the narrator rationalized his 
or her actions. This judgment was also made on a scale from 0 to 3. 
Rating – After reading each narrative, raters gave their personal judgment of how right or 
wrong the actions of the narrator were. This was done with a Likert scale from -5 to +5. 
Raters were instructed to use ‘0’ to mean “neither right nor wrong” and to write in “not 
moral” if they believed the story was not moral at all. These specific instructions were 
intended to prevent discontinuity in the scale at the zero point. In the database itself, the 
words “not moral” were coded as the code 999. When raters left the rating judgment 
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blank, it was coded as 998. These codes were used since the field uses a ‘number’ data 
type. 
 
Scene Ratings: 
This table contains the data raters generated about the locations in which the 
narratives took place. Often, the narratives took place in more than one location and 
raters chose all of the appropriate locations. Most of the other rater data is included in the 
table ‘Rating Data’. However,  in order to create a primary key in the ‘Rating Data’ table, 
it was necessary to display each Story ID and Rater ID pair only once in the table. Since 
the same rater selected multiple scenes for the same story, it precluded this data being 
included directly in the table. It is available, instead, as a subdatasheet drop down menu 
in ‘Rating Data’. This maximizes the amount of information that can be contained in that 
table. The headings in this table are: Story ID, Rater ID and Scene.  The primary key is 
the intersection of all three fields. 
Scene – This field uses the lookup table ‘LookupScenes’, which includes all 30 possible 
locations generated by the raters.  
 
Session Three Data: 
This table contains the data acquired during Session Three, the testing session 
where subjects returned to the lab and read the narratives that had been transcribed from 
their memories. For more information about this testing session, see Methods and 
Materials. The headings in this table are quite abbreviated; the complete questions asked 
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for each item can be found below as well as in the description that accompanies the 
design view of the table. The headings in this table are: 
Story ID – This field is the primary key for this table. 
Rating the Narrative Headings – For each of the following headings, the subjects were 
asked to answer the question of the general form, “how ___ was this experience?”, using 
a Likert scale from 1 to 10, where 1 was “not ___ at all” and 10 was “extremely ___”.  
For exact wording for each question, see Appendix C. The headings in this category 
include: Pleasant, Vivid, Intense, Emotional, Significant, Confidential, Regret181, Guilt, 
Embarrassment, Pride182.  
At the Time Headings – The second category of questions asked of the subjects was 
about their feelings at the time that the narrative occurred. Most of these questions 
involved Likert scale decisions. The endpoints for these scales are listed with the 
heading. The headings in this category include:  
Then RoW – At the time, how wrong or right did your actions in this episode seem to 
you? Very Wrong = 1; Very Right = 10. 
Then Options – At the time, did you feel like you had options about what you could do in 
the situation? Could Do Nothing Else = 1; Could Just As Easily Have Done Many Other 
Things = 10. 
Then Choices – To the best of your recollection, approximately how many distinctly 
different things could you have done at the time?   
                                                 
181 The wording for regret was “do not regret at all” to “regret a great deal”. 
182 The question asked for this heading was “how proud are you now about your behavior during this 
experience?” The heading ‘Pride’ was used to distinguish this question from others in Session Three about 
pride. 
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Morally Better Could – At the time, did you think there was something morally better 
that you could have done?  
Morally Better Should – At the time, did you think there was something morally better 
that you should have done?  
Content with Actions – Immediately after you made the decision and did these actions, 
how content were you with your actions? Completely Satisfied = 1; Completely 
Discontent = 10. 
How Difficult – At the time, how hard was it, morally, for you do what you did? 
Specifically, subjects were instructed to think about their psychological struggle with 
making the decision in the narrative. Very Easy To Do = 1; Agonizing and Difficult = 10. 
Second Guess Self – At the time, did you second-guess your decision?  
Frequency of Recollection – To the best of your recollection, how many times in the year 
following this episode did you think about this decision?  
Wish Done Differently – To the best of your recollection, how many times in the year 
following this episode did you wish that you’d done something different?  
Current Feeling Headings – The third category of questions elicited the differences 
between then and now. The same questions as the previous category were asked. The 
headings in this category include: 
Now RoW – Reading this today, how wrong or right do your past actions in this episode 
seem to you? Very Wrong = 1; Very Right = 10. 
Now Options – Reading this today, do you feel like you had options about what you 
could have done in the situation? Could Do Nothing Else = 1; Could Just As Easily Have 
Done Many Other Things = 10. 
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Now Other Choices – Thinking about the situation today, approximately how many 
distinctly different things could you have done at the time?   
Now Morally Better Could – Today, do you think there was something morally better 
that you could have done? 
Now Morally Better Should – Today, do you think there was something morally better 
that you should have done? 
Now Content with Actions – Today, how content are you with your past actions? 
Completely Satisfied = 1; Completely Discontent = 10. 
Now How Difficult – If you were in the same situation again, how hard would it be, 
morally, for you to decide what to do? Very Easy To Do = 1; Agonizing and Difficult = 
10. 
Still Think About It – Do you still think about whether you made the right decision in this 
situation? 
Now Frequency of Recollection – How many times in this past year have you thought 
about the decision you made in this episode? Subjects were instructed not to count times 
that they had thought about the episode since beginning the study. 
Now Wish Done Differently – When you think about this episode today do you wish that 
you’d done something different? This field uses the data type ‘memo’ to contain the 
complete text of the written-in answers given by the subjects. 
Taking an Outside Perspective Headings – This category asked subjects to imagine how 
others reading these narrative would view them. Specifically, these imaginary other 
people were described as strangers to the subject and “other normal people who might be 
in a research study”. The headings in this category include: 
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Others RoW – If other people read this situation, how wrong or right would the actions in 
this episode seem to them? Very Wrong = 1; Very Right = 10. 
Others Options – If other people read this situation, would they feel like you had options 
about what you could do in the situation? Could Do Nothing Else = 1; Could Just As 
Easily Have Done Many Other Things = 10. 
Others Morally Better Could – Would other people think there was something morally 
better that you could have done? 
Others Morally Better Should – Would other people think there was something morally 
better that you should have done? 
Others How Difficult – If other people reading this story were rating on a scale of 1 to 10, 
how hard would they say that it was, morally, for you to decide what to do? Very Easy 
To Do = 1; Agonizing and Difficult = 10. 
Others Right Choice – Do you think other people reading this would say that you made 
the right decision in this situation?  
Highly Ethical Other Do Same – Do you think a very strictly ethical person (for example 
Gandhi) would do the same thing?  
Highly Ethical Other RoW – How right or wrong would a strictly ethical person rate your 
decision? Extremely Wrong = 1; Extremely Right = 10; 
Personal Reflection Headings – The final category included additional questions that 
reflect on the subject’s personal state of mind during the narrative.   
Consider Judgments – Did you think about what other people would say at the time that 
this happened? 
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Consider Opinions – Did you think about other people’s opinions before you made the 
decision?  
Whose Opinions – Whose opinions did you consider? This field uses the data type 
‘memo’ to contain the complete text of the written-in answers given by the subjects. 
Thought About Self – How much did you think about yourself (your own needs and 
wants) when you made your decision? Did Not Think of Self At All = 1; Thought 
Entirely About Self = 10. 
Decision Based on Self – How much did you base your decision on your own needs and 
wants? Based Decision Entirely on Other Factors = 1; Based Decision Entirely on Self = 
10. 
Self Ethical Rating – Rate yourself as an ethical person. Not Ethical At All = 1; Highly 
Ethical = 10. 
Ethical Definition –Please define ethical. Subjects were asked this question after reading 
each narrative. Some answered differently each time, some referred to their first answer. 
To determine the order in which these answers were given, this table can be queried using 
the ‘Subject ID to Story ID’ table. 
Reflect General Behavior – How well does this story reflect your general behavior? 
Never Act Like This = 1; Always Act Like This = 10. 
Reflect On Self – How well does this story reflect on you? Reflects Very Badly On Me = 
1; Reflects Very Well On Me = 10. 
 
Session Three: Emotion Data: 
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This table contains the emotion choices subjects made after reading their own 
narratives. During testing session three, subjects were asked to select from a given list the 
emotions that “best describe how this experience made you feel”.  They were instructed 
to choose up three emotions from the list of twelve.  In addition, they were told to use the 
order of their choice to designate the relative degree among the emotions (i.e., the 
emotion that best described how they felt was to be chosen as Emotion 1).  This table is 
intended to be used as a subdatasheet of the table ‘Session Three Data’. The headings in 
this table are: 
Story ID – This field is the primary key for this table. 
Emotion 1, Emotion 2, Emotion 3 – The data for these fields are drawn from the lookup 
table ‘LookupEmotions’ to generate the list of the given emotions. No write-in emotions 
were allowed. Subjects were allowed to choose no emotions if they did not apply and 
were given an upper bound of 3 choices. The order of these headings contains 
information about the degree that each emotion was elicited by the narrative.  
 
Session Three: Temporal Data: 
This table contains several representations of the age of each narrative. During 
testing session three, subjects were asked to report when the actions in the narrative took 
place for each narrative. If they were unable to give a date, they were asked to give their 
“best guess of their age when this event occurred”.  This table can be used as a 
subdatasheet for the table ‘Session Three Data’ or it can stand alone. It may be especially 
useful when combined with the ‘Biographical Subject Data’ table about the age of each 
subject. The headings in this table are: 
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Story ID – This field is the primary key for this table. 
Year of Story – This field has been generated from the original text given by the subject. 
In some cases, these dates have been estimated based on the text. The original text can be 
seen in the field Original Text of Date Recollection. The code 9999 has been used to 
indicate narratives that the subject said were recurring or ongoing. This distinguishes 
them from stories where the subject was unable to provide a date. 
Age of Memory – This field is described by the equation: Age of Memory = 2004 - Year 
of Story. It is included purely for convenience of the researcher. Session Three was 
completed for all subjects in 2004. As above, the code 9999 was used to replace 
information for narratives that were recurrent.   
Original Text of Date Recollection – This field contains the original text typed by each 
subject. It has not been edited in any way. It is included in this table for researchers who 
would like to use the original text to discriminate smaller temporal units than years. 
 
Session Two Exit Questionnaire: 
This table contains the data gathered from subjects after completion of Session 
Two. An exit questionnaire was administered to collect data on subjects’ general feelings 
about the process of generating autobiographical memories and the effect that imposing a 
time limit had on the cued recall protocol. In all applicable cases below, the subjects were 
given a Likert scale from 1 to 10 to use when answering these questions. ‘Not at all’ was 
represented by 1 and ‘very much’ was represented by 10. The headings in this table are: 
Subject ID – This field is the primary key for this table. 
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Degree of Emotion – Subjects answered the question “How emotional did you feel during 
this study?” 
Degree of Difficulty – Subjects answered the question “How difficult was this task?” 
Reflection – Subjects answered the question “How much will you think about these 
memories in the next week?” 
Reflection Comparison – Subjects answered the question “How much do you think you 
would have though about these memories in the next week if you hadn’t participated in 
the study?”. This field is intended to be a comparison with the previous field. The goal as 
an exit question was to elicit some information about the affect of the autobiographical 
recall on the subject’s overall behavior. 
Suggested Time Limit – Subjects were asked to fill in a blank about how long they were 
supposed to spend recording each memory. The correct answer was 3 minutes. However, 
the question may have been ambiguous since several subjects responded with ‘4 hours’ 
which was the length of time the entire testing session was supposed to take. This field 
also gives insight into subjects’ general comprehension abilities. 
Adherence – Subjects answered the question “How closely did you try to adhere to the 
time limit?” using a Likert scale from 1 to 5.  
Pressured – Subjects answered the question “How pressured did you feel by the time 
limit?” using a Likert scale from 1 to 5.  
Comments – Subjects were given an open-ended space for comments on the testing 
session. This has been included in the database because they may provide insight for 
other researchers about the state of mind of the subjects after the cued recall protocol. 
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Session Two Exit Questionnaire: Emotion: 
This is a table that describes how subjects were feeling after completing Session 
Two. Data in this table was part of a larger exit questionnaire; however since subjects 
were able to choose more than one answer to this question, the data are better presented 
in a separate table. This table is most useful as a subdatasheet of the table ‘Session Two 
Exit Questionnaire’. The headings in this table are: Subject ID and Emotion. The 
intersection of these fields is the primary key.  
Emotion – Subjects responded to the question “How do you feel now that you have 
completed this task?” by choosing all of the ways they were feeling from the following 
list: Happy, Satisfied, Pensive, Tired, Relieved, Wrung Out. Subjects were also allowed 
to write down any other emotions they had. Written answers were taken verbatim from 
subject responses, resulting in some inconsistent emotions. 
 
Subject ID to Story ID: 
This table links Subject ID to Story ID. This generates a relationship between the 
two major divisions in this database – data that are linked to subjects and data that are 
linked to stories. For a graphical representation of this see Figure 7. The headings in this 
table are:  
Subject ID 
Memory # – Each subject produced multiple memories. These memories were numbered 
sequentially, so this field makes it possible to order the memories of each subject in the 
order that they were generated.  
Story ID – This field is the primary key for this table. 
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How the Database Can Be Used: 
 The breadth of the database makes a complete description of its contents overly 
repetitive. However, a concise presentation of some of the data can be instructive in 
demonstrating how the database can be used to address research questions. This can be 
found in Chapter 4, Section 4. The example presented will address the presumed gender 
of the narrators based on the content of the narrative and compare that to the actual 
gender of the subject who generated the memory. In addition, the queries that were 
necessary to collect these data are included in the database to help others become familiar 
with Access and queries in general. 
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Chapter 3: Figures and Tables 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“Men are more moral than they think and far more immoral than they can imagine.” 
-- Sigmund Freud 
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Figure 5: Distribution of Number of Moral Memories per Participant  
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Figure 5: The mean number of moral memories elicited during the cued recall protocol 
was 7.66; however, the mode shows that it was most common to generate 6 moral 
memories. 
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Figure 6: Distribution of Number of Words per Narrative 
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Figure 6: The number of cue words in each narrative was calculated using the Linguistic 
Inquiry and Word Count 2007 text analysis tool.   
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Figure 7: Table Structure of Major Database Divisions 
 
 
 
Figure 7: The database structure reflects the primary dichotomy among the data: 
participant oriented (Subject ID) or narrative oriented (Story ID). All of the primary 
tables can be classified into one of these categories, as shown in the table above. The 
table Subject ID to Story ID is the primary linking table.
Subject ID 
Biographical Subject Data 
Neuropsychological Subject Data 
Session Two Exit Questionnaire 
Session Two Exit Questionnaire: Emotion 
 
Story ID 
Cue Word Ratings 
Eliciting Cue Words 
Ratings Data 
Eliciting Cue Word (Multiple Cues) 
LICW Data 
Lookup Scenes/Cues 
Rating Data 
Scene Ratings
to 
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Table 2: Comparison of Database Narratives to Language and Inquiry Word Count 
Standards 
 
Table 2: Narratives from our database are quite typical when compared to the standards 
found in the Language and Inquiry Word Count manual as well as control narratives from 
our own research. The three LIWC  categories being compared to are (from left to right): 
participants who wrote on “deeply emotional topics”; participants who wrote on 
“relatively trivial topics, such as plans for the day”; and people who were “tape-recorded 
while engaging in conversations with others”. The percentages given for ‘words with 
more than six letters’ and ‘total function words’ are the percent of the total text that was 
devoted to this category. The fourth comparison is to the non-moral narratives that were 
elicited by our control cues: funny, tired and exercised. It should be noted that the control 
narratives were not edited, unlike the database narratives, which may account for the 
difference in length between the two groups. 
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Words Per 
Sentence (mean) 16.08 ± 3.69 19.56 19.84 25.87 20.18 ± 0.95 
Words in LIWC 
Dictionary  93.9% 93.42% 88.55% 91.49% 92.73% 
Words > 6 letters 11.9% 13.27% 13.87% 9.43% 13.04% 
Total function 
words 65.71% 63.93% 57.53% 60.48% 63.76% 
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Chapter 4: Results 
 
 The collection and characterization of autobiographical moral memories 
generated considerable data about the participants who generated the memories and the 
narratives prepared from them. This chapter seeks to examine some of these data in detail 
and cover others more broadly. As discussed in Chapter 2, we had various filters in place 
for screening data for their validity. For example, memories generated by participants 
whose cognitive condition was dubious on other criteria were omitted, as were memories 
that were difficult to understand. Valid data comprised all those entered into the database 
described in Chapter 3. More detailed descriptions of specific analyses and the statistical 
tests used to test their reliability are given in the following chapter. We followed general 
recommendations for data analysis183. All data were initially plotted and examined 
visually. When outliers were clearly apparent, they were removed. Any parametric 
statistical analyses were carried out only on data whose distribution did not deviate too 
much from normality or whose distribution was transformed to be normal. Some of our 
data analysis was entirely exploratory whereas other components arose from focused 
hypotheses. These cases are discussed in their respective sections below. 
 The detailed collection of data with consideration for other researchers’ possible 
interests and the in-depth characterization of the moral narratives has yielded this 
extensive collection of data. These findings comprise only a portion of the possible 
research that could be completed from the rich dataset collected from this research. This 
chapter begins by analyzing the participants in detail to examine both their demographic 
                                                 
183 Motulsky, H. (1995). Intuitive Biostatistics. Oxford, Oxford University Press. 
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and neuropsychological representativeness. We find that the sample population used for 
collecting these moral memories is normal on every measure used to assess them. The 
second section seeks to characterize the moral narratives contained in the database. The 
narratives are analyzed with respect to the cue word used to elicit them to show that the 
variation in narratives arises from the moral content of the narratives and not the 
demographics or personalities of the participants. The subsequent sections analyze 
specific hypotheses about personal moral autobiographies. Section 3 examines the 
implicit structure of moral memories and we show that negative memories can be 
differentiated into three groups: lying, stealing and hurting another person. Section 4 
demonstrates how a hypothesis-driven analysis about gender can be augmented by the 
database. We find that raters of narratives are only moderately good at being able to 
distinguish the gender of the narrator in each narrative. Section 5 examines the effect of 
brain damage to emotion-related areas on the ability to generate moral autobiographical 
memories. Finally, we examine the effect of temporal biasing on moral memory 
recollection and find that positively valenced moral memories are recollected more 
recently in a personal autobiography than negatively valenced moral memories.  
 
 
Section 1: Characterization and Representativeness of the Participants 
 
Part 1: Demographics 
 General intuition might suggest that a wide variety of demographic factors may 
influence the moral stories generated by our participants. One might expect that 
participants growing up in different cultures, religions or socioeconomic classes have 
different formative experiences. Gender, IQ and education seem likely, at least 
  144 
intuitively, to play a role in the moral choices that participants make. However, after 
collecting nearly 800 stories from 100 participants, we find just the opposite. In general, 
people from all backgrounds and walks of life seem to have experienced similar moral 
dilemmas throughout their lives and recall similar moral memories. 
There are two key questions about the demographics of our participant sample. 
First, are they a representative sampling of the population? To begin assessing the 
representativeness of our sample, we must begin by defining the population they 
describe. We chose to compare them to the population from which they were drawn: the 
general population of southern California. In the following section, we provide a detailed 
characterization of the participant group. Briefly, participants were specifically matched 
to California state averages on ethnicity and gender. They fall within the normal range for 
IQ; they are both right and left handed; and their religions, secondary languages, socio-
economic statuses and political beliefs are diverse. This characterization of the 
participants provides the basis for our second question: How might individual differences 
along demographic or neuropsychological dimensions influence the moral memories that 
participants generated? For instance, do men and women generate different kinds of 
moral memories? Does age or ethnicity impact these memories? These types of 
exploratory questions are used to probe this very large database and the interesting 
findings are treated in detail in the subsequent sections.  
  
Gender, Age and Handedness: 
Our participants were diverse and representative of the general population on all 
of the demographic measures that we collected. The gender ratio of the participants in the 
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database was quite close to the state average (53% female, 47% male and 50.2% female, 
49.8% male, respectively). We did not have any transgendered participants. All of our 
participants were between the ages of 40 and 60 years old. Participants were normally 
distributed (mean = 48.9 ± 5.9 years) within this range (see Figure 8). 83% of our 
participants were right-handed. The distribution of the others can be seen in Figure 9. 
Although the proportion (and definition) of handedness in the general population is 
disputed184, most sources suggest that approximately 90% of people are right handed.  
 
Education:   
Participants’ education (see Figure 10) ranged from only elementary education (1 
participant) to advanced graduate degrees, including medical and law school. Most 
participants (90%) had attended at least some college, which does make their general 
education level slightly higher than the local population. 56.7% of the general Californian 
population has attended “some college or more”185. The elevated educational status may 
be accounted for by the techniques used to recruit participants. All participants were 
recruited through computer advertising (or word of mouth) and nearly all of our 
participants were comfortable using computers. We do not think this difference in 
education level is significant to the recall of autobiographical memories.  
 
Income: 
The median income range for these participants was $30,000 - $60,000 per year. 
This is in keeping with local census findings. Per capita income for Californians was 
                                                 
184 Oldfield, R. C. (1971). "The assessment and analysis of handedness: The Edinburgh Inventory." 
Neuropsychologia 9: 97-113. 
185 Bauman, K. J. and N. L. Graf (2003). Educational Attainment: 2000, US Census Bureau. 
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$22,711; median household income was $47,493186. Participants were asked to report 
individual incomes, not household incomes, during our demographic collection; however 
it is difficult to ascertain how accurately they followed this instruction. A significant 
number of our participants were not (or no longer) married, so the majority of these data 
are likely to be individual incomes. The distribution of incomes in our sample was 
somewhat skewed toward lower income ranges (Figure 11). This is likely due, in part, to 
participant recruitment. Our participants were paid $15/hour for their time, without 
reimbursement for travel. Although we would like to believe that at least some of our 
participants participated because of a genuine interest in research, we suspect that many 
of them were interested in participating to make extra money. Given this, we expected to 
(and did) recruit more participants with lower incomes. Despite this, 16% of our 
participants made more than $60,000, supporting the claim that this is a representative 
sample of wage-earners in Southern California.  
 
Occupations and Foreign Language Skills: 
 Our participant pool also included nearly 50 different occupations, spanning a 
wide range of both white and blue collar jobs, including: teachers, financial analysts, 
musicians, hair dressers, a farm grower, a photographer and a substance abuse counselor. 
For a complete list, see Table 3. Participants were also culturally diverse. All participants 
spoke English as their primary language (by adolescence), but many (34%) were raised 
bi- or trilingual (see Figure 12). This exact statistic is not available for the Californian 
                                                 
186 Income data is from Welniak, E. and K. Posey (2005). Household Income: 1999, US Census Bureau. 
Our participants were tested in 2004. Data from US Census 2005 are not yet completely available at the 
time of this writing. 
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population at large, but it is in keeping with the available statistic – 39.5% of Californians 
speak a language other than English at home.  
 
Ethnicity: 
Choosing ethnically diverse participants was of primary importance to creating a 
database that was representative. The ethnicity distribution of participants in our study 
closely matches the California state averages (see Figure 13.) Given the high proportion 
of Hispanic citizens (of several races) in Southern California, we chose to match our 
demographics to ethnicity instead of race alone. Normative data are taken from the US 
Census 2000187. The participant pool slightly over-represents Black and Hispanic 
participants (by 4.6% and 3.7%, respectively) and slightly under-represents Caucasian 
participants (by 6.5%).  
 
Marital Status and Children: 
The marital statuses of our participants were varied (see Figure 14).  The number 
of married and partnered participants in the database was smaller than the average 
population188 (27% versus 52.3%) and the number of divorced participants was higher 
than average (24% versus 9.5%). Although the proportions of the marital statuses of our 
participants were not particularly close to the state demographics, we feel that the sample 
is still a good representation of the general population. All marital status categories 
(single, married, partnered, divorced, separated and widowed) were represented. The 
variance in these data is likely attributable to the size of the sample. 53% of our 
                                                 
187 Data taken from "US Census Bureau American FactFinder", from http://factfinder.census.gov/. All data 
is from US Census 2000. 
188 Kreider, R. M. and T. Simmons (2003). Marital Status: 2000, US Census Bureau. 
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participants had at least one child (see Figure 15). (One participant had 7 children.) This 
number is in line with the state averages; 56.8% of families in California have children189 
and the average family size is 3.43 people. 
 
Sexual Orientation: 
 Our participant pool included people of most sexual orientations. The population 
frequency data for sexual orientation are widely disputed in current literature. A review 
of the literature in The New England Journal of Medicine suggests that between 2 and 6 
percent of the adult population are exclusively homosexual or bisexual190. Many sources 
suggest that these reported numbers may be low, due to the social stigma associated with  
identifying as homosexual or bisexual. Our database includes participants who reported 
their sexual orientation as homosexual (4%) and bisexual (3%) as well as several 
participants who chose not to respond (6%). (See Figure 16.) One of the findings of the 
well-known Kinsey study191 was that sexuality cannot always be defined by a single 
parameter, like “sexual orientation”. We also collected attractiveness ratings and degree 
of sexual desire on a Likert scale (1 – 10). These findings were in concert with the sexual 
orientation rating (see Figure 17). Despite the controversy about the exact frequency of 
homosexuality in the population, the frequency of various sexual orientations in our 
database seems to be in line with most findings, suggesting that our participants are 
representative on this demographic dimension.  
                                                 
189 Census data is complicated here because not all of our participants would qualify as “families” by 
census data. Nonetheless, these numbers are probably representative. 
190 Friedman, R. C. and J. I. Downey (1994). "Homosexuality." New England Journal of Medicine 331(14): 
923-930. 
191Gebhard, P. H. and A. B. Johnson (1998 ). The Kinsey Data: Marginal Tabulations of 1938-1963 
Interviews Conducted by the Institute for Sex Research Bloomington, IN, Indiana University Press. 
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Religious Views: 
Participants were also religiously diverse. Since religion and morality are often 
entangled, we felt it was particularly important to collect data about participants’ 
religious beliefs and practices. Data were collected on religious upbringing, current 
religious practices and degree of participation in religion. Figure 18 shows a trend 
towards religious exploration in our participants during their adult lives. A number of 
participants (19%) participated in multiple religions or non-conventional spiritual 
practices. To gauge the effect of religion on our participants’ lives (Figure 19), they were 
asked to answer a free-response question about their religious upbringing and their 
current religious practices. These responses (usually 2-3 sentences for each question) 
were scored by one reader, to give each participant a ‘degree of religious influence’ 
rating. 92% of our participants had some degree of religious influence in their lives, 
either during their childhood or through their current religious practices.   
Our participants were generally well-matched to state averages in the distribution 
of religious beliefs (Figure 20). Overall, Catholics seem to be under-represented, but we 
believe that some of this discrepancy is subsumed by the ‘Other Christian’ group. 
Participants were performing a free-response task when asked about religion and we 
believe that some of them may simply have written ‘Christian’, without specifying 
‘Catholic’. While reliable data about the proportion of Californians who practice many of 
these religions are not always available, the Center for Religious and Civic Culture192 in 
                                                 
192 "USC Center for Religious and Civic Culture." from 
http://www.usc.edu/schools/college/crcc/demographics/lacounty.html. 
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conjunction with the Glenmary Research Center193 provides us with some statistics we 
can use to compare our sample to the general population (Table 4). In our sampling, we 
did not have any participants who were Muslim, although 1% of the population in 
California report being Muslim. We did, however, recruit several Buddhists (3%) and it 
appears that there are nearly 3 times as many Buddhist temples in Los Angeles County as 
Muslim mosques. The numbers of Muslims mosques and Hindu temples are fairly equal 
and we did not manage to recruit any participants from either religion, suggesting that our 
sampling of the population is relatively uniform. 
 
Political Views: 
 Lastly, our participants were diverse in their political views. Participants’ political 
value systems were assessed using a questionnaire; those methods are described in 
Chapter 2. Figure 21 shows that 50% of our participants were best affiliated with liberal 
values, 40% were moderate and 10% espoused conservative beliefs. The average rating 
for our overall participant pool was slightly skewed to the left (mean = 2.4 ± 0.67 on 
scale of 1 (Conservative) to 3 (Liberal)). In 2004, 43.2% of voters in California were 
registered as Democrats and 35.7 % were registered as Republicans194. Since the 
questionnaire used to test political values included questions that are divisive for some 
Republicans (like abortion), we suspect that some of our ‘moderate’ participants are 
likely to be affiliated with the Republican Party.  
 
                                                 
193 (2000). Religious Congregations and Membership in the United States. Nashville, TN, Glenmary 
Research Center.   Description of this group and these statistics: 
http://www.usc.edu/schools/college/crcc/demographics/ 
194  "Report of Registration: January 2, 2004." from http://www.ss.ca.gov/elections/ror/regstats_01-02-
04.pdf. 
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One caveat worth noting is that our participants were selected to have a somewhat 
uniform cultural context. They were all residents of Southern California who had lived in 
the area for at least 15 years. The intent of this restriction, originally, was to ensure that 
our database of memories had some uniformity in terms of social mores, societal rules 
and general tenets of behavior. Given the diversity demonstrated in the demographics, we 
feel that even given this restriction, we have constructed a broad, representative sample 
of Southern Californian society. 
 
Part 2: Neuropsychology 
 Characterization of our participants’ demographic profiles provides a detailed 
picture about where our participants come from and the groups they belong to, but it tells 
us little about the individual differences among the members of these groups. One might 
expect that personality has a strong effect on moral decisions. People who worry more 
might make less risky choices; people who are happier might recall more positive 
memories. A battery of neuropsychological tests was administered to our participants to 
characterize them as well individually as we did demographically. Interestingly, the 
findings are the same with individual measures as they are with demographics – all kinds 
of people, nervous, extroverted, happy and sad, recall similar types of moral memories.  
Our participants were also assessed on a wide variety of neuropsychological 
measures for three purposes: 1. To ensure that they did not differ from the general 
population in some way that was not encapsulated by demographics. Their IQs, 
personality types, social values and affect were measured, as well as their positions on an 
ethical diagnostic and performance on standard moral philosophy problems. 2. To 
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provide covariates for moral memories. Large group correlations allowed us to compare 
ratings from the memories with the neuropsychological features of the participants195 and 
assess whether particular individual traits were correlated with specific types of 
memories. 3. To provide background data for future studies. As with the demographics, 
detailed information about the participants who provided these narratives will allow other 
researchers to select the best stimuli for their specific purposes. 
 
Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence: 
Each participant completed the Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence 
(WASI) to measure their general intelligence. The Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale-III 
(WAIS-III) is a widely used and highly validated measure which allows us to compare all 
participants in a standardized way (using IQ). In order to collect the most information in 
the shortest testing period, the 2-subtest version of the WASI was used to assess full-
scale IQ (FSIQ), rather than the WAIS196. The 2-subtest version uses the Vocabulary 
subtest to assess an individual’s verbal knowledge as well as “cognitive abilities, such as 
memory, learning ability, and concept and language development”. It uses the Matrix 
Reasoning subtest to assess “nonverbal fluid reasoning and general intellectual 
ability”197. 
The distribution of our participants’ IQ can be seen in Figure 22. The mean IQ for 
our group was 110 ± 13.4, which is not significantly different from the published 
normative values for IQ (t[98] = 0.54, p = 0.60). IQ is used as a covariate throughout this 
                                                 
195 While correcting for multiple comparisions, of course. 
196 Wechsler, D. (1999). Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence. San Antonio, Psychological 
Corporation. 
197 Wechsler, D. (1999). Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence. San Antonio, Psychological 
Corporation. p.4. 
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work to assess the effect that intelligence has on production of moral memories. As 
discussed throughout, we have found no impact of IQ on any feature of the narratives. 
 
NEO Personality Inventory: 
The NEO-FFI personality inventory was used to evaluate participants’ general 
personality types. Research using the NEO has shown that five major factors can be used 
to describe an individual’s “emotional, interpersonal, experiential, attitudinal and 
motivational styles”198. The five factors are: Neuroticism, Extroversion, Openness, 
Agreeableness and Conscientiousness. Each is a measure of the range of normal 
personalities, so high or low scores should not be thought of as indicative of 
psychological problems. A more complete description of each personality type has been 
included in 
                                                 
198 McCrae, P. T. C. a. R. R. (1992). NEO PI-R Professional Manual. Lutz, FL.p.14. 
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Appendix F. 
The NEO addresses the need for both diversity and representativeness in our 
participant pool by allowing us to assess the variety of personality types in our sample. 
Our participants do not differ from the NEO-FFI standards (t[98] = 1.38, p = 0.167 (N); 
t[98]= 1.73, p = 0.083 (E); t[98] = 1.30, p = 0.193 (O); t[98] = 0.56, p = 0.564 (A); t[98]= 
1.01, p = 0.3.14 (C)) on any of the five factors. (p values are uncorrected for multiple 
comparisons.)  
The NEO personality factors lend themselves easily to hypotheses about moral 
decision making. The comparison between personality types and cue word is examined in 
Section 2, Part 1. In addition, personality types were used in a variety of correlations to 
consider the impact of individual differences on the narratives.   
 
Schwartz Human Value Inventory: 
The Schwartz Value Inventory (SVI) was used to collect extensive data about the 
participants’ cultural values. Since many people believe that culture affects morals, it was 
important to collect as much information about our participants’ cultural values as 
possible.  The SVI was developed for two purposes: to allow the cross-comparison of 
cultural values199 (specifically those values shared by individuals in any given country) 
and to acquire the data necessary to develop a “theory of the basic content and structure 
of human values”200. In its two developmental studies, the SVI was used to survey nearly 
                                                 
199 This is a goal shared by Milton Rokeach (discussed in:Rokeach, M. (1973). The Nature of Human 
Values. New York, Free Press.).  
200 Schwartz, S. H. (1992). "Universals in the content and structure of values: Theoretical advances and 
empirical tests in 20 countries." Advances in Experimental Social Psychology 25: 1-65. and Schwartz, S. 
(1994). "Are There Universal Aspects in the Structure and Contents of Human Values?" Journal of Social 
Issues 50(4): 19-45. 
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60,000 participants from more than 50 countries about their values (referred to during 
testing as the ‘guiding principles in their lives’). From this sample, 10 core values 
emerged: Power, Achievement, Hedonism, Stimulation, Self-direction, Universalism, 
Benevolence, Tradition, Conformity and Security. (Definitions for these values can be 
found in Table 6.) These 10 values can be arranged in a circular pattern to represent their 
relative positions on a continuum with each other201, shown in Figure 23. Schwartz 
describes these as motivational values, with two focal dimensions: openness to 
change/conservation and self-enhancement/self-transcendence.  
Our subjects completed the full SVI.  Though there are major data collection 
projects underway using the SVI, most notably the European Social Survey202, there are 
not yet “standards” for citizens of the United States or Californians on the SVI. Given the 
diversity of American culture, it seems unlikely that the entire country would show a 
uniform pattern of value loadings, in any case. Despite the lack of normative data, we can 
make some interpretations about the SVI data collected. As shown in Table 6, the three 
most highly rated values for our subjects were Self-Direction203 (independent thought and 
action), Universalism (understanding, appreciation, tolerance and protection for the 
welfare of all people and for nature) and Benevolence (preservation and enhancement of 
the welfare of people with whom one is in frequent personal contact). Schwartz identifies 
five values as ones that deal with “the needs of individuals as biological organisms”. In 
light of the stereotype of Americans as individualists, it is interesting to note that four of 
                                                 
201 For detailed definitions, see Schwartz, S. H. (1992). "Universals in the content and structure of values: 
Theoretical advances and empirical tests in 20 countries." Advances in Experimental Social Psychology 25: 
1-65. p.5-12. or Table 6. 
202 (2007). "European Social Survey." from http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/. 
203 The definitions in parentheses are taken from Schwartz, S. (1994). "Are There Universal Aspects in the 
Structure and Contents of Human Values?" Journal of Social Issues 50(4): 19-45. p. 22. 
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these five ‘organism’ values appear as the top four values for our subjects. The lowest 
rated values were Conformity (restraint of action, inclinations and impulses likely to 
upset or harm others and violate social expectations or norms) and Power (social status 
and prestige, control or dominance over people and resources). It is also interesting to 
note that Power, a value that would be stereotypically attributed to Americans is the 
lowest rated value on our survey. It may be that subjects in our study were self-selecting 
on this dimension to some extent. There are three factors that may have influenced this. 
Our subjects were available during working hours on weekdays, interested in 
participating in research and/or in need of income enough to respond to our advertising. 
These factors may have contributed to recruiting participants who were not as ‘power-
driven’ as the average American stereotype. It is also possible, of course, that the 
stereotype is merely incorrect and Americans are not as driven by power as one might 
believe. 
 Although the SVI data may not provide a great deal of insight about the 
participant population as a whole, the value dimensions of the SVI may, at a later date, be 
very informative in selecting stories from subjects with particular profiles. One can 
imagine comparing the moral choices of subjects with very different Hedonism or 
Conformity ratings, for example.   
 
Positive and Negative Affect Schedule: 
Each participant completed the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS) 
to assess their general mood. The PANAS provides a valid and reliable measure for 
assessing participant affect. It is based on a two-factor model of affect which finds that 
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‘positive affect’ and ‘negative affect’ are the two primary dimensions of mood. Despite 
the intuitive sense that these factors might be opposites, they are, in fact, orthogonal. 
Positive Affect (PA) “reflects the extent to which a person feels enthusiastic, active and 
alert.” Negative Affect (NA) “is a general dimension of subjective distress… [and] 
aversive mood states, including anger, contempt, disgust, fear and nervousness.” 204 
(Descriptions of each affect profile can be found in Table 7).  The PANAS is stable over 
a 2 month time period and highly internally consistent, providing an excellent assessment 
of the participant’s current mood state. 
Although we want the database to reflect the full range of the general population, 
there is research suggesting that emotion affects recollection. Cutler, Larsen and Bunce205 
found that people who display repressive coping techniques show inhibited recall for 
unpleasant memories. van den Berg, et al. were able to demonstrate that affective focus 
can modulate subjects’ recall (for affective versus cognitive stimuli)206. Most importantly, 
McFarland and Buehler207 found that subjects who ruminate on their feelings while 
recalling autobiographical memories will generate memories with similar moods. Thus, 
subjects who have strong negative feelings (especially those who are depressed) may 
recall different memories than those subjects who are feeling more positive. Given these 
findings, subjects were assessed using the PANAS to ensure that their general affect was 
within normal ranges. Since our subjects had previously been screened for psychiatric 
                                                 
204Watson D, C. L., Tellegen A. (1988). "Development and validation of brief measures of positive and 
negative affect: the PANAS scales." Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 54(6): 1063-1070.  
205 Cutler, S. E., Larsen, R. J., Bunce, S. C. (1996). "Repressive Coping Style and the Experience and 
Recall of Emotion: A Naturalistic Study of Daily Affect." Ibid. 64(2): 379-405.  
206 van den Berg, H., Manstead, A.S.R., van der Pligt, J., Wigboldus, D.H.J. (2006). "The impact of 
affective and cognitive focus on attitude formation." Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 42: 373-
379. 
207 McFarland, C. B., Buehler, R. (1998). "The Impact of Negative Affect on Autobiographical Memory: 
The Role of Self-Focused Attention to Moods." Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 75(6): 1424-
1440. 
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conditions and medications, we did not encounter any subjects who needed to be 
eliminated from the study due to PANAS scores208.  
Using the normative data found in Watson, Clark and Tellegen209, we found that 
our subjects did not differ significantly from normative data on either the PA (t[98] = 
0.40, p = 0.69) or the NA scale (t[98] = 0.14, p = 0.89). (See Table 8 for complete data.) 
Overall, the distribution of affect scores was quite broad (one participant had a positive 
affect of 49 out of 50).  
 
 
Ethical Position Questionnaire: 
The Ethical Position Questionnaire210 (EPQ) was used to assess subjects’ ethical 
ideologies. The EPQ measures subjects’ idealism and relativism and classifies subjects as 
belonging to one of four ethical ideologies: situationists, subjectivists, absolutists or 
exceptionists. For descriptions of each ideology, see Table 9. This measure was 
developed to explain individual differences in moral judgments in subjects who seem to 
be otherwise similar. (This work stems from the writings of F.C. Sharp211, a psychologist 
who worked at the turn of the 20th century.) Forsyth notes that a person’s ethical 
ideology likely influences their moral judgments however, “the relationship between 
                                                 
208 We feel strongly that the PANAS is an excellent measure to include in this study, especially with 
respect to future users choosing narratives based on PA or NA score. In retrospect, however, given the 
frequency in depression in the general population, it would have been prudent to administer the Beck 
Depression Inventory (BDI) as well, to ensure further depression screening. BDI reference: Beck, A. T. 
(1972). Depression: Causes and Treatment. Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press. 
209 Watson D., Clark, L., Tellegen A. (1988). "Development and validation of brief measures of positive 
and negative affect: the PANAS scales." Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 54(6): 1063-1070. 
210 Forsyth, D. (1980). "A Taxonomy of Ethical Ideologies." Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 
39(1): 175-184. 
211 Sharp, F. C. (1898). "An Objective study of some moral judgments." American Journal of Psychology 9: 
198-234. 
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ideology and behavior is more tenuous.” This test was included in the battery for two 
reasons. First, we were interested in the interplay between ideology and the types of 
stories our subjects related. Second, Forsyth showed that the EPQ is not correlated with 
Kohlberg’s developmental stages. Since most adults fall into the same developmental 
stage using Kohlberg’s models, it was our hope that it might help distinguish the moral 
positions of our subjects in a way that moral development models could not. While the 
EPQ allows us to segregate our subjects to some degree, it did not solve the latter 
problem. Like Kohlberg’s stages, most of our adult subjects (79%) espoused the beliefs 
of one ideological category: situationism (see Figure 24). Forsyth defines situationists as 
those with high relativism and high idealism. They tend to “distrust absolute moral 
principles and argue instead that each situation must be examined individually.”212  
There are a few explanations for why our subjects might have been grouped 
primarily into one category. The ethical position score can be broken down into its two 
component parts: the idealism score and the relativism score. While the relativism score 
is normally distributed (see Figure 25), as would be expected, the idealism scores were 
skewed to the high end of the scoring range (see Figure 26). Fortunately, this does not 
necessarily suggest that our subjects are not ‘normal’. Forsyth has recently found an 
increase in idealism scores across all groups, as well as increases in idealism with age. He 
suggests that this may be a combination of “developmental tendency (people get more 
idealistic as they age), [and/or] widespread social shift (people are getting more idealistic, 
overall).”213  Additionally, the 5 point scale used in our study may compress scores more 
than the 9 point scale used in older studies. Regardless of the reason, unusually high 
                                                 
212 Forsyth, D. (1980). "A Taxonomy of Ethical Ideologies." Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 
39(1): 175-184. 
213 Personal correspondence with Forsyth, D. (November 2006). 
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idealism scores overbalance the number of situationists and absolutists, as our data show. 
After some investigation, we would suggest that our subjects are “normal”, but the test is 
not well validated for different age groups. Forsyth tested the EPQ on college age 
students (mean = 21 years old ± 3.9 years). Three recent studies using the EPQ with 
adults all found that most subjects were situationists, followed by absolutists. (These are 
the two categories we would expect to be overweighted if the idealism scale is skewed to 
the left.) By comparison, studies using college students seem to have normally distributed 
idealism scores214.  
 These findings suggest that the EPQ data are most useful as the individual 
Idealism and Realism scores, rather than the overall Ethical Position. These measures are 
excellent covariates for looking at individual differences among moral decision makers or 
choosing narratives that are likely to have more idealistic styles. Future work may also 
include determining the extent to which Forsyth’s intuition (that moral ideology and 
moral behavior are not always congruent) is true, using EPQ scores and narratives from 
the database. 
 
Moral Dilemmas:  
As discussed in Chapter 1 and Appendix A, the moral philosophy problem 
referred to as ‘the trolley problem’ and its application in moral neuroscience is a major 
driving force of this work. To that end, we felt that it was important to collect data from 
our subjects on a set of standard moral dilemmas. (The full text of these dilemmas can be 
                                                 
214Wuensch, K. L., & Poteat, G. M. (1998). "Evaluating the morality of animal research: Effects of ethical 
ideology, gender, and purpose." Journal of Social Behavior and Personality 13: 139-150. 
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found in Appendix D.) 33 moral dilemmas215 were used to assess non-moral decision 
making (n = 10), non-personal moral decision making (n = 10) and personal moral 
decision making (n = 13), including the trolley and footbridge problems and a ‘Sophie’s 
choice’ dilemma.       
 The comparison of these moral dilemma data with the narratives contained in the 
database will be a rich, scientific endeavor; however, it is outside of the scope of this 
work. Nonetheless, quantifying the data for inclusion in the database is important for 
future stimuli selection as well as for using as covariates in our analyses. 19 of the 33 
dilemmas were chosen for developing a ‘utilitarian’ score216. Each dilemma was scored 
based on a weighted measure of the degree of utilitarian decision making that it elicited 
and each participant received a total utilitarian score between 0 and 42 (most utilitarian). 
Our subjects’ utilitarian distribution (see Figure 27) was somewhat left-skewed (toward 
the less utilitarian end of the scale) (skewness = 0.72). The mean utilitarian score was 
13.2 ± 7.44 (range = 2 – 33), on a scale with a maximum score of 42. Given the 
uniqueness of this scoring system, it is unknown how typical this may be of the general 
population.  
 Another score which may be worth quantifying in the future is the emotional 
component versus the cognitive component of these decisions. Greene reported 
differential brain activations when subjects were considering emotionally incongruent 
responses217. Our data do not include a timing component however, it may be possible to 
generally categorize them based on typical response patterns (i.e., subjects who say that it 
                                                 
215 Dilemmas were provided by J. Greene as published in: Greene, J. D., Sommerville, R. B., et al. (2001). 
"An fMRI Investigation of Emotional Engagement in Moral Judgment." Science 293: 2105-2108.  
216 This methodology was developed by J. Woodward. 
217 Greene, J. D., Sommerville, R. B., et al. (2001). "An fMRI Investigation of Emotional Engagement in 
Moral Judgment." Science 293: 2105-2108. 
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is acceptable to push the man off the footbridge might be given some sort of cognitive 
score increase). The value of these data in selecting moral narratives for new stimuli is 
likely limited (and thus not included in the database) but could be interesting when 
investigating the similarities (or differences) between subjects’ responses to moral 
dilemmas and their moral behaviors and decisions documented in the narratives.  
 
Correlations between Demographics and Neuropsychological Measures: 
 To examine the breadth of the data in an exploratory manner and assess the 
possible correlations among all the demographic and neuropsychological measures, we 
calculated Pearson correlations for all of the background measures. Figure 28 and Figure 
29 show these matrices. There are some weak correlations that appear in the matrix, for 
example, NEO N score appears to be correlated with age (R2 = 0.24, p <0.01) and 
Utilitarian score (derived from the standard philosophy dilemmas) appears to be 
correlated with Relativism score (from the EPQ) (R2 = 0.25, p <0.01). However, after 
correcting for multiple comparisons (the Bonferroni correction218), none of these 
correlations remain significant. This lack of significance suggests that the demographics 
have no effect on production or recollection of moral memories. (This can be seen in 
Figure 29.) It suggests that the moral events encountered, at least in this sample, are fairly 
universal. We provide these figures for qualitative interest; perhaps they will spark 
interest in future, more directed hypotheses. 
 
Section 2: Characterization of the Moral Narratives 
 
                                                 
218Abdi, H. (2007). Bonferroni and Sidak corrections for multiple comparisons. Encyclopedia of 
Measurement and Statistics. N. J. Salkind. Thousand Oaks, CA, Sage. 
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Part 1: Analysis by Cue Word  
 Fundamentally, this database is comprised of moral memories elicited by a cued 
recall protocol. It is necessary then, to begin an examination of the database with an 
examination of the cue words used to elicit these moral memories. We will demonstrate 
throughout this dissertation that the variance in moral memories is dependent on the life 
experiences of the story tellers themselves and not their demographic differences. The 
cue words used in the cued recall protocol were selected from common English words to 
elicit as many moral memories as possible. In this section, we will examine the degree of 
success that we achieved in eliciting moral memories with these cue words. We will also 
break down the demographics and one personality measure by cue word in order to 
demonstrate that the cue words did not, in and of themselves, affect the memories 
generated. 
 
Cue Word Distribution: 
The cue words chosen were quite effective: 23% (n = 758) of the memories 
recalled were moral. All of the cue words elicited at least 1 moral memory and 3 of the 4 
control cues elicited no moral memories. (The cue ‘happy’ elicited 7 moral memories, 
suggesting that it was not truly a control.) Some cue words, however, were more effective 
than others. Figure 30 shows the frequency distribution for the moral narratives in the 
database. The cues that elicited the most moral narratives are: took something that didn’t 
belong to you (n = 78), cheated (n = 69), lied (n = 60), were sneaky (n = 56) and guilty (n 
= 52).  The narratives elicited by these cues comprise 42% of the narratives in the 
database. The cues that elicited the fewest moral memories are: embarrassed (n = 1), best 
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thing you ever did (n = 4), bittersweet (n = 4), thing you’d most like others to know that 
you did (n = 5) and proud (n = 5). These narratives make up only 2.5% of the database.  
While the cues were almost all good elicitors of moral memories, some features of 
the cues distinguished them. The action cues were significantly more effective elicitors of 
memory than the emotion cues (t[22] = 2.22, p = 0.0369), a finding that seems intuitive. 
Concrete cues – like the verb phrases used for the action cues – evoke particular concrete 
events of the past. Emotional cues are more abstract, requiring the participant to re-
experience the feeling (at least to some degree) in order to summon up an action or 
choice that caused the emotion. The cues were presented in groups based on cue type219 
and the order of presentation within each category220 did not seem to affect the number of 
memories elicited (see Figure 31). The valence of the cue was significant in determining 
the number of moral memories elicited. Subjects also recalled more moral memories 
when cued with negative cues (e.g., unfaithful, worst thing you ever did) than they did 
when cued with positive cues (e.g., compassionate, thing you are most proud of having 
done) (t[17] = 2.27, p = 0.0363). This finding prompted greater examination of the role 
that valence plays in moral memory recollection, which is covered in detail in Chapter 4, 
Section 5. 
 
Demographic Impact: 
 The first section of this chapter describes the demographic features of the 
participant pool in detail and emphasizes the normality of our subjects. These subjects are 
quite representative of the population at large. This representativeness, however, tells us 
                                                 
219 See Chapter 2 for more detail. 
220 The cues were randomized within each section before being presented in a fixed presentation to all 
participants. The reasons for this are discussed in Chapter 2.  
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little about whether demographic measures can affect the way subjects perform in cued 
recall protocol tasks. Upon examination, we found that demographic measures were not 
influential on cue word usage.  Men and women produced very similar numbers of moral 
memories (men’s total n = 376; women’s total n = 382) and also showed similar patterns 
of distribution of cue words (see Figure 32). The youngest (40-45 years old) and oldest 
(55-60 years old) subjects respond similarly to the cue words, showing little difference in 
their distribution patterns (see Figure 33) when normalized for the number of subjects in 
each group.  
 
Effect of NEO Personality Types:  
To demonstrate that the cue words are robust across neuropsychological groups in 
their effectiveness to elicit memories, we have analyzed the effect of NEO personality 
type on cue word frequency. Using a median split (and eliminating subjects with a 
median score), we divided subjects into groups of ‘High’ and ‘Low’ scorers for each 
NEO factor (N, E, O, A, C)221 and generated cue word frequency plots for each group. A 
Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient was calculated to determine whether high or low 
score on any of the factors significantly impacted the frequency with which cue words 
elicited memories. All five factors showed strong correlation between the high and the 
low scoring groups, signifying that personality factor does not affect cue word usage. 
(Correlations are as follows (given as Spearman R2 values): Neuroticism = 0.940, 
Extraversion = 0.931, Openness = 0.925, Agreeableness = 0.934, Conscientiousness = 
                                                 
221 For more detail about NEO types, see 
Appendix F.  
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0.938.)  Cross correlations among the NEO factors (both high and low across all five 
factors) are all also highly correlated (R2 ≥ 0.88). 
 
Kucera-Francis Word Frequencies: 
 Finally, in examining the frequency distribution of cue words, it is important to 
look back to the selection criteria themselves. The final selection of cue words was based 
on a number of criteria (described in Chapter 2) including the balance of positive, neutral 
and negative concepts, concreteness, imageability, meaningfulness and arousal. In 
addition, preference was given to cues with greater lexical frequency (as measured by the 
Kucera-Francis frequencies)222. The final distribution of cue words, however, includes 
words with frequencies ranging from 1 to 98, providing the opportunity to examine 
whether words that are more common in the English language elicit more moral 
memories than those that appear less frequently. However, when these data are graphed 
Figure 35 demonstrates clearly that there is no relationship between the frequency of a 
word’s appearance in the lexicon and the number of memories that that cue elicited.  
 
Part 2: Language Inquiry and Word Count Analysis 
 The Language Inquiry and Word Count text analysis program was designed to 
“provide an efficient and effective method for studying the various emotional, cognitive, 
and structural components present in individuals’ verbal and written speech samples.”223 
This program allows us to analyze the contents of each narrative in the database using an 
                                                 
222 The use of the Kucera-Francis values is discussed in Chapter 2. Kucera, H. and W. N. Francis (1967). 
Computational Analysis of Present-Day American English. Providence, Brown University Press. 
223 Pennebaker, J. W., Chung, Cindy K., Ireland, Molly, Gonzales, Amy, & Booth, Roger J.  (2007). The 
development and psychometric properties of LIWC2007. Austin, TX, LIWC.net. p. 7.  
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automated process. While automated text analysis of this sort cannot interpret complex 
moral narratives, it does provide an excellent way to quantify the overall structure of the 
narratives for comparison purposes. The LIWC analysis also allows us to compare our 
narratives to other samples in order to determine how typical they are. These data have 
been shown in Table 2 and demonstrate that the narratives are quite typical in their 
number of words per sentence, percentage of words found in the LIWC dictionary, 
number of words with greater than six letters and their overall grammatical content (as 
measured by function words). 
LIWC2007 calculates the percentage of total text that is devoted to each of 80 
variables. These categories include grammatical structures (e.g., nouns, verbs), personal 
motivators (e.g.. work, religion) and psychological constructs (e.g., affective, social and 
cognitive processes). The affective processes variables are particularly useful for our 
analyses because they allow us to compare the percentages of positive and negative 
emotion words in each narrative. The dictionary of words that connote positive emotions 
contains 406 words (e.g., love, sweet) and the dictionary of words that connote negative 
emotions contains 499 words (e.g., hurt, nasty). The dictionary of ‘negative words’ can 
be further broken down into anxiety, anger and sadness related words but since ‘positive 
words’ is not further subdivided, we have chosen not to use these divisions for our 
analyses.  
 
LIWC Variable: Positive and Negative Emotion Words: 
Using the LIWC text analysis, we examined the percentage of emotion words 
(both positive and negative) found in each narrative. The distribution of these data can be 
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seen in Figure 35. The average narrative in the database contained 2.7 ± 1.85% positive 
words and 2.0 ± 1.61% negative words, a significant difference (t[1514] = 7.10, p < 
0.0001). This is a particularly surprising finding since there are more negative224 
narratives in the database.  
Additionally, Figure 35 shows that 7.9% (n = 60) of the narratives in the database 
contained no positive emotion words and 11.2% (n = 85) of the narratives contained no 
negative emotion words. 10 of these narratives overlap, hence they are entirely devoid of 
emotion words as found in the LIWC dictionaries225.  
When analyzing the data, we noticed that the narratives with the highest 
percentage of emotion words (both positive and negative) were particularly short. (The 
narrative with the highest percentage of positive emotion words (15.22%) was 92 words 
long and the narrative with the highest percentage of negative emotion words (11.59%) 
was 138 words long. The average word count for narratives was 217.6 words.) 
Examination of these two narratives found that each participant repeated the cue word (or 
versions of the cue word) frequently226. We hypothesized that this might have happened 
whenever a participant had difficulty recalling a memory that fit the cue word, accounting 
for both the high emotional word count and the length of the narrative. In order to make 
sure that short narratives were not being disproportionately represented in the word count 
analyses, we inspected the data further. The word count of the 100 stories with the 
highest percentage of positive emotional words is not significantly different (t[198] = 
                                                 
224 Negative narratives, in this case, are narratives that were cued by negative cue words.  
225 It is important to point out that this is an important caveat about analyzing data based on LIWC tallies. 
The program is only as accurate as its dictionaries are complete. The number of positive and negative 
emotion words is large (905 words combined) but it cannot contain all emotion words. More importantly, it 
cannot understand the nuance that may be imparted by the context of the narrative. However, it is this 
difficulty that is weighed against the difficulty of acquiring readers who can analyze each narrative 
individually. 
226 These are memories 5588 and 5441. 
  169 
1.82, p = 0.07) from the word count of the 100 stories with the lowest percentage of 
positive emotional words (including those stories with no positive emotional words). 
 
Demographic Impact: 
Similarly to the cue word analyses done in the previous section, we were 
interested in the influence that gender and neuropsychological measures might have on 
the number of emotional words in a narrative. While there is a wealth of literature227 to 
lead us to expect that men and women use emotion words with different frequencies, they 
are not statistically different for either positive emotional words (t[117] = 1.19, p = 0.24) 
or negative emotional words (t[168] = 0.15, p = 0.88).  (These comparisons and those 
following were done by selecting the narratives with no emotional words (n = 60 for 
positive and n = 85 for negative) and comparing them with the same number of narratives 
with the highest percentage of emotional words in each group. The outliers discussed 
above were included in these analyses.) This finding is quite advantageous for using the 
narratives as new stimuli. Since there are no underlying gender cues in the emotional 
word usage, studies involving gender can use the narratives interchangeably. For an 
example of this, see Section 4, later in this chapter. 
Research by McFarland and Buehler has found that when subjects involved in 
autobiographical recall are ‘ruminating’ on their own mood, they tend to recall memories 
with similar emotions. However, if instead the subjects are ‘reflecting’ on their own 
mood, they tend to recall memories with dissimilar emotions228. These data suggest that 
                                                 
227 As one example: Brody, L. R. Hall, J.A. (2000). Gender, Emotion and Expression. Gender Handbook of 
Emotions. M. H.-J. Lewis, J.M. New York, Guilford Press: 338-347. 
228 McFarland, C. Buehler, R. (1998). "The Impact of Negative Affect on Autobiographical Memory: The 
Role of Self-Focused Attention to Moods." Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 75(6): 1424-1440. 
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subjects’ mood may affect the emotional content of the narratives. The Positive and 
Negative Affect Schedule measures the general mood of a participant using two 
orthogonal scales: Positive Affect (PA) and Negative Affect (NA)229. Together, these 
scales provide a general picture of a participant’s mood. Comparison of PA and NA 
scores for the subjects who told the narratives with the greatest percentage of emotional 
words with those for the subjects whose narratives contained no emotional words showed  
no significant difference for either positive emotional words (for PA, t[117] = 0.14, p = 
0.89; for NA, t[117] = 0.42,  p = 0.68) or for negative emotional words (for PA, t[168] = 
0.36, p = 0.72; for NA, t[168] = 1.81, p = 0.07). 
 
Part 3: Analysis by Rater Categories  
 The automated analyses of the LIWC program provide tools for examining the 
narratives’ content, but only human readers can provide insight about the details of the 
narratives themselves. The descriptive figures in this section give a window into the 
content of the narratives as only could be described by readers. These readers, a group of 
55 anonymous raters, were recruited to categorize the narratives. (The details of this 
process are given in Chapter 3.) The ratings collected describe the actions in the 
narrative, the rationales given for various moral behaviors, and the emotions that these 
scenarios elicited in the participant. The rating sheet was designed to collect these data 
using three major categories: ‘What did they do?’, ‘Why did they say they did it?’ and 
‘How did they feel?’ Using traditional journalistic style questions made it easy for the 
                                                 
229 For more details see Chapter 4, Section 1. 
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raters to read each narrative in the context intended. Graphing the resulting data also 
makes it easy to get a sense of the overall contents of the database.  
Figure 36 shows the actions that appear in the narratives. Most prominently, there 
are 533 ratings about narratives where the narrator lied and 507 ratings where the 
participant was helping someone. The raters were asked to use a scale from 1-3 when 
categorizing the ratings to designate how well the narrative exemplified the category. 
They were also asked to note stories in which the participant specifically chose to do the 
opposite of the category. For example, if the narrator decided not to cheat on a business 
deal, the rater would give the category ‘cheating in business’ an opposite rating of 1-3. 
This allows future users of the database to more easily select narratives where the 
narrator chose not to make a bad moral decision230. The rating categories are shown as a 
stacked bar graph (Figure 36 - Figure 38) to display the contribution of each to the total 
number of ratings in that category. The reasons narrators most commonly gave for their 
actions can be seen in Figure 37. They were motivated by selfishness (n = 702 ratings) 
and doing the wrong (n = 646) and right thing (n = 596). Finally, raters were asked to 
categorize how the narrators felt about their actions (shown in Figure 38), where we find 
that subjects mostly felt regret about their behavior (n = 893) and doing the wrong thing 
(n = 835). These emotions are not surprising since all of the narratives concern morally 
laden events. Along with categorizing the feelings of each narrator, the raters were asked 
to rate how much rationalization was given for the narrator’s actions. In 1565 of the 2169 
ratings (72.2%), the narrators provided some sort of justification for their behavior.   
 In designing the rating sheet, a subsample of 100 narratives was used to generate 
the categories included. During that process, the hypothesis arose that subjects might 
                                                 
230 It also allows users to choose narratives in which the subject specifically chose to do the wrong thing. 
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change their moral behavior based on the location of their actions231. Generally, it seemed 
that subjects had different moral standards for different situations (work versus home, 
situations where children or animals were involved, etc.). In addition, knowing about 
where the narratives took place (as well as salient characters in those locations) provides 
another way to ‘see’ into the entire database at once. A group of 8 ‘scenes of action’ were 
developed from the subsample and were included on the rating sheet. Table 10 displays 
the results of those ratings. Only 11.6% (n = 251) of the ratings had no scene chosen 
while 37.5% (n = 831) of the ratings found that the narrative involved a family member 
or close friend. Not surprisingly, 29.2% of ratings also found that the narrative took place 
at home or in the narrator’s neighborhood. Raters were encouraged to write in other 
scenes that seemed important to the narrative. These scenes are enlightening in 
themselves, providing insight about other places where important moral decisions occur 
including places such as jail, hospital, rehab and on the internet. 
 After categorizing each narrative, raters were asked to give their own opinion232 
of how right or wrong the action in the narrative was (using a scale from -5 (wrong) to +5 
(right)). Raters were told to use ‘0’ to represent a morally ‘gray area’ and to leave the 
rating blank or note if they felt that the narrative did not involve a moral situation. Only 
3.3% of the ratings (n = 72) were thought by some raters not to be moral233. Figure 39 
shows two different representations of the distributions of the raters’ judgments. The first 
                                                 
231 One example of this is Memory 5096, a narrative where the subject decides while on vacation abroad to 
have sex on the beach with her boyfriend even though it is illegal. She regrets her decision in part because 
she knew she wouldn’t have to live with the consequences but her foreign boyfriend did. 
232 As was discussed in Chapter 3, this is NOT an unbiased sample and these data about the morality of the 
ratings should only be used as a way to separate the data. Any ratings for comparison to other groups 
should be done with an unbiased sample group. 
233 It is important to remember that some memories were chosen for inclusion in the database even though 
neither researcher reading the memories felt it was moral. This occurred when the subject specifically said 
that they felt the action was right or wrong. The database criteria were intentionally broad enough to allow 
the inclusion of these narratives. 
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(represented by the blue bars) is a distribution that shows the number of ratings that 
received the score shown on the x-axis. Thus, 130 ratings (5.9%) received a score of -5 
from any rater. The red bars represent the number of narratives with a mean score as 
shown on the x-axis. There are 7 narratives that received a mean score of -5. This means 
that every rater believed that these narratives234 were as morally wrong as the scale 
allowed. Together these distributions show us that individual raters rate similarly to the 
group, although the extremes (-5 and +5) are not used quite as reliably, which is to be 
expected with Likert scale ratings.  
 Any generalized description of these 758 moral narratives is complicated by the 
individuality and complexity of each narrative (as well as the number of narratives). 
However, using the categorizations generated by the raters provides an excellent 
overview of the contents and breadth of the narratives.  
 
 
Part 4: Analysis of Session Three Data 
 When participants returned to the lab for Session Three, they were asked to 
respond to 54 rating questions about each of their own moral narratives. (The methods for 
this are described in Chapter 2; the questionnaire administered is found in Appendix C). 
These ratings allowed us to investigate a number of open questions about moral 
perceptions of self, including looking at accuracy of self-perception and the effects of 
demographic and neuropsychological variables. These results are most easily interpreted 
                                                 
234 These narratives include instances of shoplifting, cheating in a relationship and stealing. 
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when they are framed by the questions that initiated them. To that end, these questions 
will be used as headings throughout this section. 
Among the ratings collected in Session Three were three questions in which 
participants rated (on a scale from 1 to 10) the morality of their own narratives. They 
were asked to reflect on the morality of their behavior in the narrative at two time points: 
first, thinking back to their feelings at the time and second, looking back on the situation 
now (i.e., on the day of testing)235. For the third rating, the participants were asked to 
judge how others reading the narrative would rate the behavior in the narrative. These 
three ratings allow us to investigate whether participants’ ratings of themselves change 
over time and how critical participants are of their own behavior. By comparing these 
ratings to those generated by the raters who read these narratives we can also examine 
whether the participants’ own ratings are similar to outsiders’ ratings as well as how 
accurate participants are in assessing how others judge them236.  
 
Does the length of time since the memory occurred affect how moral the participant 
feels the action was?  
The saying that ‘time heals all wounds’ alludes to the idea that over time painful 
memories can become less painful. Chapter 4, Section 6 discusses the effects of the age 
                                                 
235 The specific questions given were: “At the time, how wrong or right did your actions in this episode 
seem to you? Use a scale from 1 to 10. If, at the time you did it, you felt this was a very wrong thing to do, 
you would give it a 1.  If, at the time you did it, you felt this was a very right thing to do, you would give it 
a 10.” and “Reading this today, how wrong or right do your past actions in this episode seem to you? Use a 
scale from 1 to 10. If now you feel this was a very wrong thing to do, you would give it a 1.  If now you 
feel this was a very right thing to do, you would give it a 10.” 
 
236 It is very important to note that these data can only be considered preliminary findings. As was 
discussed in Chapter 3, the raters were chosen to be a homogenous group (with respect to education). All 
other demographic information about the raters is unknown. Thus, these data are biased at least by 
education. However, the raters are still diverse in the ratings they gave and we feel confident using them for 
these preliminary analyses.   
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of a memory on its recollection. Knowing that a memory’s remoteness can affect its 
recall prompted us to explore whether the age of a memory can change how the 
participant feels about their actions, as well. As shown in Figure 40, 45% of participants 
did not change their feelings about how right or wrong their actions were between the 
time of the narrative and the time of the rating. Those who did change their feelings did 
so in a normally distributed way across the entire range of possible changes. The mean 
change was to lower the rating by 0.5 points, but the variance in this was quite large (SD 
= ± 2.93 points). When we calculate the difference between the ratings of how 
participants felt at the time of the event and how participants felt at the time of the rating, 
averaged over 5 year periods, we can see that the difference in ratings changes very little 
for different time frames (Figure 41). This leads us to conclude that time for reflection 
affects participants’ moral ratings about their actions very little. 
 
 
Do subjects judge themselves differently than they think others will?  
How accurate are subjects at predicting what others think of them? 
Finding out whether we rate ourselves differently than others rate us in any 
situation is fundamental to many social behaviors237. We were able to compare our 
subjects’ own ratings of their narratives with ratings from other people, as well as with 
their own perceived ratings of others’ ratings. We find that subjects’ ratings of 
themselves are highly correlated with the rating they think others would give them (R2 = 
0.64, p < 0.001) as well as with the actual ratings that raters give them (R2 = 0.63, p < 
                                                 
237 Gossip is an excellent example of this. 
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0.001). The ratings they think others would give them and the ratings that they actually 
receive are also highly correlated (R2 = 0.57, p < 0.001).  
While these ratings are all highly correlated, the correlation does not reveal the 
constant difference in rating scores. We find that subjects rate themselves as significantly 
more moral than they are rated by others, rating themselves an average of 0.78 ± 1.47 
points higher on a scale from one to ten (t[757] = 7.16, p < 0.0001). (Similarly, subjects 
rate themselves significantly higher than they think others will rate them (mean = 0.77 ± 
1.25 points, t[757] = 6.51, p < 0.0001).) Interestingly, despite rating themselves as more 
moral, subjects are very accurate at predicting the rating that others will give them. There 
is no significant difference between the prediction the subjects gave and the actual moral 
score given by the raters (mean = 0.07 ± 1.51 points, t[757] = 0.47, p = 0.64).   
These findings suggest that, in general, subjects have an excellent sense of their 
‘moral standing’ in the world but still feel that they are more moral than that standing 
would suggest. There are, however, demographic and neuropsychological factors that can 
impact how morally a participant perceives him or herself.  
Does one gender rate themselves as more moral than the other? 
When asked to rate how ethical they were on a scale from one to ten, all subjects 
rated themselves as quite ethical (mean = 8.4 ± 1.65 points for women, mean = 7.7 ± 1.70 
points for men).  However, the women’s self-ratings were significantly higher than the 
men’s (t[745] = 6.18, p < 0.0001). Ratings of the narratives by outside raters found no 
significant difference between the behaviors of men and women (t[756] = 1.87, p = 0.06), 
which is to be expected since the raters had no specific knowledge about the gender of 
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the narrator (only that that they assumed from the narrative) and, as reported in Section 5, 
raters were not particularly good at intuiting the gender of the rater from the narrative. 
  
Are certain personality types more likely to be self-critical? 
One might expect that personality would affect how a person views their morality, 
especially if, as shown above, we are able to construct two views of morality – one that 
judges how we feel about ourselves and one that judges how the world views us. It 
appears that three personality factors can affect how critical a person is about their own 
moral position. Subjects who score high on the Neuroticism factor on the NEO-FFI 
personality measure are significantly more critical of their own morality than subjects 
who score low on this dimension (t[654] = 4.31, p < 0.0001), rating themselves 0.6 points 
lower on a 10 point scale. One can imagine that subjects who worry more might judge 
themselves more critically than subjects who are less prone to worry. However, these 
subjects are still able to make accurate assessments of how others will actually rate them. 
(Subjects who score high on N and subjects who score low on N are not significantly 
different when comparing their own judgments of how others will rate them to actual 
ratings by others; t[84]= 0.39, p = 0.70). This suggests that they are able to create two 
different assessments of their moral value, a personal (internal) one and an objective 
(external) one.  Interestingly, subjects who score high on Openness and Agreeableness 
also are more critical of themselves than their low scoring counterparts (t[622] = 2.85, p 
< 0.01 for O; t[631] = 5.18, p < 0.0001 for A), rating themselves 0.4 points lower (for O) 
and 0.7 points lower (for A). While subjects with high O scores retain the ability to 
accurately judge how others will rate their behavior (t[92] = 0.18, p = 0.86 for O), 
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subjects with high A scores do have difficulty with this assessment when compared to 
their low A peers (t[85] = 2.58, p = 0.01). While the interpretation for this finding is less 
straightforward than for the N dimension, it may be that subjects who are more open and 
more agreeable are more empathetic and therefore less critical of other people, rating 
themselves lower by comparison to the rest of the social group. Subjects who are less 
open and less agreeable may be more judgmental of others and therefore rate themselves 
higher by comparison. More research would be needed to investigate the ramifications of 
personality difference on self ratings; including other measures of self-worth could 
expand this finding significantly. 
 
Does IQ affect a participant’s personal moral rating?  
 Since we have shown that subjects are capable of maintaining two separate 
constructs about moral value, it seems important to measure whether a participant’s 
intelligence has any impact on their ability to generate these two values. A linear 
regression shows that IQ has no significant effect on a participant’s personal moral rating 
(R2 = 0.03, p = 0.29). Similarly, we find that IQ also does not affect a participant’s ability 
to predict others’ ratings of his or her own behavior (R2 = 0.00004, p = 0.99). Together, 
the findings demonstrate that IQ does not affect a participant’s ability to generate 
separate moral ratings for their own perception of moral value and the perception of 
others about them. 
 
Section 3: Cluster Analysis Reveals Implicit Categories in Moral Narratives 
 
As described in Chapter 3, the narratives contained in the moral narrative 
database were characterized in great detail by the raters, using categories generated from 
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the narratives themselves. In addition to these categories generated by researchers, we 
were interested in whether there might be an implicit category structure to these moral 
narratives. One might suspect that there are features that are fundamentally different 
between stories about positive events in a person’s life and stories about negative events, 
for example. We hypothesized that the moral narratives could be separated into these and 
other less intuitive categories based on their content using mathematical clustering 
techniques238.  
 Cluster analysis is a technique that can use a large number of different algorithms 
to collect data into meaningful groups. In a two-dimensional group of data, clusters can 
be physically proximate in space – a parameter which is easily graphed to see the 
grouping; with a multi-dimensional data set, as in the case of these narratives with many 
ratings, it is difficult to meaningfully display or interpret the groupings of these items. 
Cluster analyses are designed to address this problem. Central to the goals of all cluster 
analyses is the notion of degree of similarity (or dissimilarity) between the individual 
items being clustered. 
To begin, we used hierarchical clustering to generate a dendrogram (tree-diagram) 
of all of the narratives. All calculations were done using STATISTICA239. Hierarchical 
clustering builds a hierarchy of data clusters, usually displayed as a tree, by successively 
changing restrictions on what comprises a cluster240. To begin, each narrative is treated as 
a single leaf on a large tree; each item is its own cluster. We used agglomerative 
                                                 
238 The work in this section was done in conjunction with a Agnieszka Leśniak, Jagiellonian University, 
Cracow, Poland. 
239 STATISTICA. Tulsa, OK, Stat Soft, Inc at http://www.statsoft.com. 
240(2007). Electronic Textbook: Cluster Analysis. Tulsa, OK, StatSoft. Online at: 
http://www.statsoft.com/textbook/stathome.html. 
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methods241 to repeatedly lower the threshold on how large a Euclidean distance242 was 
necessary to comprise a cluster. Each successive change adds more narratives to a cluster, 
until all of the narratives are joined in a single cluster. As more items are added to a 
cluster, it becomes necessary to determine which items within the cluster are used to 
calculate the distance for the cluster. While there are several possible methods, we chose 
to use the complete linkage (farthest neighbor) rule. This method is used when the data 
are expected to cluster naturally, an assumption that is substantiated by our initial 
hypotheses.  In this way, the dendrogram shown in Figure 42 was generated243.  
 Figure 42 shows two major clusters that remain quite distinct until the final 
linkage (distance = 13.3). The smaller of these two clusters (on the right side) contains 
174 narratives. An initial examination of this cluster found that the ratings ‘helping 
someone’ and ‘protecting someone’ were particularly important in generating this cluster. 
By comparison, the larger cluster contains 575 narratives where ‘lying’ and ‘regret about 
doing the wrong thing’ were important ratings. Reading a subsample of the stories in 
each group confirms this finding: the smaller cluster contains stories about doing 
something good, while the larger cluster contains stories about doing something bad. 
(These will be referred to as the ‘Good cluster and the ‘Bad cluster’ throughout.) This 
finding substantiates our hypothesis that narratives about positive events are measurably 
different from narratives about negative events in a person’s life.  
                                                 
241 These are often referred to as ‘bottom-up’ methods. Divisive (‘top-down’) methods can be used for 
hierarchical clustering as well. However, since only agglomerative methods were used here, they are the 
only ones discussed in the text. 
242 Euclidean distances are measurements of the geometrical distance between data points in 
multidimensional space.  
243 These data represent 749 of the 758 narratives in the database. At the time of these analyses, 9 narratives 
did not have sufficient data to be included.  
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The dendrogram also appears to show several smaller clusters within the Bad 
cluster. (These can be seen most clearly as the Euclidean distance approaches 10.) 
However, without as clear a division as there is between the Good and Bad clusters, it is 
difficult to know which clusters are significant. In order to more closely examine the 
importance of these clusters, we performed a factor analysis on each cluster. Factor 
analysis is a statistical technique used to explain variability among observed random 
variables in terms of fewer unobserved random variables called ‘factors’. It assumes that 
all the rating data on different attributes can be reduced down to a few important 
dimensions. There are 2 ways of evaluating the results of a factor analysis. The first is the 
Kaiser criterion, which states that the main factors are these whose minimal eigenvalue is 
greater than 1244. More simply, this criterion requires that each factor extracts at least as 
much data as any one of the original variables has alone. Using this method, we found 59 
factors for the Bad cluster. The other method is the Scree test, which uses a graphical plot 
of the number of eigenvalues to determine the point at which most of the variance in the 
data has been explained. (See Figure 43.)  Using this, we found 3 factors for the Bad 
cluster. In both cases, we found only 1 factor for the Good cluster; these data will be 
presented in comparison to the Bad cluster findings in the following figures. While both 
the Kaiser criterion and the Scree test are widely used, it is known that the Kaiser 
criterion has a tendency to retain too many factors under some circumstances245. Given 
                                                 
244 (2007). Electronic Textbook: Cluster Analysis. Tulsa, OK, StatSoft. Online at: 
http://www.statsoft.com/textbook/stathome.html. 
245 It is also known that the Scree test sometimes retains too few factors. (2007). Electronic Textbook: 
Principle Components and Factor Analysis. Tulsa, OK, StatSoft. Online at: 
http://www.statsoft.com/textbook/stathome.html. 
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our findings, we chose to use the number of factors selected by the Scree test (n = 3) in 
order to best understand what distinguishes these clusters246.      
 To obtain a clearer picture of the relationship among these three factors, we 
applied a varimax rotation. This technique allows us to compare the factors and find the 
orientation that best distinguishes each group. The factors in the Bad cluster are 
orthogonal to each other (as seen in Figure 44a-c, as well as in three-dimensions in Figure 
44d.). Therefore, each factor describes a distinct group. This supports the claim that each 
of these factors can be associated with a unique cluster from the dendrogram. These data 
can be examined in contrast with the varimax rotation of the data from the Good cluster 
(Figure 45). The homogenous cloud corresponds with the single main factor found for 
this cluster.  
 One of the challenges with factor analysis is that after compressing all of the 
variables into a few factors it can be difficult to identify what each factor describes. 
Despite this difficulty, identifying the factors can be important to interpreting the data. In 
fact, in this case, it is the very reason for these analyses. Each of these factors represents a 
non-intuitive category that can segregate different types of negative narratives. Knowing 
what each factor represents will allow us to name these non-intuitive categories.  
To begin analyzing what each factor represented, we generated word frequency clouds247 
for each of the three factors (  
Figure 46 – Figure 48). To generate these figures, a large subset of the narratives from 
each Bad factor was chosen (n = 128 from Factor 1, n = 121 from Factor 2, n = 74 from 
                                                 
246 It is worth noting that if you examine the dendrogram in Figure 42 carefully, there are about 59 clusters 
at a Euclidean distance of about 4. While this is an interesting test of the two criteria, the sheer number of 
factors given by the Kaiser criterion would make the results uninterpretable. 
247 These word clouds were generated using the software from Feinberg, J. (2008). "Wordle." from 
http://wordle.net/. Sincere thanks to Jonathan Feinberg for this application. 
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Factor 3).  Subsets were chosen as shown in Figure 50, by selecting narratives from the 
outer portion of each cluster. (The clusters were chosen to include roughly two-thirds of 
the total narratives, using multiple 3-dimensional views to ensure clear separation 
between clusters.) Choosing from the outside of each cluster allowed us to avoid the 
overlapping origin for all three clusters, as well as select a group of narratives that were 
distinct. All of the narratives found in the Good factor (n = 174) were included in these 
analyses.   
 Using the software at Wordle.net, the text from all the narratives in each group 
was counted, generating a word frequency analysis for each group. These data are shown 
in Figure 46 - Figure 49 as word ‘clouds’ – images that display the frequency of each 
word in the total text analysis as a function of the word’s size. Bad factor 3 (Figure 48) 
shows the power that this kind of visual representation can have in interpreting the data. 
A qualitative analysis (even a quick glance) shows that the most important words in 
Factor 3 are: took, something, money one, back, really, take. This is substantiated by the 
word frequencies shown in the table on Figure 48. The most frequent words248 used in 
narratives that are found in Factor 3 are words about taking things and money. It seems 
that within the overarching category of ‘Bad’, narratives about stealing exist as a distinct 
group.  Similarly, we find that Factor 1 describes narratives about lying and Factor 2 
describes narratives about being hurtful to another person. Factor 2 is the most difficult to 
interpret using only the most frequent words – however, visual analysis makes the topic 
                                                 
248 It is important to note that the software removes the most common words in the English language before 
creating the word clouds. In addition, the following words were removed from all of the word clouds: 
memory, just, really, like, time. These were removed because they seemed to be unrelated to the actual 
content of the memories, but rather were common to the speech patterns of the participants in all of the 
word clouds. 
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quite clear (as does looking further down the frequency chart). This may be because a 
more varied vocabulary is used in these narratives or simply because the situations were 
more heterogeneous. This heterogeneity can also be seen in Figure 49, the Good cluster 
word cloud. Careful visual inspection makes the positivity of the content clear, but the 
most frequent words: ‘money’, ‘know’, ‘felt’ and ‘people’ do not paint as clear a picture 
as they might if the narratives were more similar. 
 To further substantiate the concepts we have been able to associate with the three 
Bad factors, we also examined two other measures that describe the contents of these 
clusters. First, we examined the rating data from which these clusters were derived. Table 
11 shows the rating categories with the greatest influence on each factor. This is shown as 
the sum of all of the rating values in that category. The concepts that we have associated 
with each of the three factors can be seen reiterated in the ten most influential ratings: 
lying for Factor 1; regret about behavior for Factor 2; and stealing/spending someone 
else’s money for Factor 3. Second, we looked at the cue words that elicited the narratives 
in each cluster. A table of the 5 most common eliciting cues for each cluster can be seen 
in Table 12; data for the Good narratives is included as well. The most common eliciting 
cue for Factor 1 is lied, for Factor 2 is was hurtful to someone and for Factor 3 is took 
something. Similarly, the most common cue for the Good narratives is compassionate.   
These data establish that most memories can be categorized in one of two ways – 
good or bad. The group of good narratives that we analyzed is very homogenous and 
cannot be further divided (as seen in Figure 49). Bad memories, however, can be 
subdivided into three main and independent factors. Using three separate data sets, we 
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have found that lying, hurting someone else and stealing are distinct types of behavior 
when recalled as moral memories.  
 
Section 4:  Using the Database for Further Research 
 
As discussed in Chapter 3, the narratives collected in the database can be used 
both as data about normal moral behavior and as stimuli for future studies. The first use 
of these data as stimuli was for a research project investigating the role of gender in 
moral judgments249.  A number of psychologists, most notably Gilligan, have investigated 
the gender differences in the moral development of adolescents and young adults250, 251. 
Recently, Overman, et al. found that contemplation of Greene’s standard trolley problem 
dilemmas could affect women’s performance on the Iowa Gambling Task252. While these 
findings are striking, the same problems exist with the dilemmas being used by these 
researchers as with researchers studying non-gender related moral judgment – the stimuli 
are not based on real-life moral challenges. To address this concern and to investigate 
gender bias in moral judgment, narratives were chosen from the database to use as 
                                                 
249 This work was conducted by Jessica Stockburger as a Summer Undergraduate Research Fellowship 
project. 
250 Gilligan, C. (1982). In a different voice: Psychological theory and women's development. Cambridge, 
MA, Harvard University Press. 
Muuss, R. E. (1988). "Carol Gilligan’s theory of sex differences in the development of moral reasoning 
during adolescence." Adolescence 23: 229-243. 
Bjorklund, F. (2003). "Differences in the justification of choices in moral dilemmas: Effects of gender, time 
pressure and dilemma seriousness." Scandinavian Journal of Psychology 44: 459-466. 
251 For other work about gender and morality, see: Bjorklund, F. (2003). "Differences in the justification of 
choices in moral dilemmas: Effects of gender, time pressure and dilemma seriousness." Scandinavian 
Journal of Psychology 44: 459-466.; Aldrich, D. and R. Kage (2003). "Mars and Venus at Twilight: A 
Critical Investigation of Moralism, Age Effects, and Sex Differences." Political Psychology 24(1): 23-40. ; 
and Agerstrom, J. and K. Moller (2006). "Moral Reasoning: The Influence of Affective Personality, 
Dilemma Content and Gender." Social Behavior and Personality 34(10): 1259-1276. 
252 Overman, W., L. Graham, et al. (2006). "Contemplation of Moral Dilemmas Eliminates Sex Differences 
on the Iowa Gambling Task." Behavioral Neuroscience 120(4): 817-825.  
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stimuli.  These narratives were modified to examine whether people rate moral decisions 
less harshly when they share the gender of the narrator. 
 
Choosing Stimuli: 
31 potential stimuli were selected from the moral memory database using the 
following criteria: (a) Is the memory gender charged? (b) Did this memory describe a 
“romantic” relationship? (c) Can the gender in this story be switched while maintaining 
the integrity of the memory?  A pilot study was done to ensure that gender-reversed 
memories were believable. From these data, 20 narratives were selected where the gender 
of the narrator could be switched.  
During the creation of these stimuli, a question arose about whether a narrative 
could be ‘gender neutral’ and whether there were narratives in the database that were 
ambiguous about the gender of the narrator. To address these questions, the rating tool 
was designed to include a question about the gender of the narrator. The raters were 
asked to identify the gender of the narrator and if they were unsure about the gender, to 
indicate that this gender choice was a guess253. 
 
 
 
An Example of Mining the Database: Are There Gender Neutral Narratives? 
 To identify candidate narratives, a ‘select’ query was designed in Access entitled, 
“How Good are Rater’s Gender Guesses?” Select queries are intended to combine and 
                                                 
253 It is important to note that this was the only question on the rating sheet where raters were asked to 
guess. Specifically they were told not to guess in any other circumstances. 
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sort data from various tables to create a datasheet that contains only the necessary 
information. This query combines gender data about the subjects (from the table 
‘Biographical Subject Data’) with gender guesses generated by the raters (from the table 
‘Rating Data’). To combine the data from these tables, the table ‘Subject ID to Story ID’ 
is used to describe the relationship between the narratives (using the field ‘Story ID’) and 
the subjects (‘Subject ID’). Three fields are used to generate the initial datasheet: Story 
ID; Actual Gender – the gender of the subject254; and Gender? – the guess at the 
narrator’s gender made by the rater. Two other fields are included for further analyses: 
Gender Guess? – a true/false field based on whether the rater was certain about their 
guess at the narrator’s gender; and Sexual Orientation – the self-identified sexual 
orientation of the subject. The design view of this table can be seen in Figure 51.  
To selectively choose ratings where the rater was incorrect about the gender of the 
narrator, the criteria ‘Female’ and ‘Male’ can be inserted as shown in Figure 51 in the 
‘Criteria’ rows . Access implies the operator ‘AND’ across rows and the operator ‘OR’ 
down columns unless specified otherwise. The criteria in row one require that only data 
where the actual gender of the participant was ‘Female’ AND the rater guess was ‘Male’ 
be included in the table. Row two requires the opposite. These two rows are joined using 
the OR statement: “Row One OR Row Two must be true”, which generates a final 
datasheet that includes all cases where the rater’s guess about the narrator’s gender was 
incorrect. It is worth noting at this point that these ‘errors’ should not be considered a 
reflection of the rater’s reliability. They were specifically instructed to make a choice 
                                                 
254 For clarification, ‘rater’ refers to the anonymous volunteers who rated the narratives, ‘narrator’ refers to 
the person who is telling the narrative and ‘subject’ refers to the person who initially recalled the memory 
that was turned into the narrative. In all cases here, ‘narrator’ is synonymous with ‘subject’. However, the 
people reading the narratives (the raters) did not know that narrator and subject were synonymous, so 
narrator is used here. 
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even if they were unsure and these data should be viewed as misperceptions about the 
narrative in general, rather than errors by the raters.  
Of the 2169 ratings in the database, 509 ratings are incorrect about the gender of 
the narrator. Those errors were split nearly evenly; 281 (55.2%) of those errors believed 
that the narrator was male, when in fact the narrative was told by a woman and 228 of the 
errors were in the opposite direction. Interestingly, the raters were relatively good at 
knowing when they were unsure. Only 113 (22.2%) of those errors were made when the 
raters thought they were sure of the gender of the narrator. To generate data about the 
raters’ guessing the criteria ‘False’ or ‘True’255 can be added to the ‘Gender Guess?’ 
column. These criteria must be added to each row in order to select the criteria in each 
row’s logical statement. 
The number of ratings in the database is nearly three times the number of 
narratives and knowing the percentage of correct guesses from each of these categories is 
informative. The same query can be used to generate the number of narratives, rather than 
the number of ratings by setting the ‘unique values’ property to ‘Yes’256.  These 509 
mistaken ratings originate from 340 distinct narratives, suggesting that nearly half 
(44.9%) of the narratives in the database contain some sort of inconclusive gender 
information. Preliminary investigation suggested that some of these narratives were 
simply misclassified based on the sexual orientation of the narrator. The self-identified 
sexual orientation of the participant257 is included in the query design as the field ‘Sexual 
                                                 
255 False indicates that the rater was not guessing, true indicates that the rater was guessing. 
256 This is done under the Properties menu which can be found by right-clicking on any empty space in the 
design view. 
257 These data were acquired at the end of Session Three from each subject. 
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Orientation’. Any of the possible selections for this field258 can be used as criteria to limit 
the datasheet, but as before must be added to each row in order to generate an accurate 
datasheet. To acquire a conservative estimate of the narratives which are gender 
indeterminate, narratives told by subjects who were not identified as heterosexual259 in 
the database were excluded from further analyses. This decision was based on the 
assumption that raters who misclassified these narratives did not feel that the gender of 
the narrator was unclear, rather that they fell victim to their own perceptual biases that all 
narrators were heterosexual. This removed 132 ratings of 110 unique narratives. This 
sorting almost certainly removes some narratives which are gender neutral from the 
dataset. Without any information about the raters’ biases, however, this method generates 
the clearest list of narratives which may be gender neutral or have gender ambiguity.  
After the all the filters were applied, 230 narratives were identified where at least 
one rater made a mistake about the gender of the narrator. In order to more clearly 
identify which narratives may contain interesting data, Table 13 was constructed. This 
table compares ratings where all the raters were wrong about the gender with ones where 
some raters were right and some were wrong, as well as looking at the guessing behaviors 
of both of these groups. (An alternative version of the table comparing narratives rather 
than ratings is included as well. However, it is important to note that this table is slightly 
more difficult to interpret as there are narratives in which all the raters were wrong but 
some of them guessed and some of them didn’t.) After dividing the ratings into the four 
quadrants depicted in Table 13, two quadrants emerge as the most interesting. The top 
left quadrant shows that there are 19 ratings where the raters were sure of their gender 
                                                 
258 Heterosexual, Homosexual, Bisexual, Polyamorous, Transgender, None. 
259 This excludes all participants who did not identify as any orientation as well as those who identified as 
homosexual, bisexual, polyamorous, transgender and none. ‘None’ is different from non-identifying. 
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choice and they were all wrong. These narratives contain strong but misleading gender 
cues, fooling all of the raters into choosing the wrong gender. For example, narrative 
5356 refers to a situation in high school where a girl had a crush on the narrator; a strong 
gender cue if one makes the assumption of heterosexuality. Despite this gender cue, the 
narrator is female. These narratives are interesting especially because they highlight the 
assumption of heterosexuality in most people who read the narratives. Narratives like 
these might be useful when studying gender to examine the biases of a participant pool.  
The second interesting quadrant in Table 13 is the bottom right quadrant, where 
438 ratings are generated by raters who were mixed in both their accuracy and their 
certainty. The 165 narratives from these ratings show true gender ambiguity – overall, 
raters were unable to ascertain the true gender of the narrator from the narrative, whether 
or not they thought they were certain of their choice. These narratives provide a large 
pool from which to choose potentially neutral stimuli for gender experiments. 
 
Section 5: Effects of Brain Damage on Moral Narratives 
 
Recent work by Koenigs et al.260 among others has highlighted the role of the 
ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC) in utilitarian judgments on trolley problem 
tasks. Individuals with damage to the VMPFC are also known to have social 
impairments261 and difficulty in real life situations262 but retain intact explicit knowledge 
                                                 
260 Koenigs, M., Young, L., Adolphs, R., Tranel, D., Cushman, F., Hauser, M., & Damasio, A. (2007). 
"Damage to the prefrontal cortex increases utilitarian moral judgements." Nature 446: 908–911. 
261Mah, L. W. Y., Arnold, M.C., Grafman, J. (2005). "Deficits in Social Knowledge Following Damage to 
Ventromedial Prefrontal Cortex." The Journal of Neuropsychiatry and Clinical 
Neurosciences 17: 66–74. 
262 Damasio, A. R. (1994). Descartes' Error: emotion, reason, and the human brain. New York, 
Grosset/Putnam. 
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of social mores and rules. Subjects with damage to the prefrontal cortex early on in life 
show particularly severe impairments and are unable to learn appropriate social rules or 
behaviors263. These findings suggest that the prefrontal cortex is a necessary structure for 
the ability to learn social rules and may be required for effective social decision making. 
However, since the PFC is not sufficient for remembering explicitly learned social rules, 
other structures must be involved in the creation of an internal set of moral rules.  
Our cued recall protocol requires the recollection of moral behaviors and decision making 
in a participant’s own life. We hypothesize that damage to the VMPFC will decrease a 
participant’s ability to reconstruct these personal, moral memories and may impact the 
number and kinds of justifications provided for his or her actions. By comparison, we 
expect subjects with other types of brain damage (amnesia, temporal lobe damage) 
should not be impaired in their ability to recall moral memories or the content therein264. 
To address these questions, we tested collected moral memories from 7 subjects with 
frontal lobe damage (2 developmental cases, 5 adult onset) as well as 14 subjects with 
other types of brain damage.   
 
Subjects and Testing Procedures: 
 21 subjects with brain damage (bilateral amygdala damage (n = 1), amnesia (n = 
5), frontal lobe damage (n = 7), temporal lobe damage (n = 8)) were recruited from the 
Patient Registry of the Division of Cognitive Neuroscience at the University of Iowa. The 
general location of the damage is shown in Table 14 for each patient group, as well as 
                                                 
263Anderson, S. W., Bechara, A., Damasio, H., Tranel, D., & Damasio, A.R. (1999). "Impairment of social 
and moral behavior related to early damage in human prefrontal cortex." Nature Neuroscience 2: 1032-
1037. 
264 Obviously, we expect that the timeline for participants with memory loss will be altered compared to 
normal participants, but the number and content of memories should remain similar. 
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background data about each participant. Six normal subjects were recruited from the local 
Iowan community to serve as controls. Normal controls were particularly essential during 
this testing because a modification to the typical cued recall protocol was necessary. 
Unlike the cued recall protocol described in Chapter 2, these subjects were tested by an 
examiner in the room. This change was necessary because a number of the subjects 
(particularly those with amnesia) were not able to complete the task alone or on a 
computer. Instead, the examiner was given a worksheet with each of the cued recall 
questions and the same instructions used in the typical testing. (These instructions can be 
seen in Appendix B.) Each question was read aloud and the participant’s answer was 
audio recorded for later transcription, while the examiner wrote a short note about the 
story on the worksheet.  
 A number of differences appeared to arise from these testing variations, even 
when comparing normal subjects. Most importantly, subjects gave much shorter answers 
(mean = 116.4 words per narrative from Iowa normals versus 217.6 words per narrative 
from the database normals; t[779] = 4.40, p < 0.0001; see Figure 52). Specifically, we 
feel that this difference results from the social difficulty of speaking at another person for 
3 minutes, rather than at a computer screen. Secondly, the subjects skipped many more 
memories when speaking to the examiner than when speaking to the computer (mean = 
4.8 cues skipped by Iowa normals versus mean = 1.7 cues skipped by the database 
normals; t[103] = 3.12, p = 0.002). Since some of the cues were intended to elicit very 
difficult memories (e.g. Please talk about the thing that you are most afraid that other 
people will find out that you did), it is likely that these cues were difficult for subjects to 
talk about with a stranger. While these differences were significant, we expected that the 
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differences between normal subjects and those with frontal lobe damage would be greater 
than the differences caused by testing. This did not turn out to be the case. As shown 
below, the difference between the normal subjects in the database and the normal subjects 
in Iowa is much greater than the differences among the subjects with brain damage. 
 
Results: 
 Our a priori hypothesis was that the number of moral memories generated by 
subjects with frontal lobe damage would be significantly different from that of brain 
damaged controls, although the total number of memories generated would remain 
constant. As shown in Figure 53, the number of moral memories generated by subjects 
with frontal lobe damage (mean = 3.8) is nearly exactly the same as the number generated 
by brain damaged controls265 (mean = 3.38) and the number generated by the normal 
controls from Iowa (mean = 3.83). Since there was variance between the total number of 
memories generated by the database controls and the Iowa normals, the percentage of 
moral memories generated was also calculated and found to be similarly invariant among 
the frontal lobe damaged subjects, the brain damaged controls and the Iowa normals. The 
number of cue words skipped by subjects with frontal lobe damage was also not 
significantly different. 
 We measured the number of words per sentence in each group to ascertain 
whether there was something substantively different about the speech patterns of the 
subjects which might affect the overall narratives. However, we found all groups used 
approximately the same mean number of words per sentence (16.08 for database normals, 
16.46 for Iowa normals, 15.28 for brain damage controls and 17.36 for frontal lobe 
                                                 
265 These are participants who have had temporal lobectomies. 
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damaged subjects). As a preliminary examination of the content of the narratives, we did 
a Language and Inquiry Word Count (LIWC) analysis in the same way that it was done 
on the database narratives (described in Chapter 3). As shown in Figure 54, the number 
of positive emotion words in each sample was not different among any of the groups. The 
number of negative emotion words was also invariant.  
 The narratives were also examined qualitatively during the editing process. (As 
with the other narratives, these were edited for readability while retaining the individual 
character of each narrative.) The most obvious differences were in length and in the 
coherence of the narratives, which varied by group. Samples of the edited narratives from 
each group are included in Appendix I. The final, edited narratives are quite readable and 
could be used as stimuli; however, it was much more difficult to the narratives from most 
of the brain damaged groups than it was to edit the narratives from the normals. One 
salient feature was that the memories were often disordered. They did not begin at the 
beginning of a story, carry through the content and then end at an appropriate finishing 
point. While this finding is merely qualitative, it may be worth examining further if more 
data are collected. 
 While our hypotheses were not sustained by the data, the number of subjects in 
each sample group was quite small. The sample sizes were small due to the rarity of these 
subjects; however, without enough statistical power it is difficult to interpret the results. 
These studies seem to demonstrate a need for greater numbers of subjects, tested over a 
greater period of time and with many more normal controls. Given the overwhelming 
differences between the database normals and the Iowa normals, any further studies with 
these subjects would need to have their own substantive control group to compare to.  
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Section 6: Temporal Biasing of Autobiographical Moral Events266 
Abstract 
Our autobiographical self depends on the differential recollection of our personal 
past, which depends on both memory remoteness and emotional saliency.  While both 
time and emotionality are known to exert strong effects on memory, little is known about 
how highly emotional, personal memories are distributed through time.  To investigate 
this issue in detail, we collected a novel database of 758 autobiographical narratives for 
personal moral events from 100 exceptionally well-characterized healthy adults.  
Negatively valenced memories were significantly more remote than positively valenced 
memories, both as measured by the valence of the cue word that evoked the memory as 
well as by the content of the memory itself.  The effect was independent of chronological 
age, ethnicity, gender, or personality, arguing for a universal emotional bias in how we 
construct our moral autobiography. 
 
Introduction 
An essential part of how we think of people is normative: some are good, others 
bad, some should be praised, others punished.  Moral judgment pervades not only how 
we think of others, but also how we view ourselves and it appears plausible that a large 
proportion of the memories that matter the most to us personally are morally laden.  
                                                 
266 This section is in preparation for submission under the title: “Becoming a better person: 
temporal remoteness biases autobiographical memories for moral events”. 
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Curiously, despite great interest both in moral cognition267 and in autobiographical 
memory268, memories for moral events have received scant investigation.  Part of the 
reason for this neglect is no doubt the effort required to collect such memories in the first 
place; another may be the presumption that moral memories are no different from other 
memories. 
Yet research on emotional memory has shown us that emotional memories are 
special.  They are typically more vivid and recollected more easily269, even though they 
are not necessarily more accurate in their details270.  Studies of so-called “flashbulb 
memories” have probed the strong effects of emotion on memory consolidation to events 
such as the 9/11 attacks on New York271, the explosion of the Challenger space shuttle272, 
or the Kobe earthquake in Japan273.  These findings mirror laboratory experiments in both 
                                                 
267 Moll J., Z. R., de Oliveira-Souza R., Krueger F., Grafman J. (2005). "The neural basis of human moral 
cognition." Nature Reviews Neuroscience 6(10): 799–809.; Greene, J. D. and J. Haidt (2002). "How (and 
where) does moral judgment work?" Trends in Cognitive Sciences 6(12): 517-523.; Greene, J. D., L. E. 
Nystrom, et al. (2004). "The Neural Bases of Cognitive Conflict and Control in Moral Judgment." Neuron 
44: 389-400.; Haidt, J. (2001). "The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail: A Social Intuitionist Approach to 
Moral Judgment." Psychological Reviews 108(4): 814-834.; Haidt, J. (2007). "The new synthesis in moral 
psychology." Science 316: 998-1002. 
268 Berntsen, D. and D. C. Rubin (2002). "Emotionally charged autobiographical memories across the life 
span: the recall of happy, sad, traumatic, and involuntary memories." Psychology and Aging 17: 636-652.; 
Rubin, D. C. and M. D. Schulkind (1997). "The distribution of autobiographical memories across the 
lifespan." Memory and Cognition 25: 859-866.; Schacter, D. L. (1996). Searching for Memory: The Brain, 
The Mind, And The Past. New York, Basic Books. 
269Burke, A., F. Heuer, et al. (1992). "Remembering  emotional events." Memory and Cognition 20: 277-
290. 
270 Christianson, S.-A. and E. F. Loftus (1991). "Remembering emotional events: the fate of detailed 
information." Cognition and Emotion 5: 81-108.; Heuer, F. and D. Reisberg (1990). "Vivid memories of 
emotional events: the accuracy of remembered minutiae." Memory and Cognition 18: 496-506.; Winograd, 
E. and U. Neisser (1992). Affect and Accuracy in Recall: Studies of "Flashbulb" Memories. Cambridge, 
MA, Harvard University Press. 
271 Phelps, E. A. (2006). "Emotion and cognition: insights from studies of the human amygdala." Annual 
Review of Psychology 57: 27-53. 
272 Neisser, U. and N. Harsch (1992). Phantom flashbulbs: false recollections of hearing the news about 
Challenger. Affect and Accuracy in Recall: Studies of "Flashbulb" Memories. E. W. U. Neisser. 
Cambridge, MA, Cambridge University Press: 9-31. 
273 Mori, E., M. Ikeda, et al. (1999). "Amygdalar volume and emotional memory in Alzheimer's disease." 
American Journal of Psychiatry 156: 216-222. 
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humans and rats that demonstrate that emotional arousal enhances memory encoding and 
consolidation via both neurological and endocrinological mechanisms274. 
Given these findings, and given that moral events are typically judged to be 
highly emotional and involve some of the same brain structures that are also involved in 
the emotional modulation of memory275, one would predict that moral memories should 
also be special.  Like emotional memories more generally, one would expect moral 
memories to predominate in our autobiography and to be recollected with especially vivid 
detail and accompanying reliving of some of the emotion. On the other hand, just as 
emotionally traumatic memories can be suppressed276, highly emotional moral memories, 
presumably especially negatively valenced ones, would be expected to be recalled less 
frequently.   
All of these considerations argue for an important contribution to our 
autobiographical selves made by memories of morally laden personal events.  We wanted 
to investigate two key questions: (1) are moral events recollected differentially through 
time (are moral memories, on average, more remote or more recent?) (2) are positive 
moral events recollected at different times than negative moral events? 
 
Method 
                                                 
274 Cahill, L., R. J. Haier, et al. (1996). "Amygdala activity at encoding correlated with long-term, free 
recall of emotional information." Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 93: 8016-8021.; 
Phelps, E. A. (2006). "Emotion and cognition: insights from studies of the human amygdala." Annual 
Review of Psychology 57: 27-53.; McGaugh, J. L. (2004). "The amygdala modulates the consolidation of 
memories of emotionally arousing experiences." Annual Review of Neuroscience 27: 1-28. 
275 Greene, J. D., R. B. Sommerville, et al. (2001). "An fMRI Investigation of Emotional Engagement in 
Moral Judgment." Science 293: 2105-2108.; Moll, J., R. de Oliveira-Souza, et al. (2002). "The neural 
correlates of moral sensitivity: A functional magnetic resonance imaging investigation of basic and moral 
emotions." The Journal of Neuroscience 22(7): 2730-2736.; Moll, J., R. Zahn, et al. (2005). "The neural 
basis of human moral cognition." Nature Reviews Neuroscience 6(10): 799–809. 
276 Schacter, D. L. and S. D. Slotnick (2004). "The cognitive neuroscience of memory distortion." Neuron 
44: 149-160.; Loftus, E. F. (1993). "The reality of repressed memories." Journal of the American 
Psychological Association 48: 518-537. 
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Participants 
We tested 100 healthy adults recruited from the Los Angeles community, one at a 
time, over a period of approximately one year.  We selected participants between the ages 
of 40-60, with equal gender distribution, and with a racial composition matching that of 
the state of California.  All subjects were screened to be neurologically and 
psychiatrically healthy and all were given an extensive battery of background tests to 
assess IQ, mood, personality, socioeconomic status, as well as political and religious 
affiliation (Table 15).  All participants gave informed consent and received written 
assurance of anonymity regarding their data. 
 
Procedure 
Participants came in for 2 separate days of testing, typically spaced several weeks 
apart.  In the first visit, we collected the background data given in Table 15 and 
eliminated subjects who were not normal, healthy individuals. After screening, we 
collected the memory data in a second session conducted on the same day. During their 
second visit, we collected self-ratings about the memories which had moral components. 
Participants read transcripts of their own memories and dated them.  All participants also 
filled out an exit questionnaire about their experience during the experiment.  
For the first visit, participants were administered a number of background 
questionnaires; here we report data collected from the Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of 
Intelligence (WASI)277, NEO Five-Factor Inventory (NEO-FFI)278, Positive and Negative 
Affect Schedule (PANAS)279 and the Ethical Position Questionnaire (EPQ)280.  
                                                 
277Wechsler, D. (1999). Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence. San Antonio, Psychological 
Corporation. 
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During the testing session, participants were seated in a room by themselves in 
front of a computer that recorded their spoken memories for later transcription.  We used 
a common cue-elicitation protocol281. Instructions and cue words appeared on the 
computer monitor.  We chose 30 cue words to prompt moral recollection, spanning both 
positive and negative affect (see Table 16). The cues were one of three types: emotion 
words, descriptions of moral behaviors and prompts about the most superlative moments 
in the participant’s life. The cues were chosen using the MRC Psycholinguistic 
Database282  to select words based on Kucera-Francis word frequencies283  and measures 
of concreteness, familiarity, imageability and meaningfulness, when available. Each cue 
word appeared on the screen in a specific question (“Please talk about a time when you 
did something that made you feel GUILTY”), followed by a 3-minute period during 
which the participant was instructed to recount a specific, personal, autobiographical 
event related to that question.  Participants’ narratives were recorded onto the hard drive 
and transcribed.  Participants filled out an exit questionnaire about their experience at the 
end of the session. 
                                                                                                                                                 
278Costa, P. T. and R. R. McCrae (1992). NEO PI-R Professional Manual. Lutz, FL. 
279Watson, D., L. Clark, et al. (1988). "Development and validation of brief measures of positive and 
negative affect: the PANAS scales." Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 54(6): 1063-1070 
280Forsyth, D. (1980). "A Taxonomy of Ethical Ideologies." Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 
39(1): 175-184. 
281Crovitz, H. and H. Schiffman (1974). "Frequency of episodic memories as a function of their age." 
Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society 4: 517-518.; Rubin, D. C. and M. D. Schulkind (1997). "The 
distribution of autobiographical memories across the lifespan." Memory and Cognition 25: 859-866.; 
Buchanan, T. W., D. Tranel, et al. (2005). "Emotional autobiographical memories in amnesic patients with 
medial temporal lobe damage." The Journal of Neuroscience 25: 3151-3160. 
282Coltheart, M. (1981). "The MRC Psycholinguistic Database." Quarterly Journal of Experimental 
Psychology 33A: 497-505. 
283Kucera, H. and W. N. Francis (1967). Computational Analysis of Present-Day American English. 
Providence, Brown University Press. 
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For the final visit, participants were given selected transcripts of the memories 
they had narrated on the first visit and were asked to rate them on several dimensions and 
date them. These transcripts were selected based on the moral content of the memories.  
Finally, we contacted 44 of the 100 participants two years after data collection 
over the phone and discussed with them the validity of their data.  Participants were 
explicitly asked if they had produced only completely truthful narratives, to the best of 
their knowledge.  Every single participant of the 44 contacted endorsed this.  We further 
had an independent and unfamiliar investigator contact 11 of the participants by phone a 
second time and probe specific memories for test-retest reliability. All 11 of these 
participants were able to provide descriptive, accurate retellings of their original 
memories. 
 
Stimulus Selection 
From a total of 3300 memories produced by the 100 subjects, we selected 758 as 
autobiographical moral memories.  Our criteria for this selection were that the memories 
needed to be: 1. episodic and personal, 2. moral and 3. involve a decision or choice. 
Events that were not recounted in the first person were excluded, as were events that were 
generic or overly vague. The moral status of the memory was judged by two independent 
raters. The two raters worked in series to determine the inclusion of the memories in the 
moral group. The first rater read all of the moral memories and used a more liberal 
interpretation of the criteria (selecting 788 memories) while the second rater read only 
those provided by the first and applied a more strict interpretation of the criteria to the 
memories. This process ensured that the memories were evaluated individually and not in 
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the context of the participant’s life overall. Minimal editing was also performed on the 
memories to clarify the narrative of the memory while retaining the unique vernacular of 
each participant. 
 
Memory Ratings 
All participants rated transcripts of their own memories during their second visit, 
as described above. Memory transcripts were also rated by an independent group of 55 
adult raters, none of whom had participated in the main experiment.  Raters judged the 
memories on a large number of attributes; here we include only ratings of six (paired) 
features. The raters categorized each memory into many categories about the actions in 
the story, the reasons for those actions and the feelings the subjects had about their 
actions. Among these categories, the raters judged whether each memory involved 
helping someone, hurting someone, doing the right thing, doing the wrong thing, feelings 
of personal moral strength and/or feelings of personal moral weakness.  
 
Cue Word Ratings 
The cue words themselves were also rated by yet a third independent group of 4 
raters, using a Likert scale from -5 to +5.  All four raters showed very high agreement on 
rating the cue words as well as agreement with the Affective Norms for English Words284  
(see Table 16).  
 
Results 
                                                 
284 Bradley, M. M. and P. J. Lang (1999). Affective norms for English words (ANEW): Stimuli, instruction 
manual and affective ratings. Technical report C-1. Gainesville, FL, The Center for Research in 
Psychophysiology, University of Florida. 
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As Table 15 bears out, all our participants were healthy and representative adults 
and our sample had a good distribution of ages between 40-60, of gender, and of 
ethnicity. Participants all treated the experiment quite seriously; several were in tears 
during their second session (where they recounted the memories) and generally endorsed 
ratings on their exit questionnaire that indicated a high level of emotional involvement 
(mean = 7.16 ± 1.89)285.   Our follow-up phone calls assured us that the memories were 
not confabulated, since all of the 44 subjects we contacted strongly indicated they had 
provided honest accounts and since the 11 subjects whose memories we probed for 
reliability were all able to produce narratives that matched their original one in overall 
content. Our independent investigator rated every narrative from every participant with 
the highest rating score, indicating that each participant was able to recall specific and 
complete details without significant prompting.  
 
Memory Remoteness influences Valence of Cue Words 
We first examined the mean age of all moral memories elicited by each of the 26 
cue words. (Four cues are left out of this analysis because they yielded too few memories. 
These are: three control cues ‘tired’, ‘exercised’ and ‘funny’ and the cue ‘embarrassed’.)   
Simply rank-ordering cue words according to the mean age of the memories (Figure 55) 
suggested a pattern whereby more remote memories were associated with more negative 
cue words.  Specifically of note are the memories elicited by the cue ‘memorable’, which 
was itself not valenced. Subsequently, we grouped these most memorable events into 
those rated positive versus those rated negative, using ratings from three additional 
                                                 
285 These participants were responding to the question: “How emotional did you feel during this study?” 
using a Likert scale that ranged from 1 = not at all to 10 = very.  
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independent raters. The mean age of the positive memorable events falls nearly 8 years 
earlier than the negative memorable events. However, given the small number of items in 
each group (n = 8), this difference did not achieve significance. 
Plotting memory remoteness against the rated valence of the cue word (Figure 
56), yielded a significant positive regression (R(26) = 0.74, p = 0.004), bearing out the 
qualitative finding above. To test whether these effects might be due to the chronological 
age of our participants, rather than the remoteness of their memories, we carried out the 
same analyses using absolute chronological age at the time of the memory.  We found 
that there was little difference in the distributions between absolute age of the participant 
at the time of the memory and the age of memory.  
 
Memory remoteness influences valence of the memory 
We next examined the recollected narratives themselves.  We began with an 
automated text analysis using the Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count database286, which 
counts the number of words in a sequence of text in terms of their frequency in various 
categories.  We examined positive and negative emotion categories.  There was no 
significant effect of the word count of emotionally valenced words as a function of 
memory remoteness, a null finding that is perhaps not surprising given that the emotional 
semantic content of the narrative is likely only weakly related to mere frequencies of 
emotion words within it. 
As a second probe of the valence of the memories, we used each participant’s 
own ratings of his/her memories. For each memory, the participant provided a rating of 
                                                 
286 Pennebaker, J. W., C. K. Chung, et al. (2007). The development and psychometric properties of 
LIWC2007. Austin, TX, LIWC.net. 
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how well the memory reflected on him or her.  Here we found a weak but significant 
effect.  While participant’s own ratings of valence correlated only weakly with temporal 
remoteness of the memory, a contrast between the two most positively rated versus 2 
most negatively rated memories for each participant did reveal a significant time 
difference (t[134] = 3.22, p = 0.0016). 
  We found the strongest effect when the memories were categorized by the 55 
independent raters.  Here we focused on pairs of categories that had clear opposites: 
moral weakness versus strength, doing the right thing versus the wrong thing, and hurting 
someone versus helping someone (Figure 57).  Each of these pairs showed a significant 
difference with respect to the mean age of the memories (t[972] = 5.44, p < 0.001;  
t[1192] = 8.68, p < 0.001; and t[958] = 7.95, p < 0.001, respectively). When the three 
negative categories were contrasted with the three positive categories, a significant 
difference was also found (t[4] = 9.21, p < 0.001). 
  
Possible covariates 
To probe for possible factors that could influence the above effects, we examined 
gender, ethnicity, IQ, religion, political affiliation, and personality. We computed a 
Pearson product-moment correlation among these variables and found no significant 
effect. 
 
Discussion 
We collected and analyzed an exceptionally rich set of data to investigate the 
temporal distribution of moral autobiographical memories.  We found that memories of 
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more positive moral events were, on average, more recent than memories of more 
negative moral events.  The effect was not attributable to chronological age as such, nor 
modulated by gender, IQ, ethnicity, personality or other factors.  The findings suggest 
that there is a universal bias in how we construct our autobiographical past, with a 
tendency to remember the most recent events as those that are also the most morally 
positive. 
An important aspect of the effect we found is that it was not strongly driven by 
participant’s own subjective ratings of their memories, but rather by the objective ratings 
of the cue words that elicited the memories, as well as by categorization from 
independent raters.  There are several plausible explanations for this. First, people may 
have relatively little insight into the emotional valence of the memory.  Second, 
subjective ratings of experienced emotional valence may diverge substantially from 
objective third-party ratings.  Third, and perhaps most intriguing, is the possibility that 
people distort the emotional valence of their memories when asked to provide explicit 
ratings, perhaps especially for memories of events for which they were responsible.  This 
possibility could also result in people’s unawareness of the memory bias we found, 
resulting in a systematic but implicit emotional bias on how we think of ourselves as 
moral agents. 
It is surprising that there were no effects due to gender, personality or any of the 
other factors we examined, since one might have expected there to be such a relationship.  
In particular, we had expected associations between personality traits and the magnitude 
of our memory bias.  
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Our database of moral memories remains a valuable resource for probing 
additional questions and for generating targeted narratives that could themselves be used 
as stimuli, for instance, in functional imaging studies.  An important future direction for 
research will be to investigate how specific the bias we found is to moral memories as 
such or whether it pertains to highly emotional personal memories more generally. 
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Chapter 4: Figures and Tables 
Section 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“The depth and strength of a human character are defined by its moral reserves. People 
reveal themselves completely only when they are thrown out of the customary conditions 
of their life, for only then do they have to fall back on their reserves.” 
-- Leonardo da Vinci 
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Figure 8: Age Distribution 
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Figure 8: The participants’ ages were distributed between 40 and 60 years old (mean = 
48.9 ± 5.9 years). 
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Figure 9: Handedness Distribution 
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Figure 9: 83% of our participants were right handed. This is in keeping with published 
estimates of handedness in the population. 
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Figure 10: Educational Distribution 
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Figure 10: Participants’ education ranged from elementary education to advanced 
graduate degrees, including medical and law school. Most participants (90%) had 
attended at least some college. 
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Figure 11: Income Distribution 
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Figure 11: Most participants’ individual income was between $15,000 and $30,000, in 
keeping with published census figures that find the average Californian makes $22,711. 
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Table 3: Occupations 
Occupation 
 Number of 
Subjects 
 
Occupation 
 Number of 
Subjects 
Administrative Assistant 12  Property Supervisor 1 
Writer 9  Product Planner 1 
Teacher 6  Producer 1 
Sales 5  Photographer 1 
Actor 5  Office Manager 1 
Musician 4  Mediator 1 
Financial Services 4  Massage Therapist 1 
Artist 4  Lawyer 1 
None 3  Law Clerk 1 
Currently Unemployed 3  Interior Design 1 
Self Employed 2  Hatter 1 
Retired 2  Hairdresser 1 
Homemaker 2  Farm Grower 1 
Esthetician 2  Engineer 1 
Entertainment Industry 2  DSP Engineer 1 
Data Collector 2  Drug and Alcohol Counselor 1 
Caterer 2  Distributor - Health Product 1 
Accountant 2  Designer 1 
Warehouse Man (Forklift Operator) 1  Customer Service Representative 1 
Training and Development Tech 1  Custodian  1 
Tour Guide 1  Consultant 1 
Student 1  Computer Specialist 1 
Story Analyst 1  Chef 1 
Security  1    
 
Table 3: Our participants’ occupations were quite varied. These data are particularly 
important in establishing that our online recruiting methods were effective in reaching a 
wide variety of people. 
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Figure 12: Language Distribution 
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Figure 12: The majority of our participants (n = 66) spoke English as their only language, 
while some were bilingual (n = 18 in Spanish, n = 10 in other languages) or spoke three 
or more languages (n = 6). It is important to note that all participants were fluent in 
English by adolescence. The languages spoken by our participants were diverse, 
including: Armenian, Chinese (Mandarin), Czech, Filipino, French, German, Hindi, 
Hungarian, Japanese, Korean, Romanian, Russian, Sign Language, Slovak, Spanish and 
Tagalog. 
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Figure 13: Ethnicity Distribution 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 13: The ethnic diversity of our participant population was carefully monitored 
during recruitment to match the US Census findings for California. As described in 
Chapter 4, the inclusion of Hispanic as an ethnicity option for participants was critical 
given our location in Southern California. 
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Figure 14: Marital Status Distribution 
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Figure 14: Our participants were distributed among all types of relationship statuses. 
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Figure 15: Distribution of Number of Children 
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Figure 15: 53% of our participants had at least one child, in keeping with US Census 
findings. 
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Figure 16: Sexual Orientation Distribution 
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Figure 16: Most of our participants (n = 85) chose heterosexual as their sexual 
orientation. The choice ‘transgendered’ was removed as an option after completing the 
study as it is not descriptive of a particular sexual orientation. 
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Figure 17: Sexual Preference Distribution 
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Figure 17: Our participants answered a number of questions about their sexual orientation 
to establish the degree to which they were interested in having sex with each gender as 
well as the degree of attractiveness they felt for each gender. These findings were 
generally in keeping with the participants’ stated sexual orientation. 
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Figure 18: Religious Distribution 
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Figure 18: Our participants were asked to provide a short written response about their 
current religion and the religion with which they were raised. 25% of our participants 
practiced no religion at the time of testing. 
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Figure 19: Degree of Religious Influence 
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Figure 19: Using written paragraphs provided by the participants, a research assistant 
rated the religious influence of each participant on a scale from 1 to 3. 
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Figure 20: Comparison of Religious Beliefs 
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Figure 20: Using data from a myriad of sources, we were able to compare our 
participants’ religious practices with the Los Angeles community. Our participants were 
generally well-matched to state averages. Overall, Catholics seem to be under-
represented, but we believe that some these participants may be categorized in the less 
specific ‘Other Christian’ group. 
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Table 4: Religious Distribution in Southern California 
Religious 
Group 
Number of temples, 
churches, mosques or 
synagogues 
Number of 
adherents 
% of total 
population 
% of recruited 
subjects 
Roman 
Catholic 278 3,806,377 40 16 
Jewish 202 564,700 5.9 3 
Southern 
Baptist 312 111,634 1.2 
3 (all Baptists 
combined) 
American 
Baptist 211 73,217 0.8 -- 
Muslim 48 92,919 1 0 
Hindu 37 NA* NA* 0 
Buddhist 145 NA* NA* 3 
 
Table 4: A detailed breakdown of religious centers in the Los Angeles area shows the 
comparison of our participant population to the general population. 
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Figure 21: Political Value Distribution 
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Figure 21: Our participants’ political viewpoints were determined using a questionnaire 
that required them to choose among three possible perspectives on current political 
issues.  
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Figure 22: IQ Distribution 
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Figure 22: Participant’s full scale IQ (FSIQ) was measured using the 2-subtest version of 
the Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence (WASI-III). (Wechsler, 1999).
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 Table 5: Value Definitions from the Schwartz Value Inventory 
 
Definition Exemplary Values Sources 
Power: Social status and prestige, control or dominance 
over people and resources 
Social power authority, 
wealth 
Interaction 
Group 
Achievement: Personal success through demonstrating 
competence according to social standards. 
Successful 
capable 
ambitious 
Interaction 
Group 
Hedonism: Pleasure and sensuous gratification for 
oneself. 
Pleasure Enjoying life Organism 
Stimulation: Excitement, novelty, and challenge in life. Daring, varied life, exciting 
life 
Organism 
Self-direction: Independent thought and action—
choosing, creating, exploring. 
Creativity, curious Freedom Organism  
Interaction 
Universalism: Understanding, appreciation, tolerance, 
and protection for the welfare of all people and for nature. 
Broad-minded, social justice, 
equality Protecting the 
environment 
Group*  
Organism 
Benevolence: Preservation and enhancement of the 
welfare of people with whom one is in frequent personal 
contact. 
Helpful Honest Forgiving Organism 
Interaction 
Group 
Tradition: Respect, commitment, and acceptance of the 
customs and ideas that traditional culture or religion 
provide. 
Humble, devout Accepting 
my portion in life 
Group 
Conformity: Restraint of actions, inclinations, and 
impulses likely to upset or harm others and violate social 
expectations or norms. 
Politeness, obedient 
Honoring parents and elders 
Interaction 
Group 
Security: Safety, harmony, and stability of society, of 
relationships, and of self. 
National security Social 
order, clean 
Organism 
Interaction 
Group 
Note about Sources. Organism: universal needs of individuals as biological organisms; Interaction: 
universal requisites of coordinated social interaction; Group: universal requirements for smooth functioning 
and survival of groups.*Emerges when people come into contact with those outside the extended primary 
group, recognize intergroup interdependence, and become aware of the scarcity of natural resources. 
 
 Table 5: This figure is reproduced from (Schwartz, 1994). 
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Figure 23: Model of Relationship Among Values 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 23: This figure is reproduced from (Schwartz, 1994). 
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Table 6: Schwartz Value Inventory Results 
 
Value Mean ± SD 
Self-
Direction 
1.9 ± 0.89 
Universalism 2.0 ± 0.81 
Benevolence 2.0 ± 0.89 
Achievement 2.3 ± 0.98 
Simulation 2.3 ± 0.95 
Security 2.5 ± 1.11 
Hedonism 2.5 ± 0.88 
Tradition 2.7 ± 0.88 
Conformity 2.9 ± 0.96 
Power 3.1 ± 0.83 
 
 
Table 6: The SVI questions are phrased as sentences in the first person. Participants read 
each statement and then rate their answer based on how much the statement is ‘like them. 
The scale for these data is: 1 – very much like me; 2 – like me; 3 – somewhat like me; 4 – 
not like me; 5 – not like me at all. 
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Table 7: Attributes of Affect 
 
 Positive Affect Negative Affect 
High Score High Energy, Full Concentration, 
Pleasurable engagement 
Aversive mood states 
(anger, guilt, fear) 
Low Score Sadness and lethargy Calmness and Serenity 
 
Table 7: The Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS) measures a person’s affect 
using two orthogonal scales, positive and negative. This table details what scores on each 
of these scales suggest about a person’s mood and behavior. (Watson, Clark et al., 1988). 
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Table 8: Comparison: Database Participant Affect Scores with Normative Values 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 8: The scale maximum for the PANAS is 50 points. Database participants were not 
different from normative values: PA (p = 0.69), NA (p = 0.89). 
 Mean ± SD Range 
Positive Affect Score: 
Database 
33.4 ±7.37 33 [16-49] 
Positive Affect: Norm 29.7 ± 7.9  
Negative Affect 
Score: Database 
13.6 ± 6.57 31 [10-41] 
Negative Affect: 
Norm 
14.8 ± 5.4  
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Table 9:  Forsyth’s Taxonomy of Ethical Ideologies 
 
 Relativism 
Idealism High Low 
High 
Situationists 
Rejects moral rules; advocates 
individualistic analysis of each act in 
each situation; relativistic. 
Absolutists 
Assumes that the best possible 
outcome can always be achieved 
by following universal moral rules.
Low 
Subjectivists 
Appraisals based on personal values 
and perspective rather than universal 
moral principles; relativistic. 
Exceptionists 
Moral absolutes guide judgments 
but pragmatically open to 
exceptions to these standards; 
utilitarian. 
 
Table 9: The two scales derived from the Ethical Position Questionnaire are Relativism 
and Idealism. The combination of scores on each of these measures defines 4 different 
types of ethical ideologies. This figure is reproduced from (Forsyth, 1980).
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Figure 24: Distribution of Ethical Positions 
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Figure 24: As measured by the EPQ, the majority of our participants were ‘Situationists’ 
– high scorers on both Idealism and Relativism. This may be caused by in increase in 
Idealism with age; see Chapter 4. 
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Figure 25: EPQ Distribution of Relativism Scores 
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Figure 25: The distribution of participants scores on Relativism(measured by the EPQ) 
was fairly normally distributed.  
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Figure 26: EPQ Distribution of Idealism Scores 
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Figure 26: The distribution of Idealism scores (measured by the EPQ) was skewed. This 
may be due to an increase in general Idealism scores with age. 
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Figure 27: Utilitarian Score 
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Figure 27: Participants responded to a set of 33 standard moral dilemmas (see Appendix 
D). The choices on those dilemmas were used to generate a Utilitarian score – a 
measurement of the degree to which they espoused utilitarian choices on the dilemmas.  
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Figure 28: Correlation Matrix Organized by Participant Data  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 28: Correlation coefficents (R2 values) are given in this matrix comparing 
background and neuropsychological measures, organized by participant. Schwartz Value 
Inventory (SVI) data were included in this matrix as well, but were not displayed 
graphically. 
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Figure 29: Correlation Matrix Organized by Narrative Data 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 29: Correlation coefficents (R2 values) are given in this matrix comparing 
background and neuropsychological measures, organized by narrative. Schwartz Value 
Inventory (SVI) data were included in this matrix as well, but were not displayed 
graphically. 
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Chapter 4: Figures and Tables 
Section 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“Virtue is a state of war, and to live in it we have always to combat with ourselves.” 
-- Jean-Jacques Rousseau  
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Figure 30: Cue Word Frequency Distribution 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 30: The red triangles on the right indicate the 4 control cue words used. Only one 
of these cues (happy) elicited any moral memories. The green triangles on the right 
indicate the 5 cues that elicited the most moral memories.  
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Figure 31: Cue Frequency Distribution in Presentation Order 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 31: The dashed, red lines show the division between each section of the task. 
Section 1 asked subjects to recall 5 memorable events, section 2 asked subjects to recall 
memories based on emotional words, section 3 asked subjects to recall memories about 
actions in their past and section 4 asked subjects to remember the best and worst choices 
in their lives. 
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Figure 32: Gender Effects on Cue Word Frequencies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 32: Female (in pink marked with diamonds) and male (in blue marked with 
squares) subjects generated similar numbers of memories to each of the cue words.  
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Figure 33: Effect of Age on Cue Word Frequencies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 33: The youngest subjects (aged 40 – 45 years old) (shown in blue, marked with 
diamonds) and the youngest subjects (aged 55-60 years old) (shown in pink, marked with 
squares) show similar distribution of cue word frequencies.
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Figure 34: Frequency in Lexicon Does Not Determine Number of Elicited Memories 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 27: The frequency of a word’s appearance in written English (shown in pink, 
marked with squares), as measured by the Kucera-Francis standards, does not influence 
the number of memories that cue words elicit (shown in blue, marked with diamonds). 
Cue words marked with asterisks use some alternate form of the word for the Kucera-
Francis frequency. Also, as seen in Table 1, the cue words took something, embarrassed, 
and qualms are not included in the graph because frequencies are not available for them. 
The control words tired, exercised and funny are not included because they did not elicit 
any moral memories. Finally, the superlative cues were omitted because there are no K-F 
frequencies available for concepts. 
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Histogram of Positive and Negative Emotion Word Counts 
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Figure 35: Distribution of Positive and Negative Words in Narratives 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 35:  LIWC2007 text analysis was used to calculate the percentage of positive and 
negative emotion words in each narrative. Two outliers have been removed from this 
graph. The category ‘Positive Emotion Words’ has a single outlier at 15.22% and 
‘Negative Emotion Words’ has a single outlier at 11.59%. 
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Figure 36: Narrative Categorization: What Did They Do? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 36: Raters selected all of the possible categories about what actions occurred in 
each narrative. The category labels in this graph have been shorted for display; see 
Appendix G for the complete category labels. 
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Figure 37: Narrative Categorization: Why Did They Say They Did It? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 37: Raters selected all of the possible categories about why the narrators said that 
they made the choices described in each narrative. 
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Figure 38: Narrative Categorization: How Did They Feel? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 38:  Raters selected all of the possible categories about how the narrators said that 
they felt about their choices in each narrative. 
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Table 10: Location of Action in the Narratives 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 10: This table shows the 9 most common locations or situations in which the 
narratives occurred. Other scenes with fewer than 10 ratings included: Church, City, 
Clinic, Court, Crowd, Focus Group, Funeral/Death, Gang, Homeless Shelter, Hospital, 
Internet/Online, Jail, Just Married, Leisure, Little League, Military Training, Movie Set, 
Movie Theatre, Rehab, and Restaurant.  
*Subjects were not required to choose a scene. ‘No Scene’ is used when the rater did not 
choose a scene. 
**The scene ‘Store’ was the only scene that was written in by enough raters to have more 
than 10 ratings. 
 
Scene of the Action  Number of Ratings 
Family/Close Friend 813 
Home/Neighborhood 633 
Job/Business Situation 363 
No Scene* 251 
School 187 
Abroad/Vacation 87 
Car 56 
Animal 40 
Store** 37 
Party/Club/Bar 36 
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Figure 39: Rater Judgments of Narrative Morality 
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Figure 39: The blue bars (left) show the number of ratings that received the rating score 
shown on the x-axis. The red bars (right) show the number of narratives with that score as 
a mean rating. The score -5 was designated as ‘wrong’ on the rater sheet; the score 0 was 
given as ‘gray area’; and the score +5 was given as ‘right’. 
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 Figure 40: Distribution of Change in Moral Ratings  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 40: 45% of participants did not change their feelings about how right or wrong 
their actions were between the time of the narrative and the time of the rating. Those who 
did change their feelings did so in a normally distributed way across the entire range of 
possible changes. The mean change was to lower the rating by 0.5 points, but the 
variance in this was quite large (SD = ± 2.93 points). 
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Figure 41: Change in Moral Behavior Ratings Over Time 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 41: A calculation of the difference between the ratings of how participants felt at 
the time of the event and how participants felt at the time of the rating, averaged over 5 
year periods, shows that most participants do not revise their feelings about a situation 
over time. 
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Chapter 4: Figures and Tables 
Section 3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“I know only that what is moral is what you feel good after and what is immoral is what 
you feel bad after.” 
-- Ernest Hemingway
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Figure 42: Dendrogram of Hierarchical Cluster Analysis of All Narratives 
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Figure 42: The x-axis labels represent only a sampling of the Story IDs for the narratives. 
In total, 749 of the narratives are represented across the x-axis. (9 narratives were left out 
of this analysis.) 
Story ID 
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Figure 43: Plot of Scree Test  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   Good Cluster     Bad Cluster 
 
Figure 43: One factor is circled in red for the Good cluster; 3 factors are circled for the 
Bad cluster. 
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Figure 44: Factor Loadings for the 3 Bad Clusters  
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 Figure 44a.       Figure 44b. 
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      Figure 44c.            Figure 44d. 
 
 
Figure 44: Figures a-c are varimax rotations of each of the three factors found from the 
Bad cluster. Figure d shows the three-dimensional plot of these same data. All plots 
demonstrate the orthogonality of these three factors. 
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Figure 45: Varimax Rotation Good Cluster 
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Figure 45: The varimax rotation of the first two factors from the Good cluster shows a 
uniform cloud; these data cannot be further separated.  
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Figure 46: Word Frequency Analysis Bad Factor 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 46: 128 narratives were used to 
construct this word cloud. The most frequent 
words (after removal of common words) are 
shown largest in the cloud and quantified in 
the table. 
 
 
 
 Word Frequency 
Said 101 
Get 101 
Know 92 
Go 91 
One 86 
Lie 81 
Going 80 
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Figure 47: Word Frequency Analysis Bad Factor 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 47: 121 narratives were used to construct this 
word cloud. The most frequent words (after removal 
of common words) are shown largest in the cloud 
and quantified in the table. 
 Word Frequency 
know 102 
said 92 
something 91 
back 81 
think 73 
thing 73 
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Figure 48: Word Frequency Analysis Bad Factor 3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 48: 74 narratives were used to construct this 
word cloud. The most frequent words (after removal 
of common words) are shown largest in the cloud 
and quantified in the table. 
  
 Word Frequency 
took 84 
something 63 
money 61 
one 52 
back 51 
really 51 
take 51 
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Figure 49: Word Frequency Analysis Good Narratives 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 49: 174 narratives were used to construct this 
word cloud. The most frequent words (after removal 
of common words) are shown largest in the cloud 
and quantified in the table. 
 Word Frequency 
money 147 
know 145 
felt 126 
people 126 
get 123 
back 119 
one 115 
something 112 
good 100 
feel 98 
  260 
Figure 50: Distribution of Selected Narratives from each Bad Cluster 
 
 
Figure 50: This figure shows the same 3-dimensional factor loading for the bad clusters 
as above, with the approximate areas selected for further word frequency analysis shown 
in the colored circles. (The actual areas selected would be represented by cubes in this 
plot.) 
  261 
Table 11: Rating Categories that Contribute to Each Bad Factor 
 
*This the sum of all of the rating values on this item in this factor. Larger numbers reflect 
more influence of this rating on this cluster. 
 
Table 11: This table depicts the contribution of each of these rating categories to each 
factor. Shown in green are the key concepts for each factor. 
Factor 1 * Factor 2 * Factor 3  * 
Selfishness 
124 
Regret about 
behavior 157 
Regret about 
doing the wrong 
thing 171 
Not taking 
responsibility for 
actions 99 
Regret about doing 
the wrong thing 146 
Regret about 
behavior 170 
Lying 92 Shame/ashamed 131 
Breaking a 
rule/law 141 
Tricking someone 
else 88 
Being hurtful to 
someone 121 Shame/ashamed 135 
Doing the wrong 
thing 84 
Being unkind to 
someone 103 
Doing the wrong 
thing 134 
Breaking a rule/law 
79 
Knowledge of 
personal moral 
weakness 101 
Knowledge of 
personal moral 
weakness 123 
Knowledge of 
personal moral 
weakness 74 
Doing the wrong 
thing 98 Selfishness 111 
Uncertainty about 
moral correctness 
of action 68 
Taking 
responsibility for 
actions 93 
Stealing/Spending 
someone's money 92 
Taking advantage 
of someone 68 Learning a lesson 76 Learning a lesson 84 
Because of money 
65 Selfishness 75 
Taking 
responsibility for 
actions 83 
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Table 12: Top 5 Eliciting Cue Words 
Factor 1  
(n = 128) 
# Narratives Factor 2  
(n = 121) 
# Narratives Factor 3 
(n = 74) 
# Narratives 
Lied 49 
Hurtful to 
Someone 27 
Took 
Something 46 
Sneaky 26 Regretful 22 Guilty 9 
Cheated 22 Worst Thing 14 Sneaky 7 
Unfaithful 11 Guilty 11 Cheated 6 
Guilty 8 Unfaithful 11 Most Afraid 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 12: These tables show the cue words that elicited the most narratives in each of the 
four factors (good, bad factor 1: lying, bad factor 2: hurting someone else and bad factor 
3: stealing.)  
 
Good Narratives 
(n = 174) 
# Narratives 
Compassionate 39 
Honest 34 
Virtuous 26 
Tempted 14 
Responsible 11 
  263 
Chapter 4: Figures and Tables 
Section 4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“Wisdom, compassion, and courage are the three universally recognized moral qualities 
of men.” 
-- Confucius  
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Figure 51: Select Query Structure for Gender Ratings 
 
  
Figure 51: The design view for the select query “How Good are Rater’s Gender 
Guesses?” shows the fields needed to implement this query as well as the linking done 
through the Subject ID to Story ID table. 
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Table 13: Outcome from Data Mining Example 
Table 13A 
Ratings All Raters Wrong Raters Mixed  
No Guess 19 ratings  104 ratings  
Mixed Guess 
 
 
108 ratings  438 ratings  
Totals 127 ratings 542 ratings  669 ratings 
 
Table 13B 
Narratives All Raters Wrong Raters Mixed  
No Guess 2 narratives  7 narratives   
Mixed Guess 
 
 
56 narratives  165 narratives  
Totals 58 narratives 172 narratives 230 narratives 
 
 
Table 13: These tables show the results of the raters’ gender guesses on the rating tool. 
(A) 19 ratings map onto 17 narratives; 15 of those narratives have other raters who were 
unsure (guessers), so they move into the mixed guess category. (B) 104 ratings map onto 
69 narratives. Only 7 of those have the unique distinction of having raters who were all 
sure. This only includes ratings/narratives told by self-identified heterosexual narrators. 
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Chapter 4: Figures and Tables 
Section 5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“Hence naturally flows the great variety of opinions concerning moral rules which are to 
be found among men, according to the different sorts of happiness they have a prospect 
of, or propose to themselves; which could not be if practical principles were innate, and 
imprinted in our minds immediately by the hand of God.” 
-- John Locke
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Table 14: Background and Neuropsychological Data 
 
Unk=Unknown 
 
Table 14: The demographic and neuropsychological details about each participant group 
in the Iowa testing procedure are shown above.  
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Comparison of Words per Narrative Among Lesion Subjects 
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Figure 52: Number of Words per Narrative 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 52: Number of Words per Narrative: All participants in the Iowa testing procedure 
produce significantly shorter narratives than the participants tested in the main study 
(t[779] = 4.40, p < 0.0001).  
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Figure 53: Number of Moral Narratives Told 
Comparison: Number of Moral Narratives Told
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Figure 53: Participants in the Iowa testing procedure recalled fewer moral memories than 
participants in the main study. There may be large individual differences that contributed 
to this finding; the main study had a range from 3 to 17 moral narratives produced. 
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Figure 54: LIWC Analysis of Positive and Negative Emotion Words 
Comparison: Number of Positive and Negative Emotion Words
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Figure 54: The Iowa testing procedure did not affect the emotional content of 
participants’ recollections. The moral narratives that were told by participants in the Iowa 
study contained similar numbers of positive and negative emotion words to the main 
study. 
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Chapter 4: Figures and Tables 
Section 6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“The first step in the evolution of ethics is a sense of solidarity with other human beings.” 
-- Albert Schweitzer 
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Figure 55: Cue Word versus Mean Age of Memory 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 55: Moral memories elicited by positively valenced cues are more recent. 
Distribution of the temporal remoteness of memories as evoked by specific cue words 
(means).  Positive and negative memories evoked by the itself valence-neutral cue “most 
memorable” are highlighted in red. 
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Figure 56: Valence of Cue Word Predicts Age of Memory 
Valence of Cue Word Predicts Age of Memory
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Figure 56: Emotional valence of the cue words is associated with the age of the memory 
they evoke. 
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Figure 57: Valence of Rating Impacts Recency of Memory 
Valence of Rating Category versus Age of Memory 
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Figure 57:  Memories with positive moral content are more recent.  We plotted the mean 
(and SEM) recency of all those memories that were classified by independent raters as 
falling into moral categories with positive or negative valence.  Contrasts between each 
of the oppositely valenced pairs of categories were significant (p < 0.001, for all three 
pairs). The contrast when comparing all three negative categories to all three positive 
categories was also significant (p < 0.001).  
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Table 15: Demographics and Neuropsychological Profiles 
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Table 15 Continued 
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Table 15: The overall demographic and neuropsychological profiles of the participant 
population is shown above. °No participants were practicing Hindus or Muslims. *Black 
included participants of African and African-American descent. **Hispanic was given as 
a separate ethnicity choice because of the large Latino community in the Los Angeles 
area. Participants were free to mark multiple ethnicities (e.g., Caucasian and Hispanic) if 
they felt that best described themselves. 
  277 
 
Table 16: Cue Words Used in Recall Protocol 
 
Cue 
Number of 
Moral 
Memories 
ANEW 
Valence Rating 
[Mean, (SD)] 
Independent 
Valence 
Ratings 
[Mean, (SD)] 
Kucera- 
Francis 
Word 
Frequency  
     
Best Thing 4 * 8.80 (0.41) * 
Bittersweet 3  5.32 (1.06) 1 
Cheated 66  1.23 (0.47) Cheat: 3 
Compassionate 42  8.39 (0.78) 2 
Doubtful 7  3.07 (0.41) 22 
Embarrassed** 1 3.03  (1.85) 1.64 (0.67) 8 
Guilty 51 2.63  (1.98) 1.64 (0.67) 29 
Happy 7 8.21  (1.82) 8.59 (0.47) 98 
Honest 45 7.70  (1.43) 8.18 (0.67) 47 
Hurtful to Someone 34 Hurt: 1.90  (1.26) 
0.82 (0) Hurt:  
37 
Lied 56 Lie: 2.79  (1.92) 
1.64 (0.67) Lie:  
59 
Memorable 18 ---- ---- ---- ° 
 Most Afraid Others 
Will Find Out 20 
* 
Afraid: 
2.00  (1.28) 
1.23 (0.47) * 
 
57 
Most Like Others to 
Know 5 
* 7.77 (0.47) * 
Most Like to Change 7 * 1.43 (0.78) * 
Most Proud 5 * 8.59 (0.47) * 
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Table 16 Continued 
 
Cue 
Number of 
Moral 
Memories 
ANEW 
Valence Rating 
[Mean, (SD)] 
Independent 
Valence 
Ratings 
[Mean, (SD)] 
Kucera- 
Francis 
Word 
Frequency  
Proud 5 8.03  (1.56) 8.80 (0.41) 50 
Qualms 18  2.66 (1.23) -- 
Reckless 10  2.25 (1.93) 9 
Regretful 36 2.28  (1.42) 1.64 (0.67) 1 
Relieved 9  7.57 (0.78) Relieve: 13 
Responsible 13  7.77 (1.42) 71 
Sneaky 56  2.25 (0.78) 2 
Tempted 39  3.68 (1.06) Tempt: 2 
Took Something 78  1.43 (0.78) ¥ 
Unfaithful 41 2.05  (1.55) 0.82 (0) 1 
Virtuous 29 Virtue: 6.22  (2.06) 
7.98 (0.41) Virtuous: 6 
Virtue: 30 
Worst Thing 29 * 0.82 (0) * 
 
 
Table 16: This table shows a list of the cue words and the number of moral memories that 
each cue word elicited. (Three control cues (tired, exercised and funny) are not included 
in the table.) The second column gives the valence ratings for each available cue taken 
from the Affective Norms of English Words (ANEW)(Bradley and Lang 1999).These can 
be compared to the independent rating data that were collected for this study in column 
three. The final column gives the frequencies of each word in standard written English 
using the Kucera-Francis frequencies (Kucera & Francis, 1967).  
*Superlative cues were phrases and therefore do not have an ANEW rating. 
** Embarrassed was excluded from the analyses because it was an outlier. 
° The word “Memory” does have an ANEW (6.62 (1.50)) and K-F rating (76) but the 
testing cue ‘memorable’ was somewhat different from the other cues and not intended to 
evoke recollections based on the cue itself. 
¥ Kucera Francis Frequency for steal: 5. 
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Appendices 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“It is in everybody's interest to seek those [actions] that lead to happiness and avoid those 
which lead to suffering. And because our interests are inextricably linked, we are 
compelled to accept ethics as the indispensable interface between my desire to be happy 
and yours.” 
-- Dalai Lama
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Appendix A: The Trolley Problem 
In 1985, Judith Jarvis Thomson287 revived a philosophical 
thought experiment originally posed by Philippa Foot288: 
 
Suppose you are the driver of a trolley.  The trolley rounds a bend, and there come 
into view ahead five track workmen, who have been repairing the track.  The track 
goes through a bit of a valley at that point, and the sides are steep, so you must stop 
the trolley if you are to avoid running the five men down.  You step on the brakes, but 
alas they don't work.  Now you suddenly see a spur of track leading off to the right.  
You can turn the trolley onto it, and thus save the five men on the straight track 
ahead.  Unfortunately, Mrs. Foot has arranged that there is one track workman on that 
spur of track.  He can no more get off the track in time than the five can, so you will 
kill him if you turn the trolley onto him.  Is it morally permissible for you to turn the 
trolley? 
 
Thomson and Foot felt that this action, although terrible, was morally permissible. The 
trolley driver is saving five lives by sacrificing one. Foot originally posed the trolley 
problem an example of the doctrine of double effect, a Catholic doctrine which claims 
that it is never acceptable to do intentional harm, but actions that cause unintentional bad 
side-effects are acceptable. She was unsure whether this doctrine could be supported, 
ethically, and suggested a number of other thought experiments for comparison289. 
Utilitarianism would also suggest that it is always better to kill one person to save five. 
However, Thomson posed a number of alternative cases, where our intuition is just the 
opposite – killing one to save five is morally impermissible. The most frequently 
compared example is one that Thomson called the ‘Fat Man’. (Typically this is now 
called the ‘Footbridge’.) 
                                                 
287Thomson, J. J. (1985). "The Trolley Problem." Yale Law Journal 94: 1395-1415. 
288 Foot, P. (1978). The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of the Double Effect in Virtues and Vices 
and Other Essays in Moral Philosophy. Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press. 
289 Foot and Thomson each designed comparative thought experiments but only Thomson’s thought 
experiments will be discussed here, as they are the ones have been used more generally.  
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You are standing on a footbridge over the trolley track.  You can see a trolley 
hurtling down the track, out of control.  You turn around to see where the trolley 
is headed, and there are five workmen on the track where it exits from under the 
footbridge.  What to do?  Being an expert on trolleys, you know of one certain 
way to stop an out-of-control trolley: Drop a really heavy weight in its path.  But 
where to find one?  It just so happens that standing next to you on the footbridge 
is a fat man, a really fat man.  He is leaning over the railing, watching the trolley; 
all you have to do is to give him a little shove, and over the railing he will go, 
onto the track in the path of the trolley.  Would it be permissible for you to do 
this? 
 
Thomson’s intuition (which is supported by experimental work by Hauser290) is that it is 
not permissible to push the fat man off the footbridge, even though by killing one person, 
five can be saved. This intuitive distinction between the morally appropriate action in 
these two cases has prompted moral philosophers and moral neuroscientists alike to 
investigate. 
 
A number of other variants on the trolley problem exist, including: 
‘The Bystander at the Switch’ – in which the reader is a bystander next to a switch for the 
trolley, rather than the driver choosing a track;   
‘The Loop’ – in which the reader is standing next to a looped track with a fat workman, 
where switching the train will kill the fat workman, saving the five further down the line; 
“The Man in the Yard” – in which you can prevent the trolley from killing five people by 
colliding it with another trolley, derailing both and subsequently causing them to fall 
down a hill on top of a man sleeping in his hammock in his own yard291. 
 
                                                 
290 Hauser, M. D., F. Cushman, et al. (2007). "A dissociation between moral judgments and justifications." 
Mind & Language 22(1): 1-21. 
291 Unger, P. (1996). Living High and Letting Die. Oxford, Oxford University Press. 
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There are also a number of other moral dilemmas that are used for contrast with these 
trolley problems. Thomson’s original contrast for the trolley problem involved a doctor 
choosing whether to take the organs from one healthy patient to cure five sick patients, 
another situation where killing one person is not justified by saving five others. 
Additional examples of these dilemmas can be seen in Appendix D.  
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Appendix B: Testing Procedure for Session Two 
Part I: 
 
Read to the subject: 
First, we would like to know about 5 things that you remember doing in your past. These 
can be memories from any time in your life – early childhood right up until a year or so 
ago. They should be memories that particularly involve you, and something that you did, 
a decision you made, or an action you took.  Don’t spend too much time thinking about 
all the different memories.  We are interested in the first 5 that come to mind as vivid, 
memorable events. Try to pick events that you can describe in detail. We’d like you to try 
to think of both positive and negative events, but whatever stands out most in your mind 
is the best. Take about 3 minutes to tell each story.  You don’t have to fill the whole 3 
minutes and you can take longer if you need more time. Instruct the subject about how 
they will know when three minutes are done. (i.e., a small clock or timer). You will have 
as long as you like to break between memories. Now you can have a few minutes to think 
of 5 things that you have done that you remember particularly well.  
                                             Do you have any questions? 
 
Memory One 
Please tell us about a very memorable thing that you have done. 
Memory Two 
Please tell us about another very memorable thing that you have done. 
Memory Three 
Please tell us about another very memorable thing that you have done. 
Memory Four 
Please tell us about another very memorable thing that you have done. 
Memory Five 
Please tell us about another very memorable thing that you have done. 
 
Good work! You’ve finished Part I. 
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Part II: 
 
Now, we would like to know about things that you have done that made you feel an 
emotion very strongly. The computer will give you an emotion word and you will tell us 
about a time when you did something that made you feel that way. For example, if the 
word is “joy”, you might tell a story about how you felt joyful when you got married. 
These should be memories of things that YOU have done (decisions that you made or 
actions you took) so you wouldn’t want to tell a story about how you felt joyful when 
Sonny married Cher, unless you are Sonny or Cher. 
Just like in the last section, you should try to make your memory about 3 minutes long.  
Do you have any questions? 
Memory One 
Please talk about a time when you did something that made you feel relieved. 
Memory Two 
Please talk about a time when you did something that made you feel doubtful. 
Memory Three 
Please talk about a time when you did something that made you feel embarrassed. 
Memory Four 
Please talk about a time when you did something that made you feel regretful. 
Memory Five 
Please talk about a time when you did something that made you feel happy. 
Memory Six 
Please talk about a time when you did something that made you feel proud. 
Memory Seven 
Please talk about a time when you did something that made you feel guilty. 
Memory Eight 
Please talk about a time when you did something that made you feel tired. 
Memory Nine 
Please talk about a time when you did something that made you feel virtuous. 
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Memory Ten 
Please talk about a time when you did something that made you feel compassionate. 
Memory Eleven 
Please talk about a time when you did something that made you feel responsible. 
Memory Twelve 
Please talk about a time when you did something that made you feel bittersweet. 
 
       Good work! You've finished Part II.  
 
 
Part III: 
 
In this part of the study, we would like to know about moments in your life where you 
acted in a particular way. We will give you the actions that you might have done and ask 
you to tell us the most important memory that comes to your mind of doing this.  Again, 
the memory could be from any time in your life. If you have never done the action that is 
presented, you may skip the question. However, please try not to skip more than one 
question. As before, please try to make each of your stories about 3 minutes long. 
      Do you have any questions? 
Memory One 
Please talk about a time when you did something you have qualms about. 
Memory Two 
Please talk about a time when you cheated. 
Memory Three 
Please talk about a time when you took something that didn't belong to you. 
Memory Four 
Please talk about a time when you were unfaithful. 
Memory Five 
Please talk about a time when you were funny. 
 
Memory Six 
Please talk about a time when you did something sneaky. 
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Memory Seven 
Please talk about a time when you were reckless. 
Memory Eight 
Please talk about a time when you exercised. 
Memory Nine 
Please talk about a time when you were tempted. 
Memory Ten 
Please talk about a time when you were honest. 
Memory Eleven 
Please talk about a time when you lied. 
Memory Twelve 
Please talk about a time when you were hurtful to someone else. 
 
Good work! You've finished Part III.  
 
 
Part IV: 
 
In this final section, we would like to hear about personal situations in your life. These 
may be very private memories but remember that everything you say here is confidential. 
If you do not want to answer a question, you may say so and skip it. As before, we would 
like you to take about 3 minutes for each story.  
Do you have any questions? 
Memory One 
Please talk about the thing that you are most proud of having done. 
Memory Two 
Please talk about the best thing you ever did. 
Memory Three 
Please talk about the thing that you would most like to change if you could go back and 
do it differently. 
Memory Four 
Please talk about the thing that you are most afraid that other people will find out that you 
did. 
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Memory Five 
Please talk about the thing that you would most like other people to know that you did. 
Memory Six 
Please talk about the worst thing you ever did. 
 
Good work! You've finished!  
 
 
For the experimenter:  
Please feel free to use the space below to make any relevant notes about the testing 
session. 
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Appendix C: Session Three Testing Questionnaire 
Part I: 
1. When did this event occur? Please give the month, date and year to the best of your 
ability. If you are unsure, please give your best guess of your age at the time this event 
occurred. _______________________________________________ 
 
2. On a scale from 1 to 10, how pleasant was this experience?  
 
?--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------? 
not pleasant at all           neither pleasant nor unpleasant            extremely pleasant 
 
3. On a scale from 1 to 10, how vivid was this experience? 
?--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------? 
not vivid at all                      somewhat vivid                          extremely vivid 
 
4. On a scale from 1 to 10, how intense was this experience? 
?--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------? 
not intense at all                     somewhat intense                      extremely intense 
 
5. On a scale from 1 to 10, how emotional was this experience for you? 
?--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------? 
not emotional at all                somewhat emotional               extremely emotional 
 
6. Please choose the emotion from the following list that best describes how this 
experience made you feel.  You may choose to rate up to three emotions  -- the emotion 
that best describes how you feel should be rated ‘1’, the second ‘2’ and the third ‘3’.  
Happy  Angry   Embarrassed  Proud 
Surprised Disgusted  Guilty   Jealous 
Afraid  Sad   Ashamed  Regretful 
 
7. On a scale from 1 to 10, how significant was this experience in your life? 
?--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------? 
not significant at all    neither significant nor insignificant    extremely significant 
 
8. On a scale from 1 to 10, how confidential do you consider this memory to be?  
Think in terms of how much you would want to share this memory with anyone else. A 
rating of 10 would mean that you would never tell this to anyone else, even your closest 
friend, and a rating of 1 would mean that you are willing to tell everyone this story and/or 
it doesn’t matter if other people know about it. 
?--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------? 
not confidential at all             somewhat confidential            extremely confidential 
 
9. On a scale from 1 to 10, how much do you regret this experience now? 
?--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------? 
do not regret at all                   regret somewhat                     regret a great deal 
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10. On a scale from 1 to 10, how guilty do you feel now about your behavior during this 
experience? 
?--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------? 
not guilty at all                      somewhat guilty                        extremely guilty 
 
11. On a scale from 1 to 10, how embarrassed are you now about your behavior during 
this experience? 
?--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------? 
not embarrassed at all          somewhat embarrassed            extremely embarrassed 
 
12. On a scale from 1 to 10, how proud are you now about your behavior during this 
experience? 
?--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------? 
not proud at all                        somewhat proud                     extremely proud 
 
 
 
Part II: 
Next we will ask you to make some moral judgments about your memory. These are 
judgments about how right or wrong, good or bad, your actions were. Please read each 
question carefully. 
  
1. At the time, how wrong or right did your actions in this episode seem to you? Use a 
scale from 1 to 10. If, at the time you did it, you felt this was a very wrong thing to do, 
you would give it a 1.  If, at the time you did it, you felt this was a very right thing to do, 
you would give it a 10. 
2. At the time, did you feel like you had options about what you could do in the 
situation? Use a scale from 1 to 10. If it seemed at the time that you could not really do 
anything else, then you would give it a 1.  If it seemed, at the time, that you had other 
options and could just as easily have done something else, then you would give it a 10.  If 
it seemed like you could have done something else, but it would have been difficult, then 
you might give it a 5 or a 6. 
3. To the best of your recollection, approximately how many distinctly different things 
could you have done at the time?   
4. Immediately after you made the decision and did these actions, how content were you 
with your actions? If, for example, you thought that you made a hard decision but were 
completely satisfied with your actions, you would give it a 1 on a scale from 1 to 10. If 
you were completely discontent with your actions, you would give it a 10. 
5. At the time, how hard was it, morally, for you do what you did?  We are interested in 
how much of a psychological struggle it was for you to take that particular action. If, at 
the time, you found it very easy and did it without having to think or worry about it 
much, you would give it a 1. If, at the time, you found it to be one of the most difficult 
decisions in your life and you deliberated and agonized over it before doing it, then you 
would give it a 10. 
6. At the time, did you second-guess your decision?  
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7. To the best of your recollection, how many times in the year following this episode did 
you think about this decision?  
8. To the best of your recollection, how many times in the year following this episode did 
you wish that you’d done something different?  
 
Now we are going to ask you some similar questions but instead of thinking about how 
you felt back then, please think about how you feel today, sitting in this room, when you 
read the memory. 
 
9. Reading this today, how wrong or right do your past actions in this episode seem to 
you? Use a scale from 1 to 10. If now you feel this was a very wrong thing to do, you 
would give it a 1.  If now you feel this was a very right thing to do, you would give it a 
10. 
10. Reading this today, do you feel like you had options about what you could have 
done in the situation? Use a scale from 1 to 10. If it seems now that you could not really 
have done anything else, then you would give it a 1.  If it seems now that you had other 
options and could just as easily have done something else, then you would give it a 10.  If 
it seems like you could have done something else, but it would have been difficult, then 
you might give it a 5 or a 6. 
11. Thinking about the situation today, approximately how many distinctly different 
things could you have done at the time?   
12. Today, do you think there was something morally better that you could have done? 
13. Today, do you think there was something morally better that you should have done? 
14. Today, how content are you with your past actions? If, for example, you thought that 
you made a hard decision but you are still completely satisfied with your actions, you 
would give it a 1 on a scale from 1 to 10. If you are now completely discontent with your 
past actions, you would give it a 10. 
15. If you were in the same situation again, how hard would it be, morally, for you to 
decide what to do?  If, today, you would find it very easy and would not have to think or 
worry about it much, you would give it a 1. If, today, you would find it to be one of the 
most difficult decisions in your life and you would have to deliberate and agonize over it 
before doing it, then you would give it a 10. 
16. Do you still think about whether you made the right decision in this situation?  
17. How many times in this past year have you thought about the decision you made in 
this episode? (Do not include thinking about it since you began this study.)  
18. When you think about this episode today do you wish that you’d done something 
different?  
 
Now we’re going to ask you to imagine what most other people might think if they were 
reading this exact memory. These people are strangers to you. They are just other normal 
people who might be in a research study like you and the ONLY information they have is 
the description of the situation that you are going to read. Please try to evaluate the next 
questions from most other people’s perspective. 
 
19. If other people read this situation, how wrong or right would the actions in this 
episode seem to them? On a scale from 1 to 10, if you think people would generally feel 
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this was a very wrong thing to do, you would give it a 1.  If you think people would 
generally feel this was a very right thing to do, you would give it a 10.  
20. If other people read this situation, would they feel like you had options about what 
you could do in the situation? On a scale of 1 to 10, if you think people reading this 
would think that you could not really have done anything else, then you would give it a 1. 
If you think people would think that you had other options and could just as easily have 
done something else, then you would give it a 10.  If other people would think that you 
could have done something else, but it would have been difficult, then you might give it a 
5 or a 6. 
21. Would other people think there was something morally better that you could have 
done? 
22. Would other people think there was something morally better that you should have 
done? 
23. If other people reading this story were rating on a scale of 1 to 10, how hard 
would they say that it was, morally, for you to decide what to do?  If other people would 
think that you would find it very easy and would not have to think or worry about it 
much, you would give it a 1. If other people would think that you would find it to be one 
of the most difficult decisions in your life and you would have to deliberate and agonize 
over it before doing it, then you would give it a 10. 
24. Do you think other people reading this would say that you made the right decision in 
this situation?  
25. Do you think that other people reading this situation would say that they would make 
the same choice?  
 
Part III:  
  Now we are going to ask you some more general questions about yourself and 
your reflections on the episode you’ve just read. These questions may require you to type 
or speak answers into the computer. If you have any problems, please come let the 
experimenter know. 
 
1. In the previous section, you had to imagine what other people would think of this 
story. If you were able to give someone reading this more information about the situation, 
what would you say?  
2. How would you explain your choices to someone reading this situation?  
3. If other people only read the situation you described, do you think they would say that 
they would do the same thing you did292?  
4. If you want to explain your answer to the last question, you may record it here.  
5. Do you think a very strictly ethical person (for example Gandhi) would do the same 
thing?  
                                                 
292 There was an additional question intended here: “If other people were allowed to read your explanation 
AND the extra information you just gave, do you think that they would do the same thing that you did?” This 
question was not included in the Session Three testing done with our participants. It would be informative to 
include it in future experiments, however.  
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6. On a scale from 1 to 10, how right or wrong would a strictly ethical person rate your 
decision? 
?--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------? 
extremely wrong     neither right nor wrong         extremely right        
 
7. Did you think about what other people would say at the time that this happened? 
8. Did you think about other people’s opinions before you made the decision?  
9. Whose opinions did you consider?  
10. Why were those opinions important to you?  
11. On a scale from 1 to 10, how much did you think about yourself (your own needs and 
wants) when you made your decision? 
?--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------? 
did not think about self at all    thought entirely about self            
 
12. On a scale from 1 to 10, how much did you base your decision on your own needs 
and wants? 
?--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------? 
based decision entirely on other factors                 based decision entirely on self            
 
13. Rate yourself as an ethical person on a scale from 1 to 10. 
?--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------? 
not ethical at all                      highly ethical   
 
14. Please define ethical for us in the text box below. 
 
15. On a scale from 1 to 10, how well does this story reflect your general behavior?  
?--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------? 
    I never act like this                             I always act like this  
  
16. On a scale from 1 to 10 how well does this story reflect on you? 
?--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------? 
It reflects very badly on me                                It reflects very well on me  
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Appendix D: Moral Dilemma Questionnaire 
Instructions: Please answer Yes or No to the following items. There are no right or wrong 
answers.  
 
Item 1 
While picking turnips you arrive at two paths, one going to the left, one to the right. If 
you go to the left you will harvest ten bushels of turnips.  If you go to the right you will 
harvest twenty bushels of turnips. 
 
Is it okay for you to go to the right in order to harvest twenty bushels of turnips instead of 
ten? 
 
Item 2 
An old friend has invited you to visit at his summer home.  There are two ways to get 
there by car: the highway and the coast road. The highway will get you there in three 
hours, but the scenery is boring.  The coast road will get you there in three and a half 
hours, but the scenery is beautiful. 
 
Is it okay for you to take the coast road instead of the highway in order to see the 
beautiful scenery?  
 
Item 3 
You get a letter from a highly respected charity.  The letter asks you to make a donation 
of two hundred dollars. The letter explains that a two hundred-dollar donation will allow 
them to give badly needed food and medicine to poor people on the other side of the 
world. 
 
Is it okay for you to not make a donation to this organization in order to save money? 
 
Item 4 
You are the owner of a small business trying to save money.  You see that you could 
lower your taxes by pretending that some of the things you bought for yourself were 
bought for your business. For example, you could pretend that the stereo in your bedroom 
is being used at the office. 
 
Is it okay for you to pretend that your personal things are being used by your business in 
order to lower your taxes? 
 
Item 5 
You have a friend who has not been able to find a job.  He figured that he would be more 
likely to get hired if he had better things to say on his job applications. He decided to put 
some false information on his job applications in order to make him seem like a better 
person for the job.  By doing this he got a job, beating out other people who were better 
for the job than him. 
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Was it okay for your friend to put false information on his job application in order to help 
him get a job? 
 
Item 6 
You are driving along a country road when you hear someone yelling for help by the side 
of the road. You pull over and find a man who has had an accident.  His legs are covered 
with blood.  The man asks you to take him to the hospital. You would like to help him.  
He will probably lose his leg if he does not get to the hospital soon. However, if you take 
him to the hospital, his blood will ruin the leather seats in your car.  
 
Is it okay for you to leave this man by the side of the road in order to preserve the leather 
seats in your car? 
 
Item 7 
You have to go from New York to Boston for a meeting.  You can take the train or the 
bus. The train will get you there right before the meeting no matter what.  The bus is 
supposed to arrive an hour before the meeting, but it is sometimes several hours late due 
to traffic. It would be nice to get there an hour early, but it would be very bad if you were 
late. 
 
Is it okay for you to take the train instead of the bus in order to make sure that you are not 
late for the meeting? 
 
Item 8 
You have a party in a few hours, and before you go you will need to take a shower.  You 
have some yard work to do before the party, and doing the yard work will make you 
sweaty. A shower would be nice right now, but if you shower now you will have to 
shower again after you do the yard work.  You are worried about your water bill and want 
to use as little water as possible. 
 
Is it okay for you to shower before doing your yard work in order to enjoy a shower now? 
 
Item 9 
A person running a telephone survey calls while you are having a quiet dinner at home. If 
you do the survey you will get $200 but you will have to interrupt your dinner. 
 
Is it okay for you to interrupt your dinner in order to get $200? 
 
Item 10 
You are visiting the sculpture garden of a rich art collector.  The garden overlooks a 
valley containing a set of train tracks. A railway workman is working on the tracks, and 
an empty runaway trolley is heading down the tracks toward the workman. The only way 
to save the workman’s life is to push one of the art collector’s prized sculptures down 
into the valley so that it will roll onto the tracks and stop the trolley. Doing this will 
destroy the sculpture. 
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Is it okay for you to destroy the sculpture in order to save this workman’s life? 
 
Item 11 
You are on vacation by the sea.  You see a group of people get on a small boat and start 
sailing for a nearby island.  After they leave, you hear that there is a big storm coming. 
The storm will hit them if they are not told to come back. The only way to protect them 
from the storm is to quickly go out and warn them.  To do this you would have to borrow 
a nearby speedboat.  The speedboat belongs to a man who would not like it if you 
borrowed his boat. 
 
Is it okay for you to borrow the speedboat in order to warn the people about the storm? 
 
Item 12 
This afternoon you will do two things: go for a jog and do some work at your desk. It’s 
sunny now, but it is supposed to rain later in the afternoon.  You don’t like to jog in the 
rain, but you don’t care what the weather is like when you are working at your desk. 
 
Is it okay for you to work at your desk now and jog later in order to get your work done 
before you jog? 
 
Item 13 
You are the leader of a group of soldiers.  You are on your way back from a secret 
mission in enemy territory. One of your men has stepped in a trap and is badly hurt.  The 
trap sets off an alarm so the enemy will be coming for you right away. If the enemy finds 
the injured soldier they will torture him and kill him.  He begs you not to leave him 
behind, but if you try to take him with you the entire group will move too slowly and be 
captured.  The only way to prevent this injured soldier from being tortured is to shoot him 
yourself. 
 
Is it okay for you to shoot this soldier in order to prevent him from being tortured by the 
enemy? 
 
Item 14 
You are walking down the street when you find a wallet lying on the ground.  You open 
the wallet and see that it contains several hundred dollars in cash. You can tell that the 
wallet belongs to a rich person.  You have been hit by hard times and need extra money.  
It would help you if you sent the wallet back to the owner without the cash, keeping the 
cash for yourself. 
 
Is it okay for you to keep the money you found in the wallet in order to have more money 
for yourself? 
 
Item 15 
You are the leader of a small army that consists of warriors from two tribes, the hill tribe 
and the river tribe.  You belong to neither tribe.  During the night a hill tribe warrior 
murdered a river tribe warrior.  The river tribe will attack the hill tribe unless the 
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murderer is put to death, but the hill tribe refuses to kill one of its own warriors. The only 
way for you to avoid a war between the two tribes that will costs hundreds of lives is to 
kill the murderer in front of everyone by cutting off is head with your sword. 
 
Is it okay for you to cut off this man’s head in order to prevent the two tribes from 
fighting a war that will cost hundreds of lives? 
 
Item 16 
You are at the wheel of a runaway trolley heading for a place where the tracks split in 
two.  On the tracks going to the left is a group of five railway workmen.  On the tracks 
going to the right is one railway workman. If you do nothing the trolley will go to the left, 
and it will run over the five workmen and kill them.  The only way to save the five 
workmen is to hit a switch that will make the trolley go to the right, but if you do this it 
will run over and kill one workman instead. 
 
Is it okay to hit the switch in order to save the five workmen? 
 
Item 17 
You, your husband, and your four children are crossing a mountain range on your return 
journey to your homeland. You have inadvertently set up camp on a local clan’s sacred 
burial ground.  The leader of the clan says that according to the local laws, you and your 
family must be put to death.  However, he will let you, your husband, and your three 
other children live if you will kill your oldest son yourself. 
 
Is it okay for you to kill your oldest son in order to save your husband and your other 
three children? 
 
Item 18 
You are on a big boat at sea.  There is a fire on the boat and everyone has to get off.  
People get into the lifeboats. All the lifeboats, including yours, have too many people in 
them. The sea is getting rough, and water is coming in over the sides. If nothing is done 
the lifeboat will sink and everyone on board will die.  However, there is an injured person 
who will not survive in any case.  If you throw that person overboard the boat will stay 
afloat and the remaining passengers will be saved. 
 
Is it okay for you to throw this person overboard in order to save the lives of the 
remaining passengers? 
 
Item 19 
You work for a large company, and you know secret things about that company.  You 
have a friend who plays the stock market, and you owe her a lot of money. By telling 
your friend secret things about your company you can help your friend make money in 
the stock market.  If you do this she will forget about the money you owe her, but helping 
people make money by telling them company secrets is against the law. 
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Is it okay to tell your friend secrets about your company so that she will forget about the 
money you owe her? 
 
Item 20 
A runaway trolley is heading down the tracks toward five workmen who will be killed if 
the trolley isn’t stopped. You are on a footbridge over the tracks, in between the trolley 
and the five workmen. Next to you on this footbridge is a stranger who happens to be 
very large. The only way to save the lives of the five workmen is to push this stranger off 
the bridge and onto the tracks below where his large body will stop the trolley.  The 
stranger will die if you do this, but the five workmen will be saved. 
 
Is it okay to push the stranger on to the tracks in order to save the five workmen?  
 
Item 21 
You are the leader of a mountain climbing group that is stranded in the wilderness.  Your 
group includes a family of six that needs a certain vitamin very badly.  Some people’s 
kidneys contain large amounts of this vitamin. There is one person in your party who has 
the vitamins in his kidneys. The only way to save the lives of the six members of this 
family is to remove one of this man’s kidneys, get the vitamins out of it, and give them to 
the six people.  The man will not die if you do this, but his health will suffer.  The man is 
opposed to this plan, but you have the power to do as you see fit. 
 
Is it okay for you to take this man’s kidney in order to save the lives of the six people 
who need vitamins? 
 
Item 22 
You are a doctor.  You have five patients who need different kinds of organ transplants. 
They will die without new organs.  You also have another patient who is a healthy young 
man. The only way that you can save the five patients is to steal the organs out of the 
healthy young man’s body and transplant them into the five patients.  If you do this, the 
young man will die, but the other five patients will live. 
 
Is it okay for you to perform this transplant in order to save the five patients? 
 
Item 23 
A deadly virus is spreading around the world, killing millions of people. You are a 
scientist. You have invented two chemicals. One of them kills the virus.  The other one is 
a deadly poison. You don’t know which chemical is which because the labels on your 
containers got mixed up. Once you figure out which is which you can use the good 
chemical to save millions of lives, but the only way to find out which is which is to test 
each chemical on someone. If you do this, one person will live, and the other will die, but 
you will then be able to start saving many other people’s lives. 
 
Is it okay for you to kill one of these people with a deadly chemical in order to save 
millions of lives? 
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Item 24 
The enemy has taken over your country.  You have two children, ages five and eight. 
There is an enemy doctor who performs painful experiments on humans that always lead 
to death. He intends to perform experiments on one of your children, but he will allow 
you to choose which of your children will be experimented upon.  You have twenty-four 
hours to bring him one of your children.  If you refuse to bring one of your children to 
him he will find them both and experiment on both of them. 
 
Is it okay for you to bring one of your children to this doctor in order to avoid having 
them both die? 
 
Item 25 
You are at the wheel of a runaway trolley heading for a place where the tracks divide in 
two.  On the tracks going to the left is a group of five railway workmen.  On the tracks 
going to the right is a group of seven railway workmen. If you do nothing the trolley will 
go to the left, killing the five workmen.  The only way to save the five workmen is to hit 
a switch that will make the trolley go to the right, killing the seven workmen instead. 
 
Is it okay to hit the switch in order to save the five workmen? 
 
Item 26 
You’ve been offered two jobs and you are deciding which one to take. Company A will 
pay you $40,000 and will give you ten days of vacation per year. Company B will pay 
you $20,000 and will give you twelve days vacation per year. Everything else about the 
two jobs is the same. 
 
Is it okay for you to take Company B’s offer in order to have two more days of vacation 
per year? 
 
Item 27 
Your plane has crashed in the mountains.  The only survivors are you, another man, and a 
young boy.  It is very cold and you have no food. To survive, you must reach a small 
village on the other side of the mountain.  It will take you several days to get there. The 
boy has a broken leg and cannot walk. He will almost certainly not survive the journey. 
Without food, you and the other man will probably die as well.  The other man suggests 
that you kill the boy and eat his remains over the next few days. 
 
Is it okay to kill this boy so that you and the other man will survive? 
 
Item 28 
You are on vacation by the sea. You see a group of people get on a small boat and start 
sailing for a nearby island.  After they leave, you hear that there is a big storm coming. 
The storm will hit them if they are not told to come back. The only way to protect them 
from the storm is to quickly go out and warn them. To do this you would have to borrow 
a nearby speedboat.  The speedboat belongs to a man who would not like it if you 
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borrowed his boat, and he has hired a guard to make sure no one uses it. To get to the 
speedboat you will have to lie to the man guarding the boat. 
 
Is it okay for you to lie to the guard in order to borrow the speedboat and warn the people 
about the storm? 
 
Item 29 
You are part of a group of scientists studying animals in the jungle.  The group includes 
eight children.  The group is captured by a gang of terrorists who keep you and the others 
locked up for several days. One of the terrorists likes you.  He tells you that the leader 
plans to kill you and the others the next day. He says he will help you escape, but that he 
needs to be sure you won’t go to the police. To make sure you won’t go to the police, he 
wants to videotape you killing one of the other scientists.  If you accept his offer, the 
other adults will die but you and the eight children will escape. 
 
Is it okay for you to kill a member of the group in order to escape from the terrorists and 
save the eight children? 
 
Item 30 
You take your broken VCR to a repair shop.  It will cost $100 to have it fixed. You see in 
the newspaper that a newer and slightly better version of your VCR is on sale for $100. 
 
Is it okay for you to have your old VCR fixed in order to avoid spending money on a new 
one? 
 
Item 31 
Enemy soldiers have taken over your village.  They have orders to kill everyone they 
find. You and some others are hiding in a basement. You hear the soldiers enter the house 
above you. Your baby begins to cry loudly. You cover his mouth to block the sound. If 
you remove your hand from his mouth he will cry loudly and the soldiers will hear.  If 
they hear the baby they will find you and kill everyone, including you and your baby.  To 
save yourself and the others you must smother your baby to death. 
 
Is it okay for you to smother your child in order to save yourself and the other people? 
 
Item 32 
You are making brownies from a book of recipes. According to the book, the brownies 
are supposed to have walnuts.  You don’t like walnuts, but you like peanuts. 
 
Is it okay for you to use peanuts instead of walnuts in order to avoid eating walnuts? 
 
Item 33 
You go to the store in order to buy headache medicine.  The store is out of the brand you 
wanted to buy. The woman working at the store suggests that you buy a different brand 
that is exactly the same as the one you were looking for. 
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Is it okay for you to buy the other brand of medicine instead of waiting to buy the brand 
you were looking for? 
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Appendix E: Table of Cue Words in Presentation Order 
 
These cues were presented in the following randomized, fixed order to every subject. 
 
Warm-up Cue: Presented 5 times 
 
Please tell us about a very memorable thing that you have done.  
 
 
Emotion Cues (3 Positive, 4 Intermediate, 3 Negative, 2 Controls) 
 
Please talk about a time when you did something that made you feel: 
Relieved (I) 
Doubtful (I) 
Embarrassed (N) 
Regretful (N) 
Happy*  
Proud (P) 
Guilty (N) 
Tired* 
Virtuous (P) 
Compassionate (P) 
Responsible (I) 
Bittersweet (I) 
 
Action Cues (10 Cues, 2 Controls) 
 
Please talk about a time when you: 
Did something you have qualms about 
Cheated 
Took something that didn’t belong to you 
Were unfaithful 
Were funny* 
Did something sneaky 
Were reckless 
Exercised* 
Were tempted 
Were honest 
Lied 
Were hurtful to someone else 
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Superlative Cues (6 Cues) 
 
Please talk about:  
The thing you are most proud of having done 
The best thing you ever did 
The thing that you would most like to change if you could go back and do it differently 
The thing that you are most afraid other people will find out that you did 
The thing that you would most like other people to know that you did 
The worst thing you ever did 
 
 
*indicates control item  
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Appendix F: Description of NEO Personality Types 
Neuroticism (N) is the most dominant personality factor and broadly it measures 
an individual’s emotional stability. The NEO professional manual describes individuals 
with low N scores as “calm, even-tempered, and relaxed, and they are able to face 
stressful situations without becoming upset or rattled.” By comparison, subjects with high 
N scores tend to have difficulty coping with stress and experience more negative feelings. 
They tend to be poorly emotionally adjusted. Facets of N: Anxiety, Angry Hostility, 
Depression, Self-Consciousness, Impulsiveness, Vulnerability. 
Extraversion (E) contrasts the commonplace ‘types’ of extraverts and introverts. 
However, it is important to note that these should be thought of as two ends of a range, 
not necessarily polar opposites. That is, introversion is the “absence of extraversion”. 
Thus, while extraverts may be described as “liking people and preferring large groups 
and gatherings”, introverts do not dislike people and gatherings. Rather, they prefer to be 
alone in the same way extraverts prefer to be with people. Extraverts “are also assertive, 
active and talkative. They like excitement and stimulation and tend to be cheerful in 
disposition.” Introverts are characterized as reserved, independent and even-paced. 
Introverts “are not unhappy or pessimistic”. Facets of E: Warmth, Gregariousness, 
Assertiveness, Activity, Excitement-Seeking, Positive Emotions. 
Openness (O) refers to an individual’s openness to experience. Individuals with 
low O scores are referred to as ‘Closed’ and present themselves as more “conventional in 
behavior and conservative in outlook” than more Open individuals. Open individuals are 
more “willing to entertain novel ideas and unconventional values”. They also tend to feel 
emotions (both positive and negative) more strongly than their Closed counterparts.  
Open individuals tend to be more exploratory of the world, both in concept and in 
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practice. Openness is also associated with creativity, aesthetic sensitivity, an active 
imagination and intellectual curiosity. Closed individuals should not be thought of as 
lacking these traits, but rather that they tend to stay close to home with their expression of 
them. One particularly interesting point about Open individuals is that they are “willing 
to question authority and entertain new ethical, social and political ideas. … An open 
person may apply his or her evolving value system as conscientiously as a traditionalist 
does.” This may make people with high O scores particularly interesting in studying 
moral decision making and behavior.  Facets of O: Fantasy, Aesthetics, Feelings, 
Actions, Ideas, Values. 
Agreeableness (A) primarily looks at an individual’s reaction toward others. 
People with high A scores are “fundamentally altruistic. [They] are sympathetic towards 
others and eager to help them, and believe that others will be equally helpful in return.” 
People with low A scores are often referred to as ‘Disagreeable’ or ‘Antagonistic’ but this 
may unfairly characterize these individuals. People with low A scores are often 
‘egocentric, skeptical of others’ intentions and competitive.” They are also “ready to fight 
for [their] own interests” and good at engaging in critical thinking. Individuals at the far 
end of both sides of this dimension may suffer from personality disorders. Facets of A: 
Trust, Straightforwardness, Altruism, Compliance, Modesty, Tender-Mindedness. 
Conscientiousness (C) primarily refers to an individual’s self-control. It is based 
on “individual differences in planning, organizing, and carrying out tasks”. People with 
high C scores are “purposeful, strong-willed and determined” as well as high achievers, 
but they may also tend towards “annoying fastidiousness, compulsive neatness or 
workaholic behavior”. Low C scorers may often be characterized as lazy or sloppy, 
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because they are not as goal-directed or purposeful as their counterparts. However, they 
are “not necessarily lacking in moral principles, but they are less exacting in applying 
them”. People with low C scores may also be more hedonistic and interested in sex. 
Facets of C: Competence, Order, Dutifulness, Achievement Striving, Self-Discipline, 
Deliberation. 
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Appendix G: Rating Worksheet 
Who? 
Male    (Guess?) 
Female (Guess?) 
-------------------------------------------- 
Child   Race? 
Pre-teen  Religion? 
Adolescent  Other? 
Adult 
 
What Did They Do? (0-3) 
___Helping someone 
___Protecting someone  
___Taking (physical) care of someone 
___Being kind to someone  
___Self-sacrifice 
___Cheating in school/work 
___Cheating in business 
___Sneaking into a movie theatre 
___Falsifying a document (resume,  
paperwork) 
___Tricking someone else 
___Physically unfaithful (to a partner,  
with someone else’s partner) 
___Mentally unfaithful (to a partner,  
with someone else’s partner) 
___Neglecting someone 
___Being hurtful to someone 
___Being unkind to someone 
___Physical harm to someone 
___Lying 
___Telling a white lie 
___Stealing/Spending someone’s money 
___Stealing an idea/plagiarized 
___Shoplifting  
___Returning lost money/wallet/things 
___Bank error/too much change/  
undercharged 
___Enlisting someone else’s help in  
doing wrong action 
___Enlisting someone else’s help in  
doing right action 
___Fighting for someone else’s rights 
___Taking advantage of someone else 
___Breaking a rule/law 
___Vandalism/Damaged Property 
 
Where? (Scene of the Action) 
Job/Business Situation       School 
Family/Close Friend       Animal 
Abroad/Vacation       Party/Club 
Home/Neighborhood            Car 
 
Why Did They Say They Did It? (0-3) 
___Taking the high road 
___Doing the wrong thing 
___Doing the right thing 
___Making extra effort to do right thing 
___Making extra effort to do wrongthing 
___Doing lesser harm to prevent greater  
harm (consequentialist) 
___Means do NOT justify the ends  
(deontological) 
___Fear of retribution/karma 
___Cheating “the system”/ “the man” 
___Righting a wrong 
___Peer Pressure/Social Pressure to act 
___Altruism 
___Teaching a Lesson/ Revenge 
___Self-Preservation 
___Getting out of a tight spot 
___Selfishness 
___Taking a chance 
___Because of money 
 
How Did They Feel? (0-3) 
___Regret about doing the right thing 
___Regret about doing the wrong thing 
___Regret about behavior 
___Knowledge of personal moral  
            weakness 
___Know. of personal moral strength 
___Uncertainty about moral correctness  
of action 
___Not taking responsibility for actions 
___Taking responsibility for actions 
___Learning a lesson 
___Putting self in someone else’s shoes 
___Shame/Ashamed 
___Powerful 
 
Did they: (0-3) 
___Rationalize an action/behavior? 
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 Appendix G: Rating Worksheet continued 
Cue Words (Circle All That Apply) 
Relieved 
Doubtful 
Embarrassed 
Regretful 
Happy 
Proud 
Guilty 
Tired 
Virtuous 
Compassionate 
Responsible 
Bittersweet 
Did something you have qualms about 
Cheated 
Took something that didn’t belong to you 
Were unfaithful 
Were funny 
Did something sneaky 
Were reckless 
Exercised 
Were tempted 
Were honest 
Lied 
Were hurtful to someone else 
The thing you are most proud of having 
done 
The best thing you ever did 
The thing that you would most like to 
change if you could go back and do it 
differently 
The thing that you are most afraid other 
people will find out you did 
The thing that you would most like other 
people to know you did 
The worst thing that you ever did 
 
Please Judge: 
 
 
<----------------------|----------------------> 
-5          0   +5 
WRONG   GRAY     RIGHT  
     AREA 
 
Lazarus’ Core Relational Themes 
(Circle All That Apply) 
 
Anger: A demeaning offense against me 
and mine 
Anxiety: Facing uncertain, existential 
threat 
Fright: Facing an immediate, concrete and 
overwhelming physical danger 
Guilt: Having transgressed a moral 
imperative 
Shame: Having failed to live up to an ego-
ideal 
Sadness: Having experienced an 
irrevocable loss 
Envy: Wanting what someone else has 
Jealousy: Resenting a third party for loss or 
threat to another’s affections 
Disgust: Taking in or being too close to an 
indigestible object or idea (metaphorically 
speaking) 
Happiness:  Making reasonable progress 
toward the realization of a goal 
Pride: Enhancement of one’s ego-identity 
by taking credit for a valued object or 
achievement, either our own or that of 
someone or group with whom we identify 
Relief: A distressing goal-incongruent 
condition that has changed for the better or 
gone away 
Hope: Fearing the worst but yearning for 
better 
Love: Desiring or participating in affection, 
usually but not necessarily reciprocated 
Compassion: Being moved by another’s 
suffering and wanting to help 
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Appendix H: Directions for Raters 
These directions may seem overly elaborate (or elementary) at times, but I hope that that 
will help prevent any miscommunication. With a rating project of this size, it’s pretty 
important that everyone do things the same way. Please try very hard to make everything 
legible. Unreadable or missing story numbers will make your ratings unusable. 
 
When you rated the stories before, we asked you to rate them on paper. This time we’d 
like to ask you to rate them on the computer, if possible. If that’s not possible, paper is 
still fine.  
 
The point of this rating is to put each story in EVERY category that it belongs in. If you 
come across a story which you do not think should be in the database, please let me 
know. Stories should meet two criteria: 1. they should be episodic and personal; 2. either 
the reader or the speaker should feel that the story involves some kind of right or wrong 
action. 
 
Stories may span a significant range of behaviors and still be in the same category. For 
example, a child who takes a piece of candy and a professional jewel thief who robs a 
museum are both stories about “taking something that doesn’t belong to you”. Equally, a 
story about someone who decides NOT to steal something should still be categorized 
under stealing. Please note these stories with the greek letter alpha α (to signify that it’s 
an anti-stealing story). If you are rating online, you can use a negative sign (-) to signify 
this instead. 
 
1. The rating sheet 
a. Label EVERY rating sheet with  
i. your unique user ID – this was emailed to you 
ii. the story number 
2. Category 1: Who? 
a. Gender:  
i. This is the only category where you should guess. 
ii. ALWAYS guess which gender the speaker is and mark if it is a 
guess or if you are certain. (We are using this as a pilot for a 
gender study at the same time.) 
b. Age: 
i. Only circle this if it is relevant to the story.  
ii. Typically, the subject being an adult is not relevant to the story. 
c. Race/Religion 
i. If this category is relevant to the story, please note it.  
ii. If there is some other category that comes up that is similar and 
relevant to the story, please write it in. (For example, if being in 
the Girl Scouts is a crucial element of the story, please write that 
in.)  
3. Category 2: Where?  
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a. This category is to highlight important story elements that may “change 
the rules” of morality. For example, you might lie in business, but never to 
your family. There are a few items in this category that are not places but 
may change the moral rules. 
b. Only circle these if they are part of the story. Do not guess. 
c. Family and Animals are important categories here even though they’re not 
places. 
4. Categories 3-5: What, Why and How? 
a. All of these categories should be rated on a scale from 0 to 3. 
i. 0 = does not apply to this category at all 
ii. 3 = great exemplar of this category 
b. If you do not want to write lots of zeros, that’s fine. I will assume that 
blanks are zeros. Be careful not to miss any lines if you’re doing this. 
c. Remember: Acts and Omissions count in these stories. Situations where 
the subject chose NOT to do something are just as important. Mark these 
with an ‘alpha’ or negative sign and your rating number. 
5. Category 6: Rationalization 
a. How strongly does rationalization play a role in this story? 
b. Use the same 0 to 3 rating scale as before. 
6. Cue Words 
a. One cue word was used to elicit this story, however, many cue words may 
apply.  
b. If a subject tells a story about cheating on their spouse, they may feel 
guilty, like it’s the worst thing they ever did, and regretful. This story 
should be categorized under all of those plus unfaithful. 
c. Do not spend too much time over-thinking this category; just do it quickly 
and move on. 
7. YOUR judgment 
a. How right or wrong do YOU think the action in the story is? 
i. Scale from -5 to +5 
ii. -5 = completely wrong 
iii. +5 = completely right 
iv. 0 DOES NOT equal “not moral”; 0 means equally right and wrong 
(completely morally ambiguous) 
v. If you come across a story that you think is not moral (even though 
the subject might), write “not moral” instead of a rating. 
b. Unlike the rest of these ratings, this is purely subjective – tell us what 
YOU think. 
c. Just to reiterate – please make things legible. Your negative signs will be 
very important here. 
8. Core Relational Themes 
a. Choose the core relational themes that best fit the story, based on the 
description of the theme NOT the emotion word. 
b. If none of them fit, don’t circle anything. 
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Similarity Ratings 
 
We are using similarity ratings to help identify "categories" that might not be intuitively 
obvious. The way to fill out this for is as follows: 
1. Read the first story and do the rating sheet as described above.  
2. Read the next story. Before you do the rating sheet, decide how similar the two 
stories you just read are. This could be for any number of reasons -- and you don't 
have to have a reason. Just do it by "feel" if you will.  
3. Put your rating on the similarity sheet and then do the second rating sheet, etc... 
4. In this fashion you’ll compare each story to the next one.  
 
 
Finally, if you have any questions or problems, please call or email. Most people have at 
least a few questions about rating or categories and the more questions that you ask, the 
better your ratings will be. Please don’t hesitate to ask. 
 
Thank you so much for helping with our research project. You are an invaluable resource. 
  311 
Appendix I: Sample Narratives from Lesion Subjects 
 
Participant with developmental frontal lobe damage:  
My sophomore year of high school was my sister's sophomore year of college. At the 
time, her boyfriend and I were really good friends. My sister got very jealous of that and 
she wanted me to quit emailing him and quit talking to him. I didn't care what she 
wanted, so I didn't stop. That was hurtful to her. Eventually I did stop talking to him but 
that’s not the point. 
 
Participant with frontal lobe damage: 
Last winter, my church started a clothing giveaway for people that don't have enough. 
About the same time, I went to the thrift store looking at things for my grandson. I saw a 
coat on the 50 cent rack and I thought, “Well, I'll take that for the church”. I told the lady 
who worked there that I was buying this for the church and she said, “Oh, would you take 
all these others?” So, I left with half a dozen bags of coats to take to the giveaway at my 
church, because they were coats that weren't selling at the thrift store. For a free 
giveaway, they were really nice looking coats. I got a variety of children's through men's 
coats. 
 
Participant with bilateral amygdala damage: 
The only time that I’ve ever lied was a long, long time ago. There was a lady I knew who 
was badly burned. She felt she was ugly and had a low self-esteem. She hated herself 
actually. I had to lie to this woman and I told her she was absolutely beautiful. She was 
badly scarred, but I told her she was beautiful. I wanted her to feel good about herself. I 
wanted to put a smile on her face, to boost her self-confidence. 
 
Participant with amnesia: 
I was dating this girl one time and one night I couldn't get a hold of her. I wanted to go to 
this concert, so I brought another girl to the event. I knew right away, that probably was 
not a good deal. The girls started talking to each other and it went downhill after that. I 
don't really want bad deals. 
 
Participant with temporal damage: 
I remember this one time when I was at a store and someone dropped some bills on the 
floor. I picked the money up to give it to them instead of keeping it myself. I don't even 
know what size bills they were. I know there's other people that would just walk off and 
take money like that with them but I just wasn't raised that way. 
 
Normal participant from Iowa: 
For the last 5 years, I’ve been going with my church on a service project in Appalachia. 
The very first year was very life changing for me. I was going through marriage 
problems, which I didn't realize until I got home and I found that he'd moved out. It's just 
a small group of about 30 people from our church that go. We go down and do hard labor 
-- making homes safer, warmer and drier for people. They live in much more unfortunate 
circumstances than we live in, in our day to day life. It was very eye opening and gave 
me a new understanding of other people's teenagers. Each experience is different, and 
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each family is different, but I try to keep in touch with those families at least once or 
twice a year. It just makes you realize that their culture is totally different in Appalachia. 
They're so appreciative, though, and they have a strong faith just like you or I and that's 
been very inspiring to me.  
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Appendix J: Selection of Narratives from the Database 
 
Memory 5144 
 
This is a recollection that I have of about 47 years ago -- it is a time when I was more 
honest than I should have been, at least in terms of the way my father looked at it. My 
father was an executive in the hearing aid industry. He traveled back and forth between 
England and countries like Germany, Holland and Belgium, attending various trade fairs 
and marketing the goods of his particular company to German importers. One time he 
took my sister and me and my mother on a combination of business and pleasure trip to 
Germany. While he was there he bought himself some very expensive, state-of-the-art 
cameras. I remember when we came back to England, my father gave me a camera and 
gave my sister one. He told me very distinctly and clearly what to say to the customs 
officer if I was asked. If the customs officer said, “Do you have anything to declare, have 
you brought anything into the country?” I was supposed to take the camera that was 
around my neck and give it to the customs officer and say, “Here we brought this 
camera.” Meantime the second camera was very carefully hidden away where it was 
unlikely that they would find it. Well, the customs agent came to our car and asked for 
the declaration. My father looked at me and said, “Give him the camera.” Without batting 
an eyelid I piped up (in my rather squeaky high pitched voice of the time) to the customs 
officer and said, “Which one, Daddy? You've got two.” I got my father in quite a bit of 
trouble. He got fined some $400 for trying to bring something in the country that he 
shouldn't have done. While the customs officer praised me for my honesty, I was persona 
non grata with my dad for quite some time after that. I got punished for being honest and 
forthright. I guess at the time I felt that honesty was the best policy and I'm not certain 
why I disobeyed my dad; maybe I was intimidated by the authority of the uniforms at the 
customs office. 
 
 
Memory 5201 
 
I hate sneakers; I wear shoes at all times. I cannot stand sneakers. A friend of mine gave 
me twenty pairs of sneakers because he was buying some more, but I wear 12’s and these 
were 10’s. I passed downtown in my car from time to time and if I saw somebody who 
looked like he needed a pair of tennis shoes I would open my trunk and give him a pair. 
One particular man, one time, was standing in front of Church’s Chicken. He had some 
old shoes on and was walking on the back of them. I knew that was uncomfortable, 
because I had been in that position.  I said, “Would you like to have a pair of tennis 
shoes?” But I was in the wrong car; the car that had the tennis shoes was at the shop. I 
said, “If you wait here 5 minutes I’m going to go and get you a nice pair of tennis shoes. 
Just wait.” Normally if you catch a person in that position they are on drugs or 
something, but not this guy. It seemed like he had to be mentally ill. I think that is wrong 
of the government just to put all the mentally ill people on the street. They’re not all able 
to fend for themselves. Anyway, I came back with the tennis shoes. I thought that when I 
came back I would buy him a dinner or something. When I got back though, there was a 
lady who had already bought him a dinner. Some people will still help each other. So I 
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think he came up that day. He wound up getting a dinner and a new pair of tennis shoes. 
He threw his old ones in the trash and went walking down the road with his new shoes 
and his chicken. 
 
 
Memory 5257 
 
I lied once a job resume.  I put on there that I had this school background and I wanted to 
put as much information on skills as I could – more than I had.  I think I put that I knew 
Photoshop and you know, other computer skills.  I didn’t feel comfortable about it 
because I knew that if I were to get that job, they were gonna ask me to do whatever 
skills I listed.  After I thought about that, I decided just not lie about it and I fixed my 
resume.  I only put down the skills that I have.  I wanted to lie because I was applying for 
this particular job. I felt that maybe putting more skills, more abilities than I had, more 
experience, would give me a better chance at getting the job. I thought that it would look 
better on my resume.  After I decided not to lie and fixed it, I got the job anyway.  I 
turned out that I don’t have to lie.  I have pretty good experiences and skills and abilities 
and that should be enough. 
 
 
Memory 5489 
 
About two months ago I was in the grocery store and I was at the cash register. There was 
this elderly lady; she must have been maybe 75, 80, I don’t know how old.  She had just 
gotten her groceries and she left her wallet on the counter. I picked her wallet up and 
called her back, because I didn’t want her to forget it. I think that was an honest thing to 
do. 
 
 
Memory 5787 
 
I was seeing a man who was married. I wasn’t involved with anyone, so I think most 
people wouldn’t say that I was being unfaithful. I think the thing that would be 
considered unfaithful on my part, would be that I was doing a dreadful, unjust thing to his 
wife. Now that it has been done to me, I can really see what a terrible, terrible thing it 
was to do to his wife. I had fallen madly in love with this man when we were working 
together. We were working and traveling together and it just happened. That’s no excuse; 
it doesn’t make it right, because it wasn’t right. I was unfaithful to a relationship between 
another man and woman. I try to be honest and faithful. I don’t want to sound like a 
Pollyanna, but that’s how I am. Maybe I’m square but that’s how I live my life. It comes 
back to my beliefs in a universal law -- the way we treat people, it’s going to come back 
on the other end. If we do something wrong it’s going to come back and we may pay 
really dearly. If we do right, god willing, it will come back to us, so I try to be faithful 
and go forward with my life in that way. 
 
 
  315 
Memory 5894 
 
When my mother passed away, oh it’s been seven, eight years ago now, I had to wrap up 
her affairs. In doing so, I learned that she was supporting an African child through the 
Christian Children’s fund.  I hadn’t known about that and I didn’t know anything about 
that particular charity. As I read the materials that she had there, I learned that she had 
been making a contribution of twenty five dollars a month that was going a long way to 
supporting this child, and feeding them and providing them with livestock and those 
kinds of things. The money really made a difference in the lifestyle and life of that family 
that that child was part of. As I thought about the fact that my mother was no longer with 
us, I realized that my mother would no longer being making those contributions to that 
charity and that child. It seemed like it was not right that just because my mother was no 
longer there to carry on that vision that she had for helping those people, that that work 
wouldn’t be done and that that sense of giving and caring would somehow disappear.  I 
found my heart going out to the child that my mother had been supporting and to that 
whole mission. As a result, I did something I hadn’t even considered doing up until that 
point -- I signed up to support a child of my own, one who was assigned to me. I make 
regular, monthly contributions to this child through this charity so that she has clothes 
and food and livestock and her family and she are not at risk.  That’s something that 
really makes me feel compassionate. 
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